TOWARDS AN INTERSECTIONAL FEMINIST DEVELOPMENT POLICY FOR GERMANY

A collaborative report

IMPRESSUM

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ACRONYMS

BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
COP	Conference of Parties
CSE	Comprehensive sexuality education
CSO	Civil society organisation
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DAC	Development assistance committee
EU	European Union
FFP	Feminist Foreign Policy
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FIAP	(Canadian) Feminist International Assistance Policy
GAGGA	Global Alliance for Green & Gender Action
GBV	Gender-based violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
GMOs	Genetically modified organisms
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HIV	Human immunodeficiency viruses
HPV	Human papillomavirus
IDPs	Internally displaced persons
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGOs	International non-governmental organisations
LGBTQI+	Lesbian, gay, bi, trans, queer, intersex, plus
LMICs	Low and middle-income countries
MAPA	Most Affected People and Areas
MEAL	Monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning (approach)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RFPs	Request for Proposals
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SRHR	Sexual and reproductive health rights
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US	United States
WEE	Women's economic empowerment
WPS	Women, Peace, and Security (Agenda)
WROs	Women's rights organisations
WVL	Women's Voice and Leadership Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the development of Germany's Feminist Development Policy Strategy, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) conducted a consultative process which included online consultations, a high-level conference, and civil society dialogues. While the broadest consultative process by the German government to date, the BMZ process had limitations in terms of Global South participation and language accessibility. To complement the official BMZ-led process, the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy (CFFP) initiated a comprehensive co-creation process involving diverse feminist civil society organisations from the Global South, Germany, and other Global North countries. Guided by position papers from various perspectives, desk research, and interviews, the CFFP feminist convenings process involved over 100 feminists from diverse backgrounds, spanned over 25 countries, provided compensation to small and Global South organisations, and incorporated intersectional perspectives. The process consisted of in-person and online convenings held in multiple languages, ensuring broad accessibility. This report is a summary of the rich discussions and recommendations of feminists. It aims to influence policymakers and initiate action in shaping Germany's Feminist Development Policy. This report opens by discussing five action areas in chapter 1, which serve as comprehensive guidelines for immediate transformative action across policy areas. The second chapter discusses feminist reflections in six thematic areas: economic justice, climate justice, food sovereignty and agriculture, sexual and reproductive health and rights, protecting minority rights, and education.

Action Area 1: Centre local expertise and authentically co-create policies

Germany's feminist development policy must recognise the work of feminist and queer grassroots organisations, challenge paternalistic structures, and engage in fair and equal knowledge exchanges. Beyond recognition, it should fund, support, and work with local feminist experts in the co-design and co-leadership of development programmes, ensuring their equal participation and avoiding doing harm in all projects. In practice, this means to examine partnership agreements, procedures, and training approaches to establish fair and authentic partnerships, involving partners from the project's start and promoting local decision-making power.

Acknowledging the expertise of grassroots feminist and LGBTQI+ organisations in working with marginalised groups and addressing intersectional challenges helps development institutions to understand tensions and complexities within communities. Prioritising long-term social change projects and empowering feminist movements to determine priorities in their own contexts is a critical step to address structural inequalities.

Action Area 2: Re-evaluate partnerships through a feminist lens and meaningfully shift power

It is important to re-evaluate existing implementation partnerships from a feminist perspective and form new partnerships with actors committed to feminist values and principles. Power must be shifted in practice, not just in words, to challenge hierarchies and promote inclusive decision-making processes. Embracing decolonisation and a reparative approach, Germany needs to reflect on its colonial history, engage in multilateral conversations on decolonisation, and address the power dynamics within its implementing agencies. Transparency and accountability frameworks should be established to vet partners' adherence to feminist principles and non-discrimination values. Risk management models and accountability mechanisms need to be revised to ensure funding does not support organisations with anti-LGBTQI+ and non-feminist principles, as seen in the case of Uganda and Ghana. Current partnership models often exclude smaller, politically marginalised, and youth-led organisations. Local feminist and LGBTQI+ organisations should be given more opportunities for meaningful engagement and decision-making, with a particular focus on South-South and triangular cooperation.[1]

Action Area 3: Reform funding and develop feminist monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning frameworks

Ensuring that as much funding as possible goes directly to grassroots feminist movements has been shown to be the most effective approach to tackling gender inequality. Yet, funding mechanisms often create barriers for smaller grassroots organisations from the Global South. At the same time funding decisions reflect geopolitical currents while

gender equality is often compromised when new crises emerge. Germany should focus on providing more core, flexible, and stable funding. Reporting and monitoring processes need to be more inclusive, contextually relevant, and grounded in grassroots perspectives, to reduce administrative burdens and foster trust. Improving accountability can be achieved through engaging in conversational reporting, shifting the focus towards participatory appraisal and evaluation, recognising, and respecting local expertise in the process. By implementing these recommendations, Germany can make significant strides in supporting feminist movements and advancing gender equality.

Action Area 4: Promote grounded digital solutions

Furthermore, the potential and risks associated with digitalisation technologies must be considered. Localising digitalisation efforts and ensuring they are not extractive is vital. Technological solutions for the climate crisis should be context-relevant and prioritise investment in adaptation measures. Additionally, it is important to acknowledge and address the gender and other biases inherent in many technological solutions to prevent harm to women and other marginalised populations. Exploring the opportunities and risks of technology and digitalisation in education is also essential.

Action Area 5: Transform the internal working of development institutions and engage in high-level political work domestically and internationally

German development institutions need to undergo internal changes to effectively implement feminist development policy. To ensure that the implementation of a feminist development policy is everyone's responsibility, rather than just a few focal

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[1] *Triangular cooperation refers to the building on the strengths of different partners (e.g. government, civil society, multilateral institutions) to find effective solutions to problems.*

points or champions, Germany must evaluate obstacles, build intersectional feminist working cultures, and diversify staff to understand global contexts. It is also critical to recognise Germany's colonial history and address biases in standards and procedures that perpetuate exclusion and discrimination. German institutions should rectify pay disparities between local and German/European staff by implementing equal pay scales, prioritising local feminist leadership, and affirmative action across government and implementing agencies. Internationally, Germany should utilise its position in multilateral spaces to advance feminist foreign and development policy. This includes amplifying feminist perspectives, supporting youth inclusion, and countering anti-gender movements by resourcing inclusive civil society and tracking anti-gender financial flows. Domestically, inter-ministerial coordination is necessary to ensure a coherent feminist development policy. Alignment between feminist development and foreign policy is crucial, and policy incoherence in areas such as migration and trade must be resolved.

Thematic Reflection: Economic Justice

Shifting from economic empowerment to economic justice is a critical perspective shift to avoid perpetuating social and gender hierarchies which involves moving away from neoliberal thinking and focusing on transforming systems and structures of oppression. Historical macroeconomic interventions, such as structural adjustment programmes, have had a lasting impact on public services and debt in the Global South and a feminist development policy should recognise this, integrating restorative justice efforts into economic programming and prioritise gender transformative development projects and programs that address unfair market structures, tax systems, and exploitative labour conditions. Unpaid and underpaid care and domestic work, beyond early childhood care, should be firmly integrated into development cooperation to dismantle patriarchal systems and norms.

Thematic Reflection: Climate Justice

Global North governments, including Germany, need to live up to commitments to address the climate crisis as well as fulfil their climate financing commitments and improve transparency and monitoring of progress while adopting a decolonial approach, acknowledging Germany's historical emissions and responsibility, and shifting away from population control arguments. At the same time, climate justice must be inextricably linked to broader human rights protection, addressing issues like slow violence and the disproportionate impact of the climate crisis on marginalised groups. In particular, Southern farmers, Indigenous Peoples, and other politically marginalised groups must meaningfully participate in decision-making processes. The role of youth and Indigenous Peoples in doing essential climate adaptation work should be recognised, and their voices protected and amplified. Safety measures, legal support, and funding should be provided to protect climate activists and environmental defenders, particularly women, youth, and LGBTQI+ individuals who face disproportionate risks and violence.

Thematic Reflection: Food Sovereignty and Agriculture

A feminist development policy recognises that food sovereignty is a human right and sees food as a common good rather than just a commodity. It also prioritises cross-learning, funds farmer-led solutions and indigenous methods, involves smallholders in decision-making, co-develops technology with women farmers, and promotes transparency and accountability in the agri-food industry and global markets. In this vein, land rights should be seen as a restoration issue, with a focus on restoring the rights of women and LGBTQI+ communities to own capital and access land. Similarly, it recognises that seed sovereignty is crucial for food sovereignty, supporting the authority of indigenous farmers to decide what is best for their own agricultural practices. All agricultural development

policies should understand and address the root causes underlying gender and other inequalities, considering local knowledge and traditional methods, and involve gender focal points at the earliest stages of project development. Women's cooperatives and community organising offer excellent resources in this regard and should be supported.

Thematic Reflection: Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights

Sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) are underfunded and face attacks from anti-rights movements globally. A feminist development policy takes a comprehensive approach to SRHR, including engaging with grassroots feminist and LGBTQI+ networks to promote intersectionality, protect rights, and counter anti-gender campaigns. A culturally specific and grounded SRHR promotion programme considers local legal contexts, avoids Eurocentric approaches, and involves community voices and counter-narratives. To achieve this, a feminist development policy must first understand context-specific barriers to access and resource grassroots work already being done.

Thematic Reflection: Protecting Minority Rights

A feminist development policy recognises that grassroots feminist and queer organisations are connected in cross-cutting networks and community organising and already working intersectionally and should thus involve these actors as full partners in protecting human rights. This means creating safe spaces for meaningful co-creation of policies and supporting locally-driven

research. To ensure programming on minority rights leads to long-term change, a feminist development policy must include the most marginalised such as trans organisations and sex worker organisations in strategy and project planning, collaborate with embassies and local LGBTQI+ groups to develop action plans for LGBTQI+ protection, support community-led research and decolonial analyses to counter anti-gender narratives. Finally, a feminist development policy should reframe its understanding of impact in project logic, provide safe spaces for politically marginalized groups to fail and re-strategise, and consider context-specific visibility requirements.

Thematic Reflection: Education

A feminist approach to education policy in Germany should centre local perspectives, address broader needs and barriers to education, and prioritise consultation with marginalised populations. This would lead to grassroots feminist organisations being recognised and supported in providing comprehensive sexuality education and community education, filling gaps left by government policy. Indigenous ways of knowing should be valued and supported in education programming, with a specific focus on funding for preserving indigenous knowledge and mental health programmes.

NB: The recommendations presented in this report are not a panacea. In aiming to supplement and support the policy development of the BMZ and other development actors, they seek to provide a set of minimum standards and necessary conditions for a feminist approach to development across key policy areas.

INTRODUCTION

In late 2021, Germany's Federal Foreign Ministry made a significant announcement regarding its intention to adopt a Feminist Foreign Policy. Shortly after, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) revealed plans to develop a Feminist Development Policy, further expanding Germany's range of feminist foreign policy instruments. It is commendable that both Germany's Feminist Foreign Policy and Feminist Development Policy are being rolled out concurrently, alongside the development of Germany's first National Security Strategy. This development is significant considering that the promotion of gender equality and the eradication of global inequalities are often treated as optional additions, rather than fundamental prerequisites for peace, security, and prosperity worldwide.

Presenting the Feminist Development Policy Strategy on 1 March 2023, Federal Minister Svenja Schulze argued that the BMZ wants to change perspectives on how development policy is done and redesign Germany's institutions that implement it, moving beyond the approach where "support for women and girls has mostly happened within the existing, often patriarchal social structures" (BMZ 2023d). These efforts are guided by the 3Rs – rights, resources, and representation. In practice, the BMZ has set itself the goal of new project funding to promote gender equality as a significant objective exceeding 85% of total official development assistance (ODA) funding by 2025 and doubling the proportion of project funding where gender equality is a principal objective from 4% to 8% of ODA by 2025. Germany is one of the largest donor countries for official development assistance globally. However, currently only a small percentage (2%) of Germany's ODA has gender equality as its principal objective, while 45% falls under the 'significant' category according to the development assistance committee (DAC) gender equality policy marker (Donor Tracker 2023). In contrast, countries with a Feminist International Assistance Policy, such as Canada, allocate more than 90% of their ODA to significantly contribute to gender equality (Donor Tracker 2023a). Moreover, the BMZ has committed to ensuring that more than 50% of the leadership positions in the BMZ are being held by women and promoting the principles of a feminist development policy in multilateral spaces.

Before the federal election in 2021, CFFP argued that a feminist approach to development cooperation must prioritise intersectional equality and justice (income, gender, and racial) over focusing on poverty reduction through economic growth, allocating substantial financial resources to achieve these goals. A feminist approach must support and work with feminist civil society, particularly in Low and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) and further acknowledge that development aid is a colonial structure, working towards decolonising this policy area. The Strategy presented by the BMZ align closely with the principles advocated for in our Manifesto (CFFP 2021), including important commitments to dismantling patriarchal and

colonial structures in international cooperation, as well as an understanding of intersectionality and the need to counter the transnational anti-gender movement.[2]

As part of the process of formulating the Strategy, the BMZ has undertaken several consultative initiatives. These included online consultations involving 400 participants from diverse backgrounds, encompassing both Global South and Global North perspectives; a high-level conference attended by approximately 100 stakeholders from the Global South and North; and a series of civil society dialogues conducted exclusively in Germany. While laudable, this process was lacking in two key ways: firstly, there was insufficient focus on participants from the Global South, with excessive participation of German civil society organisations (CSOs). Secondly, in-person consultations were only held in Germany in English or German, and participating civil society was not compensated for their time, effectively excluding many grassroots actors who operate in survival mode without funding (BMZ 2023e).

Between February and May 2023, CFFP organised a comprehensive co-creation process within the framework of its 'Towards a Feminist International Cooperation Policy for Germany' project. Meant to complement and support the official elaboration process by the BMZ, this initiative involved feminist civil society organisations from the Global South, Germany, and other Global North countries, aiming to gather diverse perspectives and shape a comprehensive Feminist International Cooperation Policy for Germany. Position papers, influenced by civil society perspectives and insights from

feminists in Côte d'Ivoire, India, Yemen, Syria, Ukraine, Iraq, Colombia, and Mexico, were instrumental in guiding the desk research and interviews and establishing the foundational framework for global feminism and envisioning German international cooperation.

The methodological approach encompassed several key elements. Firstly, it involved the active participation of over 100 feminists[3] from various backgrounds, spanning more than 25 countries, ensuring diverse global representation. To ensure equitable involvement, small and global south organisations were compensated for their time. The outreach list was compiled using a perspective matrix, aiming to incorporate as many viewpoints as possible. As a result, the consulted group comprises diverse perspectives, including those of Black, Brown, disabled, LGBTQI+, young, rural, and grassroots feminists. The process consisted of four convenings, including two held in a hybrid format, taking place in New York and Nairobi, and two online. To facilitate effective communication and engagement, interpretation was made available in French, Spanish, Arabic, and Swahili. Furthermore, to accommodate asynchronous participation, digital tools such as surveys were utilised, enabling participants to contribute at their convenience. This approach helped ensure broad accessibility and inclusivity.

This report has a strong emphasis on Africa, which is warranted due to the BMZ's specific Africa-focused strategy, in contrast to the lacking parallel strategies in other regions. This focus is also justified by Germany's historical colonial presence predominantly in Africa and is representative of the

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[2] See Denkovski et al 2021.

[3] The term 'feminists' refers to the feminists who were consulted for this study. Most of these individuals are based in the Global South, with a strong representation of feminists from the Global Majority. The term Global Majority refers to people who are not considered, or do not consider themselves to be white, i.e. able to access white privilege.

significant participation of African feminist organisations in the four convenings (the breakdown can be found in the Annex).

This report is envisioned as a vital tool for influencing policymakers, particularly in shaping the articulation, integration, and practical implementation of Germany's Feminist Development Policy. It aims to extend beyond being merely a listening document by actively initiating action.

It calls for an overhaul of outdated and unsuitable mechanisms, encourages creative collaboration, and advocates for bold transformations to achieve substantial advancements in gender equality. It is essential to address and recognise major structural shortcomings, as well as departures from common understandings of feminism, Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP), and the lessons learned over the past 30 years. The experiences of Global South feminists with development agencies, which encompass the GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH) and other large international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), provide valuable insights and lessons for consideration. For instance, the BMZ Strategy has a strong emphasis on gender mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming, which has been deemed ineffective since the 1995 Beijing Conference due to how it leaves insufficient space for intersectional thinking, has given way to new narratives that prioritise feminist movements and leadership development (OPEV 2011; Lombardo & Mergaert 2013; Jones & Shinners 2020). The objective must shift from mainstreaming to providing financial support to feminist activists in the Global South who are dedicated to dismantling the patriarchal norms that underpin social inequality.

Throughout the four convenings and desk research, as well as the background research conducted in Côte d'Ivoire, Kosovo, Ukraine, Colombia, India, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, several cross-cutting themes have emerged. These themes reflect the extensive experience of feminists in various roles,

including project implementers, managers, high-level policy advocates, educators, and supporters of feminist and LGBTQI+ networks.

Feminist development policy requires significant changes in implementation approaches to align with feminist principles and address the current challenges faced by feminists working with donors and implementing agencies. The paper opens by discussing five action areas in chapter 1, which serve as comprehensive guidelines for immediate transformative action and frame the subsequent thematic areas: a) centring local expertise and authentically co-creating policies, b) (re)examining existing partnerships through a feminist lens and meaningfully shifting power, c) reforming funding and developing feminist monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning, d) digitalisation and technology, and e) transforming the internal working of development institutions and engaging in high-level political work domestically and internationally.

The second chapter discusses how participants view the current state of play in specific thematic areas: economic justice, climate justice, food sovereignty and agriculture, sexual and reproductive health and rights, protecting minority rights, and education. They offer concrete recommendations for improvements and more sustainable impact. The critical feedback, minimum standards, and recommendations reflect deep frustrations with the existing rigidity of German development institutions which, if unchanged, run counter to feminist principles and approaches to partnerships, programming, strategic leadership, and policy implementation.

The responsibility for this transformation lies with the BMZ and implementing agencies such as the GIZ to go beyond mere 'awareness raising' among their staff on feminist development policy and feminist theory. Instead, they must enforce, measure, and demand drastic changes in policies and procedures.

Firstly, a culture change: recognising the problematic assumptions of expertise, professionalism, and knowledge residing predominantly in the Global North, participants acknowledged that programme implementation conversations often take the form of one-way knowledge transfer, with German technocrats acting as the sole educators for Southern 'local implementers'. Despite rhetoric emphasising respectful dialogues between Germany and Global South countries, the experiences of participants and local implementing partners working with Germany as a donor reveal instances of mistreatment and burdensome paternalism.

Secondly, structure: current organisational norms, such as requirements for local partners to exist for three or more years, systematically exclude youth, unregistered, migrant workers', sex workers', grassroots, and local LGBTQI+ organisations from eligibility. Complex Requests for Proposals (RFPs) create barriers for most feminist organisations, particularly those led by the Global Majority, limiting the essential local expertise necessary for a

decolonial and localised feminist development policy to be relevant and genuine. Traditional practices in the development sector, such as lengthy application processes, onerous partnership grant agreements, and reporting obligations, are rapidly evolving and should be replaced by more flexible approaches.

Thirdly, ceding space: donors must grasp the tensions and complexities within and between communities, which are often invisible without the expertise of grassroots feminists or those knowledgeable about the experiences of marginalised groups. These actors routinely work with the most marginalised populations in society.

Overall, a feminist development policy requires concrete actions to bridge the gap between theory and practice, challenging existing power dynamics, and promoting genuine partnerships with local organisations and experts. This paper seeks to offer support to the BMZ (and other development ministries) in developing and realising these actions.

1. OVERARCHING ACTION AREAS FOR A FEMINIST DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Intersectional feminist approaches have been largely modelled, driven, and led by Southern feminist organisations, feminist funders and feminist, disability, youth, LGBTQI+, and Indigenous movements for decades. This first chapter explores what feminist ways of working and implementation approaches must look like, in contrasting this with current lived experiences of feminists working with donors and implementing agencies, including Germany, as shared by more than 100 convening participants. The recommendations from predominantly Southern feminists consulted for this report offer clear pathways and solutions for better, fairer, and more feminist approaches to German development cooperation. The following five headings represent overarching action areas for immediate transformation and reform needed to ensure a meaningfully feminist development policy in both word and deed.

Action Area 1. Centre local expertise and authentically co-create policies

To foster meaningful progress towards gender equality and social justice, a Feminist Development Policy must adopt a comprehensive approach that centres local expertise and acknowledges the vital contributions of feminist and queer grassroots organisations. By recognising and resourcing the critical ongoing work, a foundation is established for transformative change. However, this transformative agenda cannot stop at recognition alone; it must extend to challenging and dismantling existing paternalistic structures and approaches that have traditionally dominated engagement with local partners. By examining how feminist development policies can effectively translate into the transformation of these power dynamics, a feminist development policy can authentically co-create sustainable positive change.

Recognise critical ongoing work by feminist and queer grassroots organisations

"It's about inclusion, we know that feminist and feminist organisations are experts in knowing what's wrong, and knowing how they can fix things, so they should be at [the] forefront." [4]

Participants explained that it is important to note the contrast between high-level rhetoric on eye-level partnership with Global South countries and the experience of local partners in practice. Built on decades of problematic assumptions placing expertise, professionalism, and know-how in the Global North, participants acknowledged that conversations around programme implementation are often construed as one-way knowledge transfer from German technocrats to Southern implementers. The notion of capacity building rests on the assumption that Southern actors either fully or largely lack capacities which fosters paternalistic and neo-colonial behaviour (Littles 2022; Beart 2022; Lentfer 2018). These approaches typically fail to acknowledge the expertise of Southern actors as well as the often un- or underpaid work they do to provide contextualised education and training of Northern actors in Southern countries. At the granular project level, shifting this dynamic means that interactions are conceptualised and undertaken as fair and equal knowledge exchanges – capacity sharing.[5]

Grassroots feminist and queer organisations have been doing essential cross-movement work and possess a deep knowledge of the local context and societal dynamics. These highly nuanced and complex interactions, between and across communities, must be recognised by donors who aim to target development programmes in intersectional ways, and should not do so by reinventing the wheel. Rather, by speaking with and prioritising local queer, disabled, and young feminist experts, donors are recognising that these groups already do much of the foundational community organising and mobilising between politically marginalised groups.[6] This approach also leads to less likelihood of doing harm or reputational damage which can be flagged by local feminists. These risks are particularly notable when deploying one-size fits all projects. For example, in women's economic empowerment projects, which avoid addressing structural patriarchal norms such as conflict over household roles, social permissibility of male violence, and differing identities such as rurality or Indigeneity, amongst other factors, were found to run the risk of increased domestic violence due to women's participation in these projects

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[4] *Participant, Convening 1.*

[5] *We intentionally use the term 'capacity sharing' instead of 'capacity building'. Capacity building has been widely criticised as connoting a lack of capacity, predominantly aimed at Global South or 'local partners'. Rather capacity sharing suggests a fairer learning process, that donors and INGOs also need to embark upon, sharing and learning together with partner organisations. For further discussion see page 64 in Oxfam's Inclusive Language Guide: https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/621487/gd-inclusive-language-guide-130323-en.pdf?sequence=4*

[6] *We use the term 'politically marginalised' instead of 'marginalised', 'minority' or 'vulnerable groups' to note that these group are only marginalised by virtue of politically condoned discrimination and reinforcement of patriarchal socio-cultural norms, which push them to the margins of society.*

(Hughes et al. 2015). Without a concerted focus on locally led development interventions, centred and built upon local expertise, a feminist development policy will not be successful. In one example on policy planning, participants called for Germany to avoid positioning itself as a leader on tackling the climate crisis, and rather learn from work being done for decades by Global South women's rights organisations on climate justice, across many intersections, including Indigenous rights in the Congo and conservation and peacebuilding in Uganda among many other cases (Resurrección et al., 2019). At the programming level, participants shared how following the earthquake in Syria in February 2023, donor governments largely failed to immediately recognise and resource the essential rapid response and re-building

work feminists were already doing, offering indispensable rapid gender analyses which are able to ground a more feminist humanitarian response. For example, Syrian women's rights organisations (WROs) had mapped the needs of breastfeeding, pregnant, or menstruating women and persons, often some of the most overlooked and highest risk groups in terms of sexual exploitation or gender-based violence (GBV) during times of crisis response. It was noted that Germany routinely overlooks meaningfully engaging with women and feminists most affected, beyond one-off or mandated consultations and speaking invitations, especially in crisis or post-crisis zones such as, but not limited to, Syria and the Balkans (Macheke and Michaeli 2023; Zilla 2023).

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

➡ Fund, support, and work with local feminist experts as equal partners in co-designing, co-leading and adapting government-funded development programmes to ensure do-no harm in all projects.

➡ Recognise there is no blanket progressive practice in international development, especially considering rising authoritarianism, shrinking civic spaces, and restricted democratic freedoms. Be guided by local feminist movements to understand locally relevant practices of inclusivity.

➡ Understand the tensions and complexities between and within communities, often indiscernible without grassroots feminist or LGBTQI+ expertise, who routinely work with those groups most at the margins of society.

➡ Channel civic space funding to feminist movement leadership-building and organising, and support them in determining feminist priorities in their own contexts as well as to work on long-term social change projects rather than simply addressing the symptoms of inequality.

➡ Develop internal accountability measures and indicators to ensure that this principle is upheld across all levels of German development policy making and implementation.

Ensure authentic co-creation of policies and programmes by transforming paternalistic ways of engaging with local partners

In contrast to rhetoric on eye-level cooperation, participants who have previous experience of working with Germany as a donor often report being poorly treated and overburdened in paternalistic ways. Across the four convenings, there was a collective understanding and resignation amongst participants that:

"German money is difficult (...) given, for example, hyper-unrealistic demands of providing food receipts for events in a war zone, translating all documentation from English to German, and broadly questioning the legitimacy and management skills of well-regarded and established feminists in executive leadership roles" (Macheke and Michaeli 2023, p.9).

Given this reality, participants recommended a close examination of partnership grant agreements, standard operating procedures, and staff training approaches to understand where co-creation is missing as a central guiding principle. Participants reflected that in practice, the most fair and authentic partnerships which centre co-creation include partners from the start of a project, inviting them to contribute to the shaping of a project (rather than being inserted later into the process) and ensure that partners hold equal decision-making power. One participant shared a positive experience with the Korean development cooperation model, where only a general approach had been mapped out by the donor, and Southern policymakers and civil society actors could give feedback and develop their own plan and direction to fit into this wider model.

At present, highly Complex Requests for Proposals (RFPs) often shut out most feminist organisations, particularly Global Majority-led, severely curtailing the necessary local expertise required for a decolonial and localised feminist development policy to be relevant and genuine. What was once thought to be 'standard' in the development sector, i.e., expectation of lengthy applications, RFPs, onerous partnership grant agreements and reporting obligations, are being rapidly transformed, disappearing, and being replaced with new, more flexible precedents by feminist funds and some governments. Co-creation and local trust and buy-in will not happen without this type of bold transformation of processes and procedures. This is remedied if Germany looks to its peers' models, learning from for example, the Women's Voice and Leadership Programme, the flagship of the Canadian Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), which because of its successes was recently renewed for another five years and expanded from CAD $156 million to CAD $195 million (Global Affairs Canada 2023). Likewise, lessons in co-creation could also be learned from the Dutch-financed Leading from the South Fund, a consortium with women's rights organisations and feminist funders, which has now been scaled up to fund EUR 80 million over five years (Channel Foundation 2021; OECD 2022). Another method is illustrated by the Swedish case, whereby local embassies are activated to conduct mapping, regular outreach, and project development with local intersectional feminist movements (Concord Sweden 2023; Kvinna till Kvinna 2023).[7]

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[7] Refer to 1.3 and Annex 2 for an expanded discussion on funding and alternative models.

Participants who had been funded by Dutch and Canadian funding also shared the strength of development programmes that intentionally funded and included "linking and learning" components into their projects, for example in the VOICE grant facility (Voice Global 2021). "Linking and Learning" meant that, in practice, feminist project partners across an entire programme, region or focus area, were encouraged by donors to jointly shape their own learning agendas, share lessons learned, engage in capacity sharing, and generally strengthen their own networks as they saw fit. Donors embedded the linking and learning activities in the overall funded project activities and meaningfully incorporated them in project outcomes and goals. We will later touch on the efficacy of this approach as it relates to monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning (MEAL), and attempts to reformulate MEAL in a more feminist way.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

➜ Simplify and overhaul implementing agency partnership processes and guidelines, with a focus on limiting unnecessarily burdensome application processes, restrictive contract clauses, and outdated reporting requirements. For this, look to examples from Canada, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

➜ Activate embassies to engage in consultation and co-create contextually relevant projects with local feminists, including advocacy and campaigns that better adapt feminist development policy to local contexts.

➜ Hire local feminist technologists to use and improve what already exists in the ecosystem, focusing on building platforms with communities from local organisations better suited to the local context.

➜ Specifically support the (already ongoing) growth of African feminist technologist ecosystems, instead of importing digitalisation content developed by European and German technologists.

Action Area 2. (Re)examine partnerships through a feminist lens and meaningfully shift power

To address structural inequalities, a feminist development policy needs to critically examine existing implementation partnerships and re-evaluate them based on their alignment with feminist values and principles. This includes assessing the level of genuine commitment to intersectionally addressing gender and other forms of discrimination and actively seeking out new partnerships with actors who demonstrate a clear dedication to feminist ideals. It is equally important to shift power in practice, not just in words. The second section explores the imperative of translating feminist principles into tangible actions that redistribute power, challenge hierarchies, and foster inclusive decision-making processes. By examining the ways in which power can be reshaped on a practical level, a Feminist Development Policy can pave the way for a truly transformative development agenda that dismantles systems of oppression.

Examine existing implementation partnerships and develop new partnerships with actors demonstrating a clear commitment to feminist values and principles

"This narrative of working with non-feminist organisations...on addressing issues of feminism, does not sit well."[8]

In addition to co-creation as the foundation for partnerships, feminist participants advocated for new partnership creation to be part of meaningful partnership development. The BMZ's understanding of intersectionality is welcomed but also requires partnerships to demonstrate this commitment in practice. Feminist participants shared how uneven vetting mechanisms consistently shut out prospective smaller, highly politically marginalised and youth partners. Broadly, feminist participants also pinpointed risk management models as hugely counterproductive to building trusted intersectional partnerships. Additionally, questions were frequently raised around the accountability required from INGOs and Germany-based CSOs that were seen as trusted partners of GIZ or BMZ funding, which would come at the expense of newer smaller, Southern-led feminist and LGBTQI+ organisations. Participants particularly raised the issue of INGOs and Germany-based CSOs with no feminist principles nor categorical commitment to feminist thematic areas (e.g., SRHR, including access to abortion and gender-affirming healthcare, and LGBTQI+ rights), yet often responsible for managing significant portions of German-funded aid in the context of a Feminist Development Policy.

A lack of transparency and accountability frameworks on how partners are vetted on their adherence to fundamental values and principles of equality and non-discrimination can damage the trust and willingness local feminist and LGBTQI+ organisations have to co-create and work with German implementing agencies. Despite strong signaling in the BMZ Feminist Development Strategy to counter the anti-gender movement, a similar commitment is not evident within the BMZ Africa Strategy. This is especially worrying given the investigative report findings that Global North-funded projects (including German projects) supported anti-LGBTQI+ actors and advocacy activities in Ghana and Uganda (Provost 2023; CNN 2022). While official responses have been offered, in the case of German funding going to anti-LGBTQI+ activities in Uganda (CFFP 2023), compared to its peer's transparency on due diligence, partner codes of conduct and overall vetting requirements, the accountability mechanisms in place at the BMZ and GIZ level remain unclear. For example, a high-profile CNN investigation uncovered that Brot für die Welt, the German Protestant Church charity, spent over EUR 1 million to support individual Christian Council of Ghana members projects, an entity which had publicly stated as recently as 2020 that cultural norms and religious values in Ghana do not support LGBTQI+ rights (CNN 2022). These findings are enormously worrying given the work of these bodies and organisations in Ghana, which through the National Coalition for Proper Human Sexual Rights and Family Values, strongly advocated for anti-LGBTQI+ legislation (ibid). Notably, Brot für die Welt does not have a stated policy on LGBTQI+

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[8] *Participant, Convening 2.*
[9] *As of 11 May 2023, the Federal Foreign Office has also announced expanding support for NGOs working in Uganda in the LGBTQI+ sector but has not given specific details about the volume of funding increased. See: https://www. bundestag.de/presse/hib/kurzmeldungen-947686*

inclusion and protection. Given that the vast majority (76.9% in 2020) of German bilateral development funding goes through Germany-based CSOs (OECD 2022), the absence of accountability mechanisms and assurances that German development funding will not go to anti-LGBTQI+ organisations or activities, is alarming and warrants immediate rectification and changes to partnership vetting requirements. Considering this dissonance between policy and practice and the lack of publicly accessible reporting and monitoring around vetting requirements for GIZ and BMZ-funded partnerships, it was strongly recommended that the German government assess organisational capacity including a much stronger focus on adherence to feminist principles. For example, ensuring local, German, and INGO implementing partners have a basic knowledge of feminist principles and approaches, are intersectionally inclusive, and operate in line with the stated values of the development policy is critical.

Immediate re-routing of funding away from partners without clearly stated feminist values, which includes clear LGBTQI+ and abortion rights policies, must happen. Feminist participants reiterated that this is a moment for German feminist development policy to 'walk the talk' and push back the anti-gender movement in substantive and material ways. Moreover, across all its range of development funding instruments, participants argued that Germany has moral and financial obligations to ensure that do-no-harm principles apply equally to all groups, including the most politically marginalised.

Convening participants argued that local partners who are explicitly feminist, LGBTQI+, and sex worker-led organisations, understand the feminist landscape in their own communities, and are therefore the best placed to reach people most on the margins and to train and engage in capacity sharing with German entities abroad such as embassies, political foundations, and GIZ offices. In recent years, the phenomenon of one-and-done consultations has emerged

as the approach favoured by donors and implementing agencies, including Germany, to ensure a façade of intersectional representation. This superficial approach often results in correspondingly superficial impact that is not sustainable post project closure, particularly in conflict contexts or contexts where civic space is increasingly shrinking. Moreover, such superficial consultations often sound hollow and fail to close the accountability loop by not providing feedback on which recommendations collected from grassroots activists are being implemented, which not, and the reasons behind the decision. Participants strongly recommended that government and implementing partners pay closer attention to this, especially when making symbolically significant invitations for feminist inclusion, balancing this with an equal focus on substantive paid leadership and decision-making opportunities for local feminists.

In addition to the general overarching recommendation to "do inclusion better and more deeply" two specific challenges, key for German funders to directly address, were highlighted around new partnerships. Current organisational norms (e.g., local partner requirements around three or more years of existence), categorically eliminate eligibility for most youth, unregistered, migrant worker, sex worker, grassroots, and local LGBTQI+ organisations. Participants shared that they often heard donors and funding agencies justify this because of concerns over reputational or financial risk, or in terms of liability. However, participants in the convenings strongly disputed this, and encouraged a mindset shift: instead, viewing these organisations as huge assets as they are often able to shed bureaucracy that limits programmatic impact, have deep(er) community networks, and work across networks and between groups, rather than in thematic silos. By engaging and supporting these organisations, implementing partners also increase chances of building a broader evidence base for impact of their work, and stronger outreach. One feminist shared how by funding and encouraging pitches from

smaller organisations or new coalitions that move beyond the 'usual suspects', donors run the positive risk of seeing a broader impact, across different under-reached groups.

Engaging with new partners, and new Southern-led coalitions and grassroots feminist CSOs, is also critical to supporting youth engagement. Notably, the BMZ Africa Strategy mentions youth engagement frequently, in terms of promoting youth civil society engagement, and in its shared values around the importance and potential of youth engagement (BMZ 2023). Young feminists shared how they are heavily relied upon to do sensitisation work in communities, creating their own highly salient digital campaigns, and shifting narratives online, in communities, and in the streets. But they often do this essential work with the least resources and are excluded from decision-making spaces, resembling youth washing more than fair and meaningful partnership-building. In addition to their strong digital expertise and presence, youth activists explained how they often eschew thematic silos, for example, working across and amplifying connections between the climate crisis and period

poverty, making them powerful change agents. However, young feminists explained how due to donor judgement on the size and scale of their work and misplaced perceptions around lack of seriousness or an implied distrust (echoing the earlier point made around newer or unregistered organisations), they are often left un- or underfunded and unrecognised as serious changemakers. This is despite young feminists engaging in vast amounts of unpaid labour, which can come at a steep cost and potential detriment to their future education, employability, and ability to protect themselves from both economic shocks and costs related to their own safety. Young feminists, and participants representing other small and often systematically underrepresented groups, such as LGBTQI+, migrant, and refugee participants, unequivocally recommended that donors like Germany, need to work much more diligently and consistently across institutional units and departments, to repair and renew relationship-building efforts and build goodwill where onerous administrative burdens have often damaged their local reputation as a fair partner.[10]

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Remove organisational years of existence requirement, and instead replace it with a feminist values check.
→ Report regularly and timely, to local feminists consulted, on how their feedback will be used, how consultations reach across politically marginalised groups, and when feedback was not used, provide succinct and clear rationales on why it was not used, and how it will be used in the future.
→ Provide paid opportunities for deeper more meaningful youth engagement across projects and give Global South youth more decision-making power in partnerships to determine and adapt community projects.

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[10] *The murder of George Floyd, the resurgence of the Black Lives Matter movement, and corresponding mass public protests also impacted the aid sector. Decolonisation and racial justice became front-of-mind, within a sector rife with racism, white saviourhood, and built upon colonial administrative tendencies. See: https://www.opendemocracy. net/en/transformation/black-lives-matter-also-reckoning-foreign-aid-and-international-ngos/*

Shift power meaningfully, grounded in a decolonial and reparative approach

Within the development sector, particularly since 2020, more donors and large INGOs have been engaging in discourse around power shifting, as one manifestation of a commitment to localisation and decolonisation. Within the Convenings, several participants reflected on these pledges three years on, sharing their direct experiences with donors and INGOs. The prevailing view was that there remains the need to embrace and implement changes at every level of operations, re-thinking resourcing, structures, managerial expectations within and outside Germany, including more flexible timelines to counter widespread "urgency culture" prevalent in the development sector (Racial Equity Index 2021). Rather than planning for simple shifts in resources or locations such as simply moving an organisations headquarters to the Global South as an indicator of shifting power while existing power dynamics and hierarchies within operations remain unaddressed, participants advocated for better accountability, reporting, and reflection on efforts to operationalise these changes. In the case of Germany, these changes need to be rapidly and urgently mainstreamed and operationalised within the GIZ (and other implementing organisations) and expected of all Germany-based development CSOs, with clear, timely roadmaps to power and resource-sharing indicated in all strategic plans and demonstrated in project and programme theories of change.

As the feminist development strategy is translated from policy into programming, German development actors should reflect on how they have framed development cooperation broadly, and the impacts of that framing, intentionally inquiring how colonisation and colonial practices manifest in current development practices. Embracing discomfort, Germany must also lead by example in engaging in multilateral conversations on decolonisation and power, particularly given its central role in convening

the Berlin Conference in 1884/85 which spurred the 'Scramble for Africa', committing the first genocide of the 20th Century in (now) Namibia, and in light of its colonial history more broadly in Namibia, Cameroon, Togo, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Gabon, Congo, Central African Republic, Nigeria, Chad, Ghana, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, and the Federated States of Micronesia (Kohrt 2018).

Participants shared the problematic nature of German implementing agencies abroad, which almost always place Germans in senior positions, and limit the agency and autonomy of local staff, particularly those lower in the hierarchy, spots often occupied by young women or LGBTQI+ persons. For example, in Africa, almost all German political foundation offices have executive leadership and board chairs that are German, barring one example shared where there was temporarily an African Executive Director in Mali. Further illustrating persisting colonial practices, convening participants pointed to the imposition of German organisational norms, particularly German hierarchical and bureaucratic systems, on local aid organisations. This has resulted in problematic copy and paste solutions like past projects which funded German style job-seeking centres ill-fitted for local contexts in Ghana, Tunisia, and Nigeria, or imposing norms around bookkeeping and receipt issuance that are simply ill-suited for many dynamic or cash-based development contexts (Macheke and Michaeli 2023; Naceur n.d.; Serra Mingot and Rudolf 2020).

Participants shared how colonial assumptions around legitimacy and validity of knowledge (especially knowledge on anti-racism and decolonisation in development) manifest themselves, for example, within ministries, large INGOs, and implementing partners in the Global North, racialised women are often asked to provide facts and 'evidence' of colonial practices, most often with no

follow-up. This illustrates the critical need for German implementing partners and government institutions to allocate more resources to research, funding, dialogue, and training on decolonising development, and centralise these conversations across their staff structures as part and parcel of major strategic goals and transformation across all departments rather than leaving the burden to people belonging to already marginalised groups to undertake education efforts.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Track where resources are being shared with local and Southern-led organisations, how much and at what rate these changes are being implemented internally (GIZ and BMZ).

→ Produce transparent evaluations and reflections, in multiple languages, demonstrating the effects of resource sharing changes in terms of equitable resource re(distribution), and how much decision-making and strategic leadership is co-held by Southern feminist partners.

→ Strongly encourage and collaborate with political foundations to review their Foundations Constitutions as part of implementing a Feminist Development Policy and allow Executive Directors and other leadership positions to be recruited from at least the continent, ideally the region of representation.

→ Pilot action-research initiatives in collaboration with the German Ministry for Education focused on anti-colonial scholarship, particularly from former German colonies, that bridge anti-colonial research and provide practical pathways for development cooperation projects.

→ Prioritise South-South and triangular cooperation initiatives as centres for innovation and create space for feminist civil society in these initiatives.

Action Area 3. Reform funding and develop feminist monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning (MEAL) frameworks

"To say that German funding is a systemic culture of micro-managing, throughout the entire project is an understatement." [11]

Across the four feminist convenings, desk research, findings from other feminist civil society clusters globally, including those in countries with a current or previous Feminist Foreign Policy or Feminist Development Policy like Sweden and Canada, funding feminist movements was identified as the lynchpin of enabling a truly feminist development policy. Germany, as the largest ODA donor by volume can make a significant difference

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[11]*Participant, Convening 1.*

and lead by example by transforming its approach to funding, and how it is prioritised and channelled. Despite being a large ODA donor, between 2014-2020, only 0.4% of Germany's overall gender-focused aid went to women's equality organisations and institutions (ICRW 2022). The following recommendations clearly illustrate how direct, flexible, simplified, and transparent funding norms and mechanisms are both attainable and essential to transform Germany's development cooperation to be more respectful, more fit for purpose, more decolonial, and more inclusive.

Simplify funding, making it more accessible, transparent, and reliable with an emphasis on core and flexible funding

The most impactful way to sustainably address gender equality, is to fund, with the least amount of restriction possible, youth and feminist organisations to scale up and keep doing the work they are already doing and support them in building strong feminist networks. The most effective way to do this is for gender equality and broader aid funding to go directly to feminist organisations, demonstrating donor trust in feminist organisations to best know the most pressing gender and structural inequality issues in their context (Mama Cash 2022). Participants gave numerous examples that demonstrated clearly how extremely strict and rigid project and funding plans cannot be effectively applied in different contexts, especially in conflict settings.

Germany should explore all potential pathways to enable direct and flexible funding, learning from the Canadian, Swedish, or Dutch examples, as well as feminist funders and large philanthropic actors, and hybridising and contextualising these models as needed (Engagement Global, n.d.). One relatively easy pathway is for gender equality funding to be channelled to larger Southern led (non-INGO) regional organisations who know the local contexts and can act as a trusted intermediary actor. Action Area 1 highlights that INGO's without clear feminist principles are often not best placed to manage and implement a feminist development policy, even if they have a Southern presence. Instead, Southern-led regional and local feminist organisations (such as the Centre for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW), the African Women's

Development and Communications Network (FEMNET), and WeArePurposeful which already subgrant to feminist organisations) can guide Germany towards localisation of aid – essential transformative work that the rest of the development sector is moving towards. Rapid, direct, and flexible funding to Southern feminist organisations would also better initiate intergenerational and intersectional conversations between donors and Southern grantees, building the necessary networks and rapport, and create space for compensated intersectional guidance needed by donor governments implementing a Feminist Development Policy. Annex II offers three case studies which feminist participants specifically praised as being exemplary of more feminist funding mechanisms which at least partially address the gaps and shortcomings of development funding explored in this report: Canada, the Netherlands, and feminist funds.

Participants, many of whom represented small, informal, youth, unregistered and/or grassroots feminist organisations, uniformly reported how funding from many donors, including Germany, applies restrictive funding mechanisms which end up selecting the same organisations to consistently receive funds. Though they are experts in working with oppressed groups, have deep knowledge of intersectional feminism, and know how to work safely in challenging contexts, they face many barriers to access development funding. On the one hand they may not be familiar with the complex application systems of big donors, or when they are, they lack the resources (money,

application language proficiency or time to invest in unduly bureaucratic processes). As a result, they are rarely successful in months-long, multi-month funding processes.

Moreover, participants highlighted how new, or community organisations often face a 'catch 22' because they can only be seen as trustworthy to receive funds if they already received funding. Young feminists underlined that they often do not possess the same social and political capital and access to networks that older, more established feminist organisations have, which can further complicate funding processes making them off-limits to such groups.

In contrast, participants expressed frustration with how funders often give unwarranted trust to more bureaucratically established organisations which may work in the mainstream, but often do not work with (or work against) people in informal settlements, drug users, sex workers, and/or LGBTQI+ communities, undermining their intersectional credibility. This problem is further exacerbated when these larger, predominantly Northern or Northern-funded organisations provide no transparency on their feminist values, particularly on guaranteeing that their funding does not go to anti-trans, anti-sex worker, anti-abortion, and broadly anti-gender movements, advocacy, and activities (see Action Area 2). What is needed is for donors to engage in deeper introspection to understand their own role as grant makers and proposal reviewers who control the processes and set the pre-requisites.

Participants highlighted the impact of geopolitics on funding priorities and results in unpredictable fluctuations in funding, the most recent example being how Russia's war in Ukraine diverted significant funding from Africa, where ongoing humanitarian crises such as famine and drought in the Horn of Africa, war in Ethiopia and Sudan, climate crisis displacement in the Sahel, Central, and Southern Africa, are routinely underfunded and overlooked (Cilliers 2023; Mcallister 2022; Zhang and Reyes 2023). Thematically,

participants remarked that gender equality funding is often first on the chopping block when funding is needed elsewhere with examples of funds for tackling the climate crisis are generated through cuts in already underfunded areas like SRHR. This is not to argue that essential climate crisis funding should be reduced, but rather to call for cross-funding and linking thematic areas like SRHR and climate. In contrast, funding to massive private-sector led projects without clear feminist principles that may not be community-led, participatory and/or durable could be cut. Without routine monitoring and transparently addressing funding fluctuations and disparities, donors with feminist development policies will directly undermine their commitments to gender equality and decolonial approaches.

According to participant feedback and very limited publicly available information, there appears to be very little core funding that Germany provides. This needs to change. Germany can lead the way alongside peers like Canada and the Netherlands. When core funding is possible it is limited to 7-10% of overhead costs which does not facilitate strategic, long-term planning for under-resourced organisations. This fits into the general pattern of not paying or severely underpaying feminists for their expertise while simultaneously relying on their labour through time-consuming, multi-part, real time consultations, assumption of unpaid community organising, contextual mentoring and network-building on behalf of implementing agencies, INGO partners, or other non-local entities as just some examples. This is further exacerbated when it comes to youth organisations - participants shared how they faced expectations to volunteer or work for nominal sums as community champions doing essential work, even when they themselves come from informal settlements and/or face economic precarity. This approach only enables larger, more powerful, and resourced organisations (often INGOs or non-local organisations) to further legitimise and ground their work off the back of unpaid or underpaid young feminist labour.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Commission and publish segmented data on German ODA Gender Equality funding to answer the following questions: what is the percentage of money going to feminist organisations (led in Global North and led in Global South)? Of this money, what is going to non-INGOs? What percentage reaches non-INGOs led and based in the South? What percentage of Gender ODA funds is reaching LGBTQI+, Indigenous Peoples, Sex Worker, and/or disability justice organisations?

→ Report and require departmental level minimum percentages of budgets and funding reaching feminist organisations in Global South (and further breakdown by politically marginalised groups, e.g., LGBTQI+, disabled persons, Indigenous Peoples). Incentivise departmental targets that results in significant increases in proportion of budgets shifted to local feminist organisations.

→ Mandate and report quantitatively on how implementing agencies are funding and network-building with local Southern feminist organisations. Remove specific funding restrictions to allow for capacity sharing, mentorship, and accompaniment, to be fundable activities.

→ Translate funding calls to Swahili (as one major example) and other Indigenous languages as a way of making them accessible.

→ Eliminate requirements for local partners to provide documentation in German.

→ Introduce a requirement for INGOs to be in a consortium with Southern feminist grassroots and collectives and demonstrate how they are compensating them fairly.

→ Allocate resources for salaries, health insurance, and pension plans, in line with the rights afforded to Global North feminists.

→ Recognise the precarious operating conditions for feminist, LGBTQI+, and Indigenous organisations, and fund safety costs that are identified by them (also including budgeting for rapid/flash funding in conflict or rapidly shrinking civic spaces).

→ Better and more frequently engage in aid as reparations long-term dialogues, directly with grassroots actors and feminist organisations, including in Namibia and Burundi.

→ Provide flexible funding disbursement methods (or mandate a flexible approach with implementing agencies) that considers migration status and/or accessibility challenges to formal bank accounts and proposes simplified alternatives to receiving funding.

→ Redefine risk in financing, understanding that the risk of a feminist development policy failing is namely: a policy that makes no or negligible changes, at the expense of ignoring solutions, tailor-made for contexts which are often held by smaller or unregistered organisations.

→ Monitor and report on substantive cuts made to gender equality funding, especially regarding historically underfunded areas such as SRHR and environmental protection.

→ Remove thematic silos and thematically exclusive funding pots which punish innovative feminist organisations working interdisciplinarily and ignore cross-cutting gendered implications of most funded thematic areas.

Redefine how MEAL is being done, making it responsive and avoiding instrumentalisation

While reporting is often conflated with monitoring and evaluation, (bottom-up) accountability and learning are frequently neglected or tacked onto projects as add-ons. Given how historically monitoring, evaluation, and learning has been situated within neo-colonial approaches that focused on scrutinising native populations, over-documentation, and its newer iterations such as "results-based management", it is not surprising that feminists, LGBTQI+, youth, Indigenous Peoples, and disabled persons movements often feel their work falls outside the remit or is actively excluded by monitoring, evaluation, and learning (Azevedo and Colnar 2023; Corsetti 2022). But with more discussion about what a feminist MEAL could look like, it remains important that we understand where risks around co-optation lie and be receptive to what Southern and grassroots feminist would recommend.

Throughout the convenings there was scepticism about the crude wedging of feminist labels and categories onto MEAL, with one participant remarking that feminist perspectives are often being instrumentalised. Instead, they recommended that first and foremost, donors and implementing agencies conduct an honest stocktaking exercise on why past development MEAL practices have not worked and absorb the enormous body of research on this. And then, move away from said problematic indicators accordingly. Participants strongly advocated this process be undertaken through investing, testing and co-led by Southern partners, to ensure that the MEAL derived is inclusive of (bottom-up) accountability and learning, is contextually relevant and applicable, and is based on a system of participatory appraisal in evaluation.

> *"The donors come and go, but my community stays, those are the ones I will continue working with…When you go, I am left stranded and the people I used to work with I have either lost touch with or created a conflict (due to donor-imposed reporting burdens and demands)."*[12]

Participants who have a deep knowledge of working with German funders, as well as those who have seen more collaborative, productive, and respectful approaches from other donors, were equally clear that German MEAL, particularly reporting standards, must change. Most flagged that their experiences with entities like the GIZ, were riddled with heavy administrative burdens often so unnecessary and so ill-equipped that were likely irrelevant for their context. Yet said burdens were routinely foisted upon them, with the unequal power dynamic, often meaning that organisations had no choice but to comply or lose funding. As was earlier mentioned in our previously commissioned

paper from the Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID) (Macheke and Michaeli 2023), these heavy administrative burdens, presented with arguments of compliance, risk management, and/or monitoring and evaluation, strongarming Southern feminist organisations into unfair and exploitative agreements, with many participants noting this came with a high risk and likelihood of Germany destroying trust in local communities, and painting itself as an inflexible, untrustworthy, and unreliable partner in development. Specific examples of this were noted where donors focused on just quantitative impact, which has been well problematised across the sector as a poor

[12] *Participant, Convening 1.*

measure of social change and narrative shifts, and a limited bellwether for structural changes to factors affecting inequality (Batliwala 2006). As was pointed out, this approach of reducing people to numbers and beneficiaries is dehumanising. This removes people's dignity from their experiences, lives, and stories, that they are entrusting to development workers. Furthermore, as a knock-on effect, the well-being of essential local staff and enumerators, who often report very difficult experiences while being offered very little well-being support, are most often tasked with the high pressure to implement projects and mobilise communities, leaving them potentially at risk of experiencing vicarious trauma (Rozo 2021).

Other examples shared by participants were continuous requests for evaluations and audits, which often proved to be a humiliating and traumatising experience, acting as a byword for a clear lack of trust on the part of German funders. Indeed, participants criticised and pointed out the contradiction in German organisations demanding

copious training on financial and project management from local feminist organisations inherent distrust despite ample training from German agencies, and already well-developed multi-donor reporting skills present in local organisations.

Feminist participants made very clear and actionable recommendations on how to counter this, namely looking to the successes of feminist funders in championing 'conversational reporting' annually, absorbing further administrative work beyond these conversations to the better staffed agencies like the GIZ, or large INGOs, especially at headquarter level. Failure to drastically alter reporting burdens also wastes the expertise and resources of local feminist organisations, impacting their ability to deliver projects and programmes. Moreover, participants reiterated that reporting burdens contribute zero net positive impacts in communities, no further advancement to achieving project goals, nor do they deliver national or regional progress on gender equality.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Focus implementing agency efforts on prioritising the "A" in MEAL, particularly bottom-up MEAL, which aims to close accountability loops and report back to communities.
→ At a minimum, coordinate and harmonise with other major funding agencies locally (e.g., USAID, DFID, GAC, EU) to coordinate shared financial management training and minimise duplication at local or regional level.
→ Absorb and adapt existing feminist MEAL approaches, in coordination and contextualisation with local feminist organisations.

Action Area 4. Promote grounded digital solutions

Technology has often been a central piece of development policies, not the least in the approach of Germany via the GIZ and the former GTZ (Gesellschaft für Technische

Zusammenarbeit), which historically focused on technocratic interventions. Germany's new digitalisation strategy commits to a "sovereign, fair, feminist and sustainable

digital policy" (BMZ Digital Global 2023). However it is not clear that the strategy has a strong feminist foundation or a localisation precedent for Germany to build upon, limiting legitimate co-creation. How it practically links to the Feminist Development Policy is also unclear. Participants raised the concern that the focus on promoting digital skills will follow an established pattern where development actors encourage communities to acquire new knowledge on a specific

platform created by in the Global North without sufficient due diligence on existing programmes and trainings, especially in Africa. This approach has led to duplication and a non-recognition of materials and methods developed by local feminists, framing them as redundant or non-trustworthy. Advancing these policies without a gender lens can also lead to risks to politically marginalised populations.

Acknowledge the gender and racial bias inherent in many technological solutions and ensure that they do not cause harm to women and other politically marginalised populations

Previous research has routinely shown that most agricultural technologies and corresponding interventions were originally designed by men, for men, often historically overemphasising efficiency, i.e., unsustainable intensification and high yield crop varieties, and monopolistic approaches (e.g., cash crops), at the cost of other factors, in addition to imposing a Western male breadwinner cultural norm. Systems that have been the purveyors of agricultural supports and technologies, such as agricultural extension systems, have also been flagged as having a male bias. Other specific examples such as mechanical bean threshers being too big for (many) women to operate and transport between farms, illustrate the systemic and underlying design bias, stacked against women, despite their highly significant role in food provision. It is now more readily accepted that there were inherent gender biases in the imposition of technology on communities and on underlying assumptions around technological adoption.

Strong political commitments and attempts to nudge local populations towards rapid tech uptake, ostensibly positioned to showcase climate-sensitive policies leading to visible change, often falter and fall on the backs of women and politically marginalised groups. One such example noted how Kenyan political leadership widely endorsed gas cylinders in an aim to lessen deforestation

from wood-burning stoves. However, in addition to gas cylinders being highly challenging for rural populations to access at times, there was no clear analysis how women in rural settlements could get gas cylinders, and the gendered risks of doing so (e.g., exposing them to GBV, extortion, etc.). Feminists agreed that the simple addition of technology through development projects is rarely effective, and frequently has considerable unintended knock-on effects for women, girls, and politically marginalised groups, including unintended consequences. Overall, there were differing perspectives on the role technology can and should play in agriculture, often noting the need for careful attention to be paid around neo-colonial approaches which have parachuted in 'external' technology and technological expertise, ill-suited to its context, and displacing local researchers and networks of equally valuable indigenous climate expertise. It is important to note that although feminist participants shared their knowledge and evidence of agricultural interventions mostly at local and regional levels, women's macro-work across and within large value-chains is also an area of work that German development cooperation should focus on. Several recommendations below provide clear guidance on first steps and minimum standards, particularly given the tendency of private sector approaches to only address superficial gender differences.

cooperation should focus on. Several recommendations below provide clear guidance on first steps and minimum standards, particularly given the tendency of private sector approaches to only address superficial gender differences.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Address underlying gender biases and norms that relegate women's roles as farmers as less productive.
→ Understand, through local research, the potential gendered risks of introducing tech solutions.
→ Develop context specific technologies which must be approved and co-tested with local women's groups before being rolled out.

Localise skill promotion efforts

In the past, significant focus has been put on digitalisation projects and services, particularly with a focus on women being digitally savvy, receiving digital upskilling, and accessing digital, app-based, or home-based work. Participants highlighted that, if done well, this sort of intervention could be a lifeline, particularly for persons with disabilities, for whom remote work is often a must-have. When it is not grounded in gender analyses spanning different groups it could also contribute to women's regression from public spaces and less visibility overall. Such tensions in programme priorities could be better flagged and navigated in strategy development processes if local feminist expertise is taken on board much earlier and at much deeper levels. In Africa specifically, Germany's approach to digital transformation has thus far failed to break the market dynamic with many data and digital transformation strategies in Africa revealing a critical issue of dominance and over reliance of expertise and while new feminist policies and national strategies are coming up in Africa, many lack an Afro-feminist lens (Iyer et al., 2021a).

Unfortunately, data and digital skills are concentrated overwhelmingly in the private sector, which has led to situations where states in the Global South depend on foreign private tech firms/consultants to provide fundamental parts of their digital and data infrastructure (Mbabazi 2022). At the height of digital extractivism and automated imperialism (Iyer et al., 2021b) states continue to grapple with highly coordinated methods and approaches to developing better digital transformation strategies that do not capture the way of life of many Africans, the culture and impact of technologies in their lives. One instructive example is the digital content on the Atingi Platform, a project of the GIZ. In the publicly available and accessible 'Digital Skills and Transformation Courses', less than 45% of the content appears to be developed by technologists based in the Global South (Atingi Content Library 2023) including courses related to gender and women's rights such as 'Tackling Online Gender-Based Violence' and 'Women Going Digital'.

Considering the growth of e-learning and the use of the internet as a (more) affordable educational venue, participants were keen to encourage policymakers to recognise that for young people and many politically marginalised groups, like LGBTQI+ and disabled persons, offline and online realities are interconnected. Furthermore, digital spaces, including but not limited to social media sites, are being used for learning and information access, but these spaces are frequently dominated by patriarchal, misogynist, homophobic, and racist narratives which restrict access to knowledge, undermine learning, expose youth to hate speech and bullying, causing considerable harm to young people's mental health. These challenges are often underpinned by widespread issues and fears around surveillance, lack of privacy, data security, all of which could have direct consequences on individual and community-level safety. However, feminists were quick to point out, there is a need for a balanced approach that pre-emptively weighs these digital risks (including with context specific insights and analyses on disinformation and hate speech) while still understanding and supporting online learning opportunities, both formal and informal, that are often more accessible for women, girls, LGBTQI+ people, and persons with disabilities.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Address underlying gender biases and norms that relegate women's roles as farmers as less productive. Firmly centre an Afro-feminist lens in developing digital solutions in Africa, tackle digital harms, and ensure that proposed solutions (e.g. remote work) do not have the effect of further restricting access to the public sphere for women and other marginalised groups.

→ Centre women and girls as Indigenous and future innovators, engaging in regular open communication and convenings to nurture co-creation processes with local partners.

→ Recognise partners' organic processes of social change without always imposing grant priorities developed in donor countries.

→ Map the digital landscape in partnership with local feminists, to ensure fairer and more meaningful discussions in determining what is a locally relevant feminist development policy.

→ Fund locally-led feminist tech, feminist archival projects and broadly fund feminist research led by feminists and done by feminists from the affected groups.

→ Fund digital rights grassroots organisations and collectives to debunk oppressive and harmful narratives and research into feminist algorithms.

→ Endorse opportunities to access quality online education and strengthen safe feminist digital innovations have been built and piloted in Africa.

Ensure technological solutions for the climate crisis are context-relevant and do not deprioritise investment in adaptation measures

As the climate crisis has become impossible to ignore, so too has the proliferation of ways to co-opt it, particularly with a strong financial focus on technological solutions as being the key to resolving it. This is problematic for numerous reasons, namely that not everyone will have equal access to these new technologies and top-down, Northern driven investment into said technologies will be, by their design, likely ill-fitted for many other contexts. Additionally, any deferral to technologies as the primary means to stave off the climate crisis, typically does not factor in the time that will still be needed to get said technologies off the ground, which is not a short-term solution. Secondly, while there is significant investment in climate technology, it does not often take an intersectional approach, for example addressing the climate crisis as a social crisis or linking it to compounded health and economic crises it will and is already causing. So much of the

investment excludes feminist and intersectional voices, who could potentially address these overlapping crises or pilot technology but are often left fighting for small pots of funding while there are large sums dedicated just to specific climate technology financing. The focus on a proliferation of climate technology, is on green innovation and economy, essentially co-opting rhetoric about climate justice. And while global data and digitalisation policies, particularly within Global North countries, often carefully scrutinise issues of surveillance, privacy rights, data security and so forth, many technologies used in development projects rarely meet these same standards, and in the case of climate projects, risk climate activist safety and the rights of Indigenous Peoples to natural resource governance and management by creating data vulnerabilities.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Invest in climate technology that is (Global Majority) women-led and implemented. Withdraw funding from those without gender transformative approaches and outcomes.
→ Invest in pilot technologies that are co-developed and locally led by feminist climate movements.
→ Match the funding for climate-tech with funding for grassroots orgs and frontline defenders.

Action Area 5. Transform the internal working of development institutions and engage in high-level political work domestically and internationally

Diversify internal structures and meaningfully diffuse responsibility for the implementation of feminist development policy

Participants were in agreement that in order to transform how development policy is being done, German development institutions must also change themselves. In practice, this means undertaking rigorous evaluations of obstacles to delivering Feminist Development Policy and building new intersectional feminist working cultures. As an essential first step, there needs to be a minimum level of racial and ethnic diversity of staff to understand globally different contexts compared to Germany and Europe. Additionally, participants argued that a limited working knowledge or superficial recognition of Germany's colonial history (Kniestedt 2020; Goltermann 2022; Auswärtige Autoren 2019; Bonn Postkolonial n.d.) and the deep ties between coloniality and development cooperation, meant that without systematic intervention, internal Global North donor and implementing agency cultures[13], are likely to continue upholding colonial standards around proper procedures and professionalism, examples given being dress codes, politics of hair, educational attainment biases, and corresponding perceived intellectual capacities. These forms of exclusion and discrimination internally also translate to external behaviours, with Southern feminists often reporting feeling unheard and treated unfairly.

Further, participants were unequivocal in their assertion that it is the responsibility of the BMZ and the GIZ to not just engage in top-level awareness raising with its staff on

Feminist Development Policy and feminist theory, but to develop and enforce drastic changes to policies and procedures, and implement meaningful monitoring and accountability frameworks. Some of the more granular changes needed around more realistic implementation timelines for social change, project conceptualisation, and MEAL are discussed above. At the macro level, meaningfully embedding Feminist Development Policy entails making feminism, and by extension feminist development policy, everyone's responsibility, rather than just the priority or obligation of a handful of overburdened focal points and feminist champions within the institutions. Lessons learned from both Canadian and Swedish research (Kvinna till Kvinna 2023; Women's Voice and Leadership Program Formative Evaluation 2022) found that Feminist Development Policy and its implementation must be diffused across teams and requires both incentives and resources for staff to take it on. Without that it will fail to deliver durable changes in policy making, policy translation, and policy implementation in development institutions.

In addition to these calls for the requisite internal professional development within Germany, serious concerns were raised about the way local expertise and labour is undervalued. Pay disparities between local staff of implementing agencies and German or European staff (often in management or more senior supervisory roles). Previous

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[13]*We use donor and implementing agencies to include both government donors and their development cooperation agencies. This can also include large external implementing agencies, such as INGOs who are responsible for a large volume of aid spending and determine largescale programme design and strategic direction of how ODA is used.*

research has shown this wage gap between locals and 'expats' in the aid sector, to be an alarming 400-900% (Carr and McWha-Hermann 2016). These enormous disparities directly undermine commitments to respectful, fair partnerships, and a decolonised approach to development. They are also unreflective of the heavy reliance of implementing agencies on their local staff. German institutions have an opportunity to rectify this and co-create and use contextually relevant pay scales and standardised matrices, that transparently ensure German development institutions

(including non-government implementing partners) are mandated equal pay employers. Moreover, employment directives can be issued to prioritise local feminist leadership and affirmative, positive action across government and implementing agencies. Lastly, greater coordination between German ministries and units is desperately needed, particularly to minimise the duplication of reporting demands, but also to more collaboratively and jointly fund overlapping issues (e.g., protection issues as they relate to the climate crisis and unpaid care).

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Utilise Section 1 and Section 5 of the General Act on Equal Treatment to issue hiring directives within German development institutions to prioritise positive action based on racial and ethnic origin.
→ Translate pay scales in local contexts that equalise equal pay for equal work and limit wide disparities across pay grades.
→ Invest in consistent professional development and performance evaluation systems to monitor the uptake of feminist development policy.
→ Increase funding and resources to Feminist Development Policy focal points and teams responsible, including resources for external Global Majority feminist consultation processes.
→ Mandate transparent annual reporting in the BMZ and GIZ on institutional changes attributed to feminist development policy.

Leverage Germany's position in multilateral spaces to strengthen multilateralism and, in particular, recognise and counter anti-gender movements

The declaration of a feminist development policy provides significant high-level opportunities that must not be fully utilised to showcase Germany's commitment to decolonial feminism on the world stage and truly lead by example. The clear language and commitment of Germany to affirm multilateralism was perceived as a good opportunity for Germany to capitalise on its established diplomatic credibility, strong international reputation, and well-developed

networks to comprehensively advance Feminist Foreign and Feminist Development Policy. In particular, as a Global North government with leverage in multilateral spaces like the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), Germany can model solidarity with Global South movements by allowing its policies to be led by Southern movements, activating financial streams that can counter the shrinking of civic space and suppression, and be bold in taking risks.

Learning spaces, like the FFP+ Group at the UN of which Germany is a member, but also more civil society facing groups like the Alliance for Feminist Movements, of which Canada, Malawi, and Mexico are members, offer a unique opportunity that Germany could benefit from. By committing to these learning spaces, Germany could better connect with and foster feminist civil society networks in the Global South critical to effectively deploying a feminist development policy. Participating in learning forums like these, publicly signal Germany's willingness as a relatively new and less experienced player in the field of feminist foreign and development policyto learn from other members, especially Southern participants who have been leading the way for decades. Adopting this learning mindset is essential but should not be used to stall action, rather to acknowledge and resource other (mostly) Southern feminist actors, who have ample expertise, but are often ignored.

Across the four convenings, participants welcomed the clearly delineated priority in the BMZ feminist development policy strategy to counter anti-gender movements in light of the serious ways in which anti-gender movements endanger and destroy the fabrics of feminist movements and their space for action. Efforts at the multilateral level are needed to build stronger coalitions between like-minded governments and with civil society. By threatening the rights of women, girls, and LGBTQI+ people and further entrenching gender and broader social inequalities, anti-gender movements hollow out youth and feminist movements. To effectively offset the enormous financial and social power of anti-gender movements, inclusive civil society needs to be adequately resourced to monitor, understand, strategise, and respond. Participants highlighted that to respond to an opposition that is engaging cross-regionally, feminist civil society must be organised and structured in the same way to adequately respond.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Consistently spotlight feminists from the North and South alike at high-level forums, ensuring feminist perspectives on all issues become normalised and mainstreamed at forums like the United Nations and the European Union, beyond ministerial roundtables with Feminist Foreign Policy states or likeminded member state conferences on SRHR.

→ Strengthening the recognition of youth as important constituents and holders of feminist knowledge, and pushed for young, Southern feminist inclusion within core delegations and high-level meetings.

→ Be a better feminist ally in leading from behind to ensure that development policy is determined from the grassroots up rather than responding to global policy processes.

→ Ensure that the threat posed by anti-gender movements is highlighted by German delegations, and that gender issues are not instriumentalised and used as bargaining chips in negotiations.

→ Put its money where its mouth is and mobilise high-level champion groups in partnership with feminist movements that are effectively tracking anti-gender financial flows and acting as watchdogs (Hughson 2021; Shameem 2021; Denkovski 2021).

→ Lead the way in supporting transnational networking activities by progressive civil society that is not constrained by country strategies.

Work domestically to ensure coordination and policy coherence across ministerial portfolios

Internally, a similar focus and determination is required, to match external levels of political engagement, with intensive inter-ministerial coordination required to ensure that a feminist development policy is coherent. Both the Canadian and Swedish experiences (Feminist Foreign Policy Working Group 2021; Concord Sweden 2023) show us how if these crossovers between Feminist Development Policy and Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) are not addressed (e.g., in the areas of trade and defence), the overall public support and uptake of Feminist Development Policy and FFP, will be weakened. Following the rescindment of the Swedish FFP, Swedish civil society that worked closely with and within the Swedish government, reflected that much more transparency and candour on progress and reporting on how policy incoherence was (or was not) being addressed, including communicating limitations, but also pressing for realistic changes, is necessary to give credibility to FFP and Feminist Development Policy. However, Swedish civil society also flagged that FFP and Feminist Development Policy must live outside and beyond one or two high-level ministerial champions, particularly to be durable and ensure sustainable transformational change within and across government institutions.

The BMZ Development Strategy explicitly states how its Feminist Development Policy functions in alignment with the FFP Guidelines of the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt, AA). Specific areas of alignment identified were around SRHR, peace and post-conflict reconstruction processes, and the economic empowerment of women (BMZ 2023b).

While these commitments mention standing up for gender equality in negotiations (e.g., EU negotiations) with the exception of the collaboration with the Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, other key Ministries such as Trade and Defence, are not explicitly named (BMZ Feminist Development Policy 2023). While feminist participants did note that the collaboration between the BMZ and the German Federal Foreign Office on the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) should act as a positive model for future necessary collaboration, it was also noted that other Ministries, such as Trade and Defence, must be coordinated with, for policy coherence to be ensured. Specific focus areas for inter-ministerial coordination raised by participants included: planning complementary implementation timelines, addressing internal pushback or administrative challenges in policy uptake and buy-in, and rapid adaptation of policy positions in response to changing and highly volatile humanitarian contexts.

Participants urged Germany to address specific areas of policy incoherence, namely: how development funding is (in)directly used to keep migrants outside of Europe and how Germany's trade positions, in lockstep with the EU, often uphold inequitable trade and investment treaties and debt arrangements that disproportionately harm Southern women and politically marginalised groups, while locking Global South countries out of these key decision-making space (Concord 2021; Groneweg 2022; Pavese 2021).[14]

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[14] *See further discussion in Chapter 2.*

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Conduct top-level scoping study on where feminist development policy faces opposing priorities resulting in incoherence with Germany's other policy positions (e.g., Trade and Defence) and create inter-ministerial action plan for addressing these concerns in policy translation.

→ Institute a Feminist Foreign Policy Advisory Board based made up of politically marginalised groups including queer people, sex workers, and youth from the Global South. This Advisory Board should collaborate with all relevant ministries, the Chancellery as well as implementing agencies and parliamentary working groups. The Board should further directly cooperate with the BMZ Youth Council.

→ Better recognise policy linkages between trade, climate, defence, and migration policies to ensure cross-coordination for policy coherence.

2. THEMATIC REFLECTIONS

The immediate, crosscutting action areas for feminist development policies outlined above establish the foundation for transformative change. The manifestation of these action areas in key policy domains will be examined in the following thematic reflections. Economic justice, climate justice, food sovereignty, sexual and reproductive health and rights, minority rights protection, and education are essential spheres in which feminist principles should be ingrained to foster holistic and sustainable development. Through these thematic reflections, the intersections and synergies between these policy areas and the crosscutting action areas will be explored, with the aim of creating a comprehensive framework that addresses gender inequality and other forms of structural violence through a feminist development policy, grounded in the experiences and perspectives of grassroots feminist movements representing those most affected by development programming. At the same time, these recommendations are not all-encompassing, they rather provide reflections on where change should start. For more on this, see also the CFFP Manifesto for a Feminist Foreign Policy for Germany (CFFP 2021).

2.1. Economic Justice

A shift from economic empowerment towards economic justice[15] is essential to avoid entrenching social and gender hierarchies which continue to keep women, girls, and LGBTQI+ people in positions where they must work for development rather than make

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[15]We intentionally use 'economic justice' as our central term, to move away from 'women's economic empowerment' (WEE), which has been highly problematised, not dissimilar to the critique and repercussions of trickle-down economics and structural adjustment programmes. WEE was often predicated on a promise to address widescale gender equality, often at a bare-minimum gender-sensitive level rather than at a gender-transformative level. By focusing on economic justice, we note that structural inequalities, and exploitative economic systems and markets continue to unfairly and disproportionately affect women, girls, and other politically marginalised groups. See further discussion: https://www.scielo.br/j/cpa/a/9zJqwjXHP4KbgfsLRCY7WpC/?format=pdf&lang=en

development work for them (Urgent Action Fund, 2023). Yet, Germany's feminist development policy strategy continues to focus on economic empowerment over economic justice (BMZ 2023b).

Move away from neoliberal thinking to transforming systems and structures of oppression

Since the 1980s, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have consistently promoted neoliberal ideas of liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation across many developing countries. Neo-liberal solutions posit that increases in household income, individual access to markets and capital, or technological and financial resources will lift women and girls, and by extension, whole communities out of poverty (Michaeli 2021; Chant 2008; Ceia, Nothwehr and Wagner 2021). Such approaches fail to consider systemic inequalities such as racism, gender norms, exploitative labour conditions, as well as the long-term repercussions of colonialism and highly disadvantageous trade, investment, and debt agreements towards the Global South. In fact, convening participants agreed that a continued focus on neoliberal solutions has at best patched over problems often created by neoliberal economics in the first place, and at worst exacerbated them. A feminist development policy should bolster gender transformative development projects and programmes which prioritise shifting norms and power, transforming systems and structures of oppression like patriarchy, neoliberal capitalism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism, to address unfair market structures, unfair tax systems, and exploitative labour structures.

The impact of historical economic interventions, and structural adjustment programmes, in particular, which dismantled the public sector, manifests itself among other ways in the struggle of Global South governments to implement mandated interventions in public services. The cyclical nature of debt was universally recognised by feminists as contributing to both an inability to provide public services and a need for severely underfunded civil society to fill the vacuum. In Africa, the debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio for 50 countries averaged at 60% as of 2022 (Trading Economics 2022). Global South countries are also often locked out of spaces where such macroeconomic issues are negotiated at the multilateral level including for instance ringfenced policy spaces in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on global tax flows, which with the proper integration of Southern perspectives could make a sizable difference in recapturing illicit financial flows, estimated at over \$68 billion a year in the case of Africa, triple the amount of development aid (McVeigh 2017). By advocating for Global South feminist representation in these spaces, tax justice efforts can also include the protection and promotion of care infrastructure investments in the Global South, and advocate against foreign investment treaties that keep women globally trapped in underpaid, precarious, and labour-intensive jobs.

As one example, in often-deployed conditional cash-transfers and direct payment programmes, participants articulated the need for a proactive approach grounded in a gender analysis to avoid funding projects that ostensibly seek to empower women but result in increased gender-based violence since they threaten patriarchal dominance and masculinities without addressing them. Moreover, such projects to involve women in the formal economy put extreme pressure on them to

ensure economic stability and often increase the care burden[16] (Sepúlveda Carmona 2018). Finally, such interviews without a gender transformative approach also individualise structural problems. The solution is not as simple as eliminating cash transfer wholesale but rather accompanying them with careful, locally led gender and care analyses, community co-leadership, and money distributed across diverse channels, including to communities directly, co-operatives, and other networks of women and other oppressed groups.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Consistently spotlight feminists from the North and South alike at high-level forums, ensuring feminist perspectives on all issues become normalised and mainstreamed at forums like the United Nations and the European Union, beyond ministerial roundtables with Feminist Foreign Policy states or likeminded member state conferences on SRHR.

→ Strengthening the recognition of youth as important constituents and holders of feminist knowledge, and pushed for young, Southern feminist inclusion within core delegations and high-level meetings.

→ Be a better feminist ally in leading from behind to ensure that development policy is determined from the grassroots up rather than responding to global policy processes.

→ Ensure that the threat posed by anti-gender movements is highlighted by German delegations, and that gender issues are not instrumentalised and used as bargaining chips in negotiations.

→ Put its money where its mouth is and mobilise high-level champion groups in partnership with feminist movements that are effectively tracking anti-gender financial flows and acting as watchdogs (Hughson 2021; Shameem 2021; Denkovski 2021).

→ Lead the way in supporting transnational networking activities by progressive civil society that is not constrained by country strategies.

Engage in restorative justice efforts for lasting macroeconomic damage

Lastly, given the damage that decades of neo-colonialism and imperialism have had on instrumentalising women's participation in markets as the primary indicator for increased overall gender equality, it was noted that a feminist economic justice policy must make good on its promises to integrate and promote decolonisation and intersectionality in practice, and consider gender equality holistically (Michaeli 2021; Cronin-Furman, Gowrinathan and Zakaria 2017). One particular recommendation to do this is to link all economic programming with restorative justice approaches. Beyond recognising how

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[16] *The 5R approach is one solution in this regard. It stands for Recognise, Reduce, Redistribute, Reward, Resilient, and Represent care work. For further information: https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/A-toolkit-on-paid-and-unpaid-care-work-en.pdf*

women and other oppressed groups are disproportionately affected by poverty, it would recognise past harms misguided approaches have caused, including colonial laws and norms that are often still enforced, and clearly acknowledge how histories of previous harms still affect present generations. One example from the

convenings noted how across Central America and Mexico the notions of economic justice and restorative justice are being combined, because there is an understanding that funders cannot solve deep-seated economic disparities by focusing on purely market mechanisms such as job creation and start-up funding.

"The very understanding of what restorative justice is, is broadened in our region because the State has historically been associated with structural violence that the State itself validated or promoted. Thus, it has been pointed out that the State needs to acknowledge its responsibilities if it aims to become a promoter of human rights. If we only give economic support and fail to address the history of discriminations, social and economic, this will be insufficient to include women and minoritised groups."[17]

A focus on restorative justice also should apply to business-related human-rights violations specifically regarding corporate conduct and operations in foreign jurisdictions, particularly in the case of German corporations. While GIZ-initiated 'Sunday café' programmes to enable women workers to discuss and inform themselves of their labour rights are welcomed, this approach does not tackle the perpetrators of harm (i.e., negligent corporations violating labour rights) and rather individualises and

places the onus, and danger, on women workers to organise (UNWG on Business and Human Rights, n.d.). A feminist approach would focus on stronger coordination with the Foreign and Trade Ministries: targeting corporate powerholders, while supporting women's and politically marginalised groups' labour movements. It would further aim to hold corporations accountable and bind them to prioritise human rights and environmental protection.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Fund feminist economic analyses and action-research on colonial legacies and Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), advocating for said research to form basis of decolonial economic justice curriculum for relevant GIZ and BMZ staff responsible for project design and overarching portfolio oversight.

→ Further strengthen the Due Diligence Law by introducing civil liability for companies and allowing survivors of human rights abuses access to German courts.

→ Support whistleblowers and create safe and meaningful spaces for workers in the Global South to organise and engage with German representations abroad.

→ Champion the UN Legally Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights over the non-binding guiding principles on Business and Human rights, given its more transnational focus and scope that will ensure that all corporations are held accountable both at home and abroad.

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[17] *Participant, Convening 2.*

Firmly integrate unpaid and underpaid care and domestic work including beyond early childhood care provision in development cooperation

Unpaid and underpaid care and domestic work is one of most pervasive barriers to gender equality and uprooting patriarchal systems and norms affecting women, girls, LGBTQI+, and other politically marginalised groups. While development programmes have recently begun considering unpaid care work, this typically focuses interventions related to early childhood care provision, with an aim to get women into the formal labour market. Participants raised major gaps in these approaches, notably how the existing Global Alliance on Care and World Bank investments are not intersectional in their approach, often excluding care for elders, disabled persons, and youth, with the focus being on early childhood care provision.

Some development programmes, such as the WE-CARE programme, have had successes influencing national governments to invest in research to quantify unpaid care and embed it into national planning processes. However, by and large, many national governments and donors do not invest in this necessary data collection and care work is rarely a mainstreamed or flagship priority in development programmes. This type of data collection would act as the crucial first step to recognising, representing, and more systematically encouraging state investment and co-partnership with donor agencies and care workers in reduction and redistribution mechanisms. Additionally, care work is often seen at the household and community level, which neglects to recognise the compounded threats experienced by domestic (migrant) workers and underpaid health workers.

"There is a need for Global North governments to address how their care shortages result in an extractive relationship and demand for Southern care workers, while often these same governments are simultaneously criticising Southern countries for their undervaluing of domestic workers. A feminist development policy on care would seek to reconcile these realities, by jointly advocating for Northern solidarity and policy coherence on fair and safe working conditions for all domestic and migrant workers, including those Germany is reliant upon".[18]

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Fund and promote national-level data collection on care work, framed around the 'care economy', especially as it relates to GDP. Ensure that all types of care work are captured in data collection, including but not limited to paid domestic work, other forms of underpaid care work, and unpaid care work.
→ Advocate for skills recognition for domestic workers, especially those without professional qualifications, and fair inclusion of them in care economy.
→ Ensure policy coherence between migration, domestic and development policy, which requires reporting on Germany's care infrastructure and dependencies on migrant labour and precariousness of care work in Germany.

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[18]*Participant, Convening 2.*

> → At the interministerial level, work towards fair, equal, and easy access to healthcare and social service infrastructure for all migrant workers in Germany.
> → Advocate in multilateral and bilateral spaces for ratification of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention on Domestic Workers, and report on Germany's progress in monitoring and implementing the Convention.
> → Emphasise provision of safe and affordable care infrastructure in development projects.
> → Require clear development investment into care work mainstreamed across all gender equality projects.

2.2. Climate Justice

Germany was the 2nd largest donor in absolute terms (7th in relative terms) for climate projects in 2021, although total volume decreased relative to 2017. The focus of bilateral funding in 2021 were energy transition projects, with approximately equal spending on adaptation and mixed mitigation/adaptation projects. Under its G7 presidency in 2022, Germany launched the Global Shield against climate risks, providing seed funding of EUR 170 million and aiming to mobilise funding for Loss and Damage compensation (Donor Tracker n.d.). The feminist development policy strategy encouragingly recognises that the devaluation of Indigenous knowledge integral to colonialism is responsible for the lack of integration of this knowledge into the solutions to the climate crisis as well as that climate change and the loss of biodiversity disproportionately affect marginalised groups (BMZ 2023b).

As a framing for all discussions on climate justice, feminists were aligned on a need for development policies to rigorously examine the institutional track record on climate, paying close attention to commitments and (missing) follow-through from Global North governments. A prime example is the COP15 (Conference of Parties) commitment of USD 100 billion[19] to be given to the Global South by 2020, which was deferred to 2023 and to date looks unlikely to be met (Eckstein 2023). Questions arose about how seriously new loss and damage financing, or any other commitments, can be viewed and relied upon, given this reality of broken promises and significant shortfalls in climate financing. Ahistorical approaches to pledging new commitments risk that they falter in similar ways if not prioritised in high-level Northern commitments with mandatory action plans and monitoring climate commitments, and in high-level foreign policy dialogues with other Northern governments. Considering this, feminists raised the need for transparent and regular official progress reporting and monitoring, to be invested in or coordinated by Global North governments like Germany, particularly given the seat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat in Germany and this year's landmark first ever Global Stocktake.

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[19] *The original COP commitment was 100 billion USD by 2020 which was not kept and therefore reset as a new goal pledging 100 billion by 2023, which to date looks highly unlikely. See further discussion here: https://www.germanclimatefinance.de/2023/02/22/mixed-results-on-climate-finance-at-cop-27/*

Ensure a firmly decolonial approach to climate justice

Participants noted the absence of a decolonial approach in most Northern climate crisis policies. On the one hand, Germany strongly emphasises the phase out of fossil fuels in high-level engagements, as well as its commitment to solidarity in countries harder hit by the climate crisis. On the other, the Global Shield (flagship German initiative) has been called a distraction from loss and damage, punitive and irrelevant for those living in poverty, and divorced from the principles of solidarity and the 'polluter must pay' ethos. Given that the world's richest countries produce(d) an overwhelming 86% majority of carbon emissions, compared to the miniscule 14% contributed by low- and middle-income countries, recentring responsibility and resourcing said responsibility is imperative. Broadly, participants were in consensus that the Global North, including Germany, must take responsibility for its historical emissions, such as those which contributed to the rapid industrialisation and economic development of Germany, and the climatic impacts through colonisation. Such responsibility means Germany should not engage in political scapegoating or finger wagging at other industrialised nations, including those in the Global South like China and India, but rather first take responsibility for its own history. Additionally, this responsibility must also include clear efforts to steer away from utilising racist arguments around population control, as a means of placing blame on countries in the Global South and evading Northern responsibility for the climate crisis. Instead, taking responsibility must focus on the debt that is owed to the Global South, which bears the brunt of current climate crises, and of whose labour, natural resources and economies, Global North wealth, and economic prosperity, is built off.

"Farmers are the first scientists, why do we not treat them as such?"[20]

Participants with experience in high-level climate advocacy shared that Global North actors tend to dominate these spaces, preventing the recognition of rights of politically marginalised groups from the Global South, and those politically marginalised in the Global North, e.g., Sinti & Roma, Black & Indigenous Peoples (including but not limited to First Nations, Saami, Métis, Maori, and Inuit), migrants and refugees, and disabled people. This was especially evident by how little space is offered or available for direct testimonies and consistent engagement with Southern (women) farmers, at the forefront of experiencing the climate crisis, pushing aside critical insights on climate adaptation mitigation. While following decades of concerted advocacy and mobilisation by Indigenous Peoples and people in the Global South, governments have finally begun considering issues such as loss and damage (Åberg 2023), without the lived experiences of these advocates being placed at the centre of current and future negotiations and agenda-setting, other issues such as maintaining and monitoring funding levels for mitigation and adaptation, sustainable and wide-reaching progress on inclusive feminist climate justice, will remain unattainable.

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[20] *Participant, Convening 2.*

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Publicly acknowledge Germany's role and responsibility given disproportionate historical contribution to emissions (including as it relates to German colonisation) and current consumption patterns by committing to supporting stronger and binding regulations that target Global North emissions and aim at more comprehensive Global North mitigation commitments.

→ Transform and shift global narratives away from population control into more decolonised focus on Global North's responsibility and the debt owed to Global South given industrialisation and Global North emissions.

→ Demonstrate political solidarity at high-level events, by proactively advocating against COPs held in countries with a militarised environment, poor human rights track records, or climate crisis denialism. In instances where these COPs do occur, better use the spaces to support and champion local and international civil society efforts.

→ Practically support Southern youth feminist activists as part of core climate delegations, through supporting access to accreditation and providing (easy access) funding to support their travel costs.

→ Prioritise substantive participation and decision-making power (not just representation) of frontline (Most Affected People and Areas, MAPA) communities into decision-making and negotiating spaces, aiming for strong and equitable Global Majority women, youth, LGBTQI+, disabled, migrant, and Indigenous representation and input.

→ Participate in co-leading a more ambitious, transformative UNFCCC Gender Action Plan, alongside opening the space for meaningful participation with Global Majority youth and Indigenous feminists.

→ As host of the Green Climate Fund Replenishment Conference in October 2023, Germany should advocate in high-level engagements with other FFP and progressive states to prioritise funding intersectional climate projects.

Firmly link broader human rights protection with climate programming, centre those most affected by the climate crisis, and recognise slow violence

Major climate issues such as land erosion, soil damage, water supply pollution, and rising sea levels, all aspects of the systematic collapse of infrastructure referred to as slow violence remain excluded from global negotiations and climate policy priority areas with far reaching effects. This collapse manufactures food production crises, which then creates climate refugees disproportionally consisting of politically marginalised groups, exposing them to heightened risks of sexual and gender-based violence, yet their experiences and needs are often sidelined.

Participants cautioned against the trend of climate justice projects being disconnected from broader human rights protection. One example is how, while United States (US) infrastructural investments in Mexico and Central America nominally aim to address slow violence and its ripple effects, they do so with a view of stemming migration to the US.

They also spoke of the need to centre local expertise as critical to developing sustainable climate justice programming. Project design should substantially map the mosaic of supportive community actors using asset-based community development approaches to ensure long-term sustainability. For instance, a mushroom farming project had initially provided a good set-up for farmers and the community, but had no long-term sustainability plans upon project funds drying up. Participants argued that had women and other politically marginalised groups been involved at project conceptualisation and allowed to lead and self-manage from the beginning, the withdrawal of funds would not have had the effect of halting all progress. In another example from Northern Ghana, where extreme weather events such as floods and droughts are common highlights, the challenge of undue reliance of one-size fits all policies modelled on masculinised farming norms. Development and agricultural extension policies prescribing the same methods, assuming large scale

implementation and rollout, ignored the fact that women in Ghana on average own only up to two acres of land, rendering these policies gender-blind and irrelevant to women farmers. A more positive example from a German-sponsored project in Tanzania, showed how when projects take a more comprehensive life stage approach, linking the climate crisis to daily life impacts on women and girls (e.g., drought increasing vulnerability exposing these groups to more dangerous situations and increasing care workload), a wider array of under-reached groups are likely to be engaged. In this case, the project involved farmers and blue-collar women, and consolidated concerns of women farmers, including their expertise and knowledge of natural fertilisation methods that result in safer and more sustainable agriculture. These examples point to the importance of embedding community knowledge and planning for how projects will gain community buy-in, especially when aiming for wider more inclusive projects.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Co-develop a broad, inclusive definition of climate migration to include unacknowledged groups like domestic workers and migrant workers, as groups that may qualify as internally displaced persons (IDPs).

→ Commit to addressing 'slow violence' climate issues such as erosion, soil damage, water supply pollution, and rising sea levels, and integrate them into global negotiations as feminist climate policy priority areas.

→ Require a dual human rights and intersectional justice approach to funding all climate infrastructure projects, in coordination with other relevant German ministries, including but not limited to: Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety and Consumer Protection, and the Federal Ministry for Food and Agriculture.

→ Ensure the EUR 85 million Germany committed to at the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) COP 15 directly reaches Indigenous women and other politically marginalised groups, within Indigenous and rural communities and be firmly linked to human-rights and intersectional approaches.

Recognise the critical role of youth and Indigenous peoples and the disproportionate risk they face in their advocacy

Participants urged Germany and other Global North governments to recognise the critical role youth, especially rural youth, and Indigenous Peoples should have in shaping climate crisis policies and acting as land and water defenders. In addition to symbolically affirming these two groups' roles in climate justice forums, other nexuses such as development, peace, and security, were raised as areas where Indigenous and youth voices must be better amplified, prioritised, and protected. The ties between these nexuses are evident in the example of the Sahel, where feminist participants noted the tremendous value of youth climate justice activists influencing security outcomes, inextricably linked to the region's climatic and environmental crises. Simply recognising these nexuses is not sufficient – what is needed is reframing policy to reflect youth as not only having localised knowledge, but also being most burdened with fighting the impacts of the climate crisis for the longest, and therefore most invested in long-term regional stability.

Yet, youth, women, LGBTQI+, and Indigenous Peoples who undertake this essential climate advocacy work are often advocating against large corporations which can result in legal challenges, where local laws may not protect freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and their right to peaceful protest. This leaves climate activists bearing their own highly onerous legal fees, in addition to them potentially facing threats to their safety, reprisals, and/or family members being blacklisted or threatened by security forces. These risks and imminent dangers, in addition to the high amount of online GBV that young women and LGBTQI+ activists face, needs to be safeguarded against. These risks to safety must be understood as far more precarious than any perceived risks from donors, particularly given the successes of many youth and Indigenous movements in speaking truth to power on climate issues, in

the face of such imminent dangers and threats to their safety, exacerbated by shrinking civic spaces.

Additionally, if Germany is serious about addressing GBV, feminist and queer environmental human rights defenders are critical actors to protect and partner with. This is especially important for a feminist climate policy to address, given that attacks on these defenders are likely to go unreported, and women environmental defenders are often subject to sexual harassment, threats, verbal abuse, and surveillance to a greater extent compared to their male counterparts. When women challenge patriarchal local structures of power, for example regarding resource management, they put themselves into vulnerable positions, often with very limited legal protections, and may not even be safeguarded from their own communities. For example, when women are dropped into water management projects in a top-down approach, it often poses dangers for them when they confront resource hoarding in their communities.

Instead, a feminist climate justice policy would support existing youth and Indigenous Southern leadership structures, with minimal interference and strings attached. In practice, this could mean financially supporting youth-led climate projects to co-shape and co-deliver locally relevant initiatives. Given the urgency of the climate crisis, and the recognition within Germany's feminist development strategy of the importance of Indigenous Peoples rights, feminist participants strongly pushed for overall funding to be directed towards Indigenous People's social movements. The direct and rapid funding mechanisms, as well as the presence of Indigenous women's organisations in the CLARIFI Consortium (Rights and Resources n.d.), are a promising new modality for Germany to commit to (BMZ 2022). This type of mechanism and others

similarly straightforward and co-owned, would substantively affirm the invaluable generational wisdom, and ecological knowledge Indigenous Peoples hold. Participants shared how Global North donors and implementing agencies often construed funding rural, youth, and Indigenous groups as inherently risky, compared to the carte blanche trust and presumed expertise of private sector actors to lead public-private partnerships, many of whom may in fact contribute directly or indirectly to land degradation, environmental destruction, or propping up carbon markets (Eurodad 2022).

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Adopt funds for safety for climate activists and environmental defenders, including legal support funds.
→ Promote projects based on capacity-sharing for legal aid support for fair access to trial, and capacity sharing on online safety between climate advocate networks.
→ Coordinate and advocate with other FFP states and UN Special Rapporteurs for stronger monitoring on the rights and safety of women, youth, and LGBTQI+ environmental human rights defenders. Resource participatory climate justice projects which address these risks in relation to shrinking civic space.
→ Transparently communicate funding channels going directly to Indigenous Peoples (e.g., via CLARIFI) and how this funding supports feminist organisations and is attached to projects with gender-transformative approaches and outcomes.
→ Avoid taking a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) approach but strongly advise German corporations with CSR strategies to implement them in the least harmful and most respectful way (i.e., in case of tree planting pledges: listen, fund, and support Indigenous movements who can better ensure the least land degradation and preservation of human rights).
→ Mobilise and pledge unconditional and debt free, flexible economic and climate justice financing that is responsive to Indigenous Peoples' needs, catering to rural and Indigenous women, including language preservation as a climate justice initiative.

2.3. Food Sovereignty and Agriculture

Germany was the largest donor by volume for agriculture in 2021, spending approximately the DAC average of 6% in this area with 44% of the funding being earmarked as bilateral (DonorTracker n.d.). The feminist development policy strategy states that the BMZ advocates for both food security and food sovereignty, better access to land and land ownership for women, and decent and fair working conditions in global supply chains (BMZ 2023b). Convening participants highlighted the inextricable nature of the

discussions and recommendations on climate justice and food sovereignty and agriculture, seeing the latter as the cornerstone to addressing the climate crisis. Similarly, food sovereignty was also flagged as cross-cutting with broader economic justice, particularly given the impacts of trade restrictions. Participants also flagged the significance of women farmers, their critical scientific and community roles, and how development

cooperation has historically ignored their differential needs, and has, instead, touted technological adoption, and further entrenched precarious work across agricultural value chains. The following section also centres the importance of feminist consultation with food and agriculture sovereignty experts, such as youth, Indigenous Peoples, and rural women.

"Food sovereignty – is a human right. Food is a common good, instead of just a commodity. We have the right to define our own food and agricultural systems."[21]

Understand land rights as an issue of restoration

A feminist development policy should centre historical analysis of land rights (including matrilineal or women's land rights pre-colonisation) and understand that even within the same country, there is a need to approach respective geographies and sub-country contexts differently. Such a robust knowledge and experience base would open opportunities for donors, implementing agencies, and development workers, to understand cultural norms, intersecting identities, spaces, and culturally relevant ways to work towards restoring the rights of women and LGBTQI+ groups to fully own capital and have access to land. By re-

affirming these context-based realities, and the legacy of land rights struggles fuelling war and militarisation, a feminist land rights policy would be more likely to advance do-no-harm approaches and respond to the climate crisis. Without centring women and politically marginalised groups' land rights, feminists warned that smallholders' voices and essential knowledge would be locked out of policymaking and policy implementation, perpetuating gendered power imbalances, also making agricultural policies less relevant given the disproportionate amount of food women smallholders provide globally.

"Seed sovereignty is the base of food sovereignty. It is not just research from scientists in the capital, or scientists coming from North America and Europe to tell indigenous farmers what is best."[22]

Given the long-term damage of structural adjustment programmes, convening participants underlined that national agriculture systems were heavily defunded, removing state power and mechanisms to support local agrarian systems through subsidies and guaranteed prices, amongst

other growth and incentivisation strategies. One example from Ghana noted how despite a heavy focus of development interventions supporting women agricultural entrepreneurs and traders, trade policies severely inhibited their ability to trade their goods outside their own country for fair prices, damaging access

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[21]*Participant, Convening 2.*
[22]*Participant, Convening 2.*

to markets and economic opportunities, defeating the project focus on training, quality control, and marketing skills. Furthermore, a decolonial feminist climate policy must treat seed sovereignty as a key condition to overall food sovereignty, and a major obstacle to women and politically marginalised farmers acting as strong environmental stewards of the land. Participants articulated how trade and investment policies that for example, tacitly allow for or facilitate laws or policies that de facto criminalise farmers selling seeds, are inherently neo-colonial and replicate the long-term damage of structural adjustment programmes still felt in Global South countries.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Pledge unconditional and debt free, flexible climate justice funding that promotes food sovereignty as a fail-safe approach to tackling the climate crisis.

→ Ensure robust and well-funded legal services in implementing partner countries where climate justice projects are funded, in terms of supporting fair(er) land tenure.

→ Strengthen networks of women's rights, feminist, and women's smallholder farmer organisations by financially supporting their participation in land reform dialogues with government officials.

→ Harmonise all agricultural policies and free trade agreements to remove impositions of non-native species on Global South farmers and/or exclusionary patenting of bio-engineered crops.

→ Advocate in high-level trade and agricultural forums for the removal of constraints and conditionalities around required yearly harvests and high-yield productivity quotas, which often result in net-zero gain or losses to farmer households, and crop intensification that can lead to biodiversity loss, soil damage, and farmer indebtedness.

→ Transparently report and demonstrate on how a feminist approach to agricultural policy is reflected in Germany's current trade and agricultural negotiations, including public statements in support of smallholder women farmers, more stringent regulations on German corporate GMO lobbying to low and middle-income countries, and proposed economic incentives that benefit women smallholder farmers.

→ Conduct thorough due-diligence before entering public-private partnerships with corporate actors whose environmental, economic, and human rights track record may directly endanger, or cause economic harm, to women farmers, and human rights defenders in communities.

Ensure that agriculture development policies address underlying gender and other forms of inequality

Across value chains and agricultural communities, for decades, feminist research has explored the impacts of agricultural extension services and agricultural development interventions on communities and gender dynamics (Berger, DeLancey, and Mellencamp 1984). Some key findings show that once an agricultural activity becomes profitable, often due to simplistic tick-box measures of including women or the introduction of technology, men typically displace women, regardless of if the original intervention intended women as the target group (Tavenner and Crane 2022). Even a project with a focus on targeting women, can still result in men taking over after women may have learned a new technology or set of skills from the project, because of unchanged underlying structural inequalities,

for example gendered norms around unpaid care work. Conventionally, market analyses tend to over focus on barriers to technological adoption as being mainly: lack of capital, lack of market, and/or lack of guaranteed prices. On the other hand, major constraints that are more gendered and tied to patriarchal norms, are often under-recognised, such as time and labour shortage, husband's disagreement, and fear of failure or being criticised by husband (CARE 2020). These findings provide an important framing for the feminist recommendations to critically view technology, focusing instead on structural inequalities, better co-creation of localised technology, and/or affirming indigenous and traditional methods as technological expertise.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Invest in intersectional target group analysis, gather disaggregated data along intersectional lines, and investigate how different identities (e.g., women smallholder farmer with primary education versus disabled women smallholder farmer with vocational training) affect the ways in which target group(s) benefit equally from the prospective project impact.

→ Conduct gender-responsive due diligence and impact assessments on all projects focused on income generation, sustainable production and processing, and public-private partnerships.

→ Involve gender focal points at the outset of the proposal development stage, building in time to ensure proper, fair consultation with diversity of groups, especially women and Indigenous Peoples, that will flag cultural and regional gender differences.

→ Immediately sign and signal support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, with particular action towards implementing Article 4 on Women and Article 15 on Food Sovereignty.

Recognise and resource the existing knowledge base of women's cooperatives and other forms of community organising

Feminist participants raised women's cooperatives as an under-resourced yet strong platform for what works well to support a feminist approach to agricultural development policy. Decades of mobilisation in women's cooperatives, has created strong women and locally led knowledge repositories. Women's participation in agricultural co-operatives has often led to improving women's access to resources, their access to markets and the spaces themselves function as effective learning and knowledge dissemination channels. One participant raised the example of how local municipalities supported women's cooperatives in South-eastern Turkey in concert with regional development agencies and the Federal Ministry of Agriculture's allocated funding to women's agricultural enterprises, allowing women's cooperatives to unconditionally work on using their own local seeds, and identify and strengthen their market access options. Another under-acknowledged aspect of women's participation in food sovereignty is the vast expertise they often hold in food provision skills, essential to nutritionally sustaining households.

Approaches such as the 'lived experience of food sovereignty' and 'people-centred food sovereignty', provide important insights into socio-culturally relevant knowledge that women and Indigenous Peoples in particular hold. These perspectives have been relatively unexplored and not well integrated into agricultural development approaches, which could lead to more localised and respectful means to resource smallholder's agency and resistance to capitalist modes of production, and the associated knock-on effects such as land and resource enclosure and challenges to traditional economies. If feminist development policies hope to invest heavily into agricultural research, the most impactful and gender-equal way to do this is to support locally led culturally sensitive research, and particularly locally owned research into native crops, seeds, and local means of achieving food sovereignty. This will require donors and implementing agencies to drive conversations at national, regional, and local levels to understand where funding is going, ensuring it is supporting more decolonised research, and expanding to reach groups like women, LGBTQI+, disabled, and Indigenous smallholders. By striving to genuinely understand food sovereignty from a local lens, implementing partners would better see and be able to co-design projects that affirm the cross-cutting nature of food sovereignty, unpaid care, socio-cultural and ecological relationships, with several participants noting that land is not just about productivity, but also land and food being spiritually and culturally significant. One participant gave an example detailing how the Gambian government in cooperation with a Gambian women's organisation co-created their own project for contextually relevant microcredit for food security project in the country. Examples such as this one and many others, were held up as models by feminists, which demonstrate positive outcomes when donors trust local women's rights organisations (WROs) and feminist organisations to co-create their own programs, engage in proposal-writing, and dismantle colonial stereotypes (and MEAL practices) that assume both distrust in terms of use of funds by local organisations, and lack of agricultural acumen.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Finance and prioritise cross-learning between feminist climate organisations, youth, and Indigenous organisations to share local expertise.

→ Fund farmer-led climate smart agricultural solutions and Indigenous methods. Demonstrate flexibility and openness to change for farmers to adapt their innovative proposals (considering seasonal changes, crop diversification strategies, etc).

→ Invite in smallholders' expertise and needs into high-level climate crisis discussions.

→ Co-develop any agricultural technology with women farmers and approach these pilots humbly as a 'silent partner', accepting if the technology fails or it is rejected due to unpredicted consequences.

→ Commission mapping of local community assets, including knowledge on sustainable farming methods, Indigenous farming techniques, prior to any project start, with time built in to project timelines to adapt and contextualise projects at local level.

→ Champion a 'whole of supply chain approach', investing in participatory-action research, particularly with producer and farming communities, that tackles how power relations manifest at each and every level of the value chain.

→ Model and strongly encourage full transparency and accountability mechanisms for German agri-food conglomerates to ensure women's leadership, decision-making power, and control over resources across all parts of the value-chain, including at the cultivation, production, and raw material processing levels where women are most concentrated, as part and parcel of general human rights compliance.

→ Fund Indigenous ways of knowing in agriculture and food sovereignty, facilitating spaces for German agencies to learn from Indigenous Peoples, engaging in reciprocal knowledge sharing rather than information extraction, and avoiding the imposition of German working norms on Indigenous experts.

2.4. Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights

Sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) are one of the pillars of gender equality and remain grossly underfunded within development cooperation (and foreign policy). In an era of growing anti-rights, anti-abortion rights, and anti-gender movements, SRHR progress is under attack and rights are being rolled back at global, regional, and national levels. It is encouraging that the Feminist Development Policy Strategy recognises this threat and that Germany is part of the Action Coalitions on Bodily Autonomy and Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights within the framework of the Generation Equality Forum, committing to strengthen partner countries' health systems and general access to health services for marginalised groups (BMZ 2023b). However,

a (more) comprehensive approach to sexual and reproductive health is needed beyond a focus on access to health service. A feminist SRHR policy needs to identify what has not worked to advance these rights, engage with the feminists, including LGBTQI+ networks making an impact on- and offline in protecting SRHR and countering anti-rights campaigns, and adjust policy and programming accordingly. This also includes a serious need for donor governments to develop better, and more inclusive strategies to address SRHR during humanitarian crisis responses, in particular ensuring better protection of human rights defenders and groups at high risk of compounded discrimination and violence such as disabled persons, the elderly, young women, and LGBTQI+ persons.

"Enough of funding only family planning at the detriment of other issues. We need a comprehensive and inclusive approach. We need to see more investment on the issues that are more at risk LGBTQI+, CSE, abortion rights, sex workers rights and adolescents SRHR rights. This is what is contested, and we risk loss if we don't ensure a comprehensive approach."[23]

Counter anti-gender movements and promote intersectionality

Feminists commended the red thread visible across the BMZ Feminist Development Strategy on countering the anti-gender and anti-rights movement, particularly highlighting the need for intersectional promises to come to life in terms of SRHR funding and programming. By funding and recognising the high degree of harm and risk of rights rollback for the most politically marginalised groups, Germany can truly enact an expansive approach to SRHR, expanding the frame of gender to include gender non-conforming, non-binary, trans, and intersex people, truly walking the talk to bridge their feminist development strategy with their LGBTQI+ inclusion strategy (Federal Government of Germany 2021).[24]

Living up to intersectional values also means proactively seeking out and fostering collaboration with actors who address issues and populations intersectionally with participants arguing that donors (especially in SRHR) force artificial silos by unduly rigid definitions of funding calls and eligibility.[25] Notably, the work and lives of women, girls, and LGBTQI+ persons, revolves around overlapping spheres, for example recognising displacement caused by climate crisis and its effects on menstruation, safe access to abortion, and basic SRHR services.

Feminists cautioned against policy makers approaching SRHR through population control discourse within family planning discussions. Such language mirrors neo-colonial eugenics in promoting SRHR, which not only risks immediate disavowal and rejection of projects wholesale from communities who are tired of being viewed in undignified ways, but also fails to address systemic causes of population growth.

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[23]*Participant, Convening 3.*
[24]*See further discussion in Protecting Politically Marginalised Groups section, p. 58.*
[25]*See also Chapter 1 on Action Areas.*

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

➜ Fund and foster feminist learning alliances and networks on SRHR with grassroots organisations such LGBTQI+, sex workers, youth, and disabled persons to better learn how these movements effectively counter anti-gender actors.

➜ Strengthen the uptake of the German LGBTQI+ strategy amongst programme implementation staff to incentivise funding wider SRHR calls and projects to better include LGBTQI+ organisations and movements.

➜ Promote and resource intersectional movement networks which share similar strategies and campaign challenges in countering anti-gender movements, anti-vaccine movements, and climate-denial movements.

➜ Direct embassies to regularly amplify local feminist messaging and campaigns around SRHR priorities, including outside of key advocacy moments (e.g., International Women's Day and 16 Days of Activism against GBV).

➜ Support long-term advocacy work of politically marginalised and historically excluded groups (e.g., sex workers, LGBTQI+, and disabled persons) to shift narratives, public opinion and social norms on SRHR and human rights.

➜ Provide historically excluded groups with flexible rapid funding (e.g., sex workers, LGBTQI+, and disabled persons) to design and lead their own SRHR service provision.

Understand context-specific barriers to access and resource grassroots work both at the level of service provision and social attitude change

Feminist participants noted the importance of taking a macro-view of SRHR to see how it fits into local and national health system realities, as well as what this means for systemic gaps in population outreach. This is particularly relevant for Germany, as a major ODA donor with a focus on health. Analysed from this perspective, SRHR projects and programmes can better recognise and address major access barriers. What was often observed by feminist participants working in this field, was that feminist development policies have mostly focused on strengthening (existing) health systems, which was not flagged as the 'wrong' approach, but often translated into collaborations between countries in the Global North and big multilateral organisations like UN agencies. Subsequently these collaborations frequently fail to

acknowledge that some health systems do not (or cannot) properly accommodate women and politically marginalised communities, like LGBTQI+ groups, because they must follow the letter of the law in the country, which can be anti-abortion rights, anti-LGBTQI+, and anti-sex worker rights. In practice, feminists shared how this means women and children living with human immunodeficiency viruses (HIV), as just once example, often must find their own ways to access healthcare. In these realities, the funding from WROs and LGBTQI+ organisations become even more critical to filling service gaps left unfilled by government and multilateral organisations. Moreover, WROs and LGBTQI+ organisations do essential work of community organising, surveying and consolidating policy demands, working in coalitions, using locally relevant

feminist analyses, to identify these health system gaps and advocate for better, more inclusive services.

Thematically, participants identified several specific SRHR access barriers which should be considered across planning, conceptualisation, and implementation stages. Access barriers identified include but are not limited to cut-off points at 18 years of age which exclude adolescents, high exclusion of queer people, non-inclusion of persons with disabilities often fostered by discriminatory narratives that persons with disabilities do not have sexual relations, non-inclusion of elderly people, and gaps in accessing information about adoption. Adding to these barriers were overarching

patriarchal blockers, such as the existence of patriarchal authorities (such as boyfriends, fathers, and husbands) who acted as gatekeepers and strong determinants of whether women and girls can access SRHR. Systemic gatekeeping also occurs within the intersections of class and gender, where feminists described how in many contexts, if you are economically privileged or if you are deemed culturally 'desirable' may mean belonging to a dominant ethnic group, having lighter skin complexion, or possessing the ability to speak English (or other dominant colonially-imposed languages such as French, Portuguese, Spanish), you may have more privileged access to (better) SRHR services.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Fund and strengthen movements at the grassroots level that do essential community organising and mapping of SRHR services.
→ Conduct intersectional rapid gender analyses in all emergency responses to identify contextually relevant SRHR needs.
→ Invest in strategies that reduce barriers to access for (diverse groups) of women and other politically marginalised groups in SRHR leadership positions.
→ Work with other governments, multilateral organisations, and intergovernmental bodies to expand primary health care that targets and includes politically marginalised groups.
→ Promote feminist health champions at multiple levels of governance (domestic and in implementing agencies, and national jurisdictions), vetting that said health champions include all groups, including trans women and sex workers, in their health promotion efforts.

Counter anti-gender movements and promote intersectionality

"Our SRHR needs are not recognised (in Morocco), where LGBTQI+ sex is criminalised. Therefore, with rape or sexual harassment you cannot report that to the police or report it generally because there isn't even political recognition....they speak about us as marginalised, but in parliament, they don't speak about us."[26]

As previously mentioned, a feminist SRHR policy must recognise, strengthen, and elevate local expertise and co-creation based on culturally-sound normative frameworks. Building off this evidence, it must then also be informed and adapted by highly varying legal realities in different national jurisdictions, to be considered relevant. Feminist participants reflected on the rollback of Roe v. Wade in the US and how it reverberated globally, illustrating how, when policymakers and policy advocates fail to guarantee sustainable and durable SRHR legal protections, politically marginalised persons are the first to feel the grave and numerous knock-on effects. In response to these consequences, participants articulated a need for feminist development policies to clearly map local SRHR legal contexts, and support feminist civil society and human rights defenders, amplifying their messages, in their work that bridges both SRHR and civic space building activities. This approach both better suits local contexts, where rights are or may be under attack, but also avoids programme irrelevance. One feminist shared how Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) policy dialogues within community conversations, without proper local consultation, resulted in strong focuses on topics like the equal pay gap, which were hardly considered "a real issue" in Honduras where basic SRHR and LGBTQI+ persons' rights to exist, are fundamentally threatened. Feminist SRHR policies that undertake this legal scoping, also then need to make good on their promise to apply decolonial approaches, namely recognising and planning how to counter, and support feminist and LGBTQI+ civil

society in countering colonial-era homophobic 'sodomy' laws, inherited from colonial powers like Germany. To date, it is worth noting that Namibia, Cameroon, Togo, Papua New Guinea, and the Federated States of Micronesia still have anti-LGBTQI+ laws inherited in part or fully from German colonial legal framework, in concert with British and French colonial law. Broadly speaking, a stronger knowledge of inherited colonial anti-LGBTI and anti-abortion rights laws is needed for a Feminist Development Policy to truly address and redress human rights violations against politically marginalised groups.

Similarly, feminists adamantly opposed the ongoing imposition of Eurocentric, top-down and one-size fits all approaches that are rife in SRHR project conceptualisation and policy directives. The enormous risk this poses to women, girls, LGBTQI+ persons, local communities, and local humanitarian and development workers, was flagged as a common yet serious mistake, which further risks backtracking on hard-earned SRHR in ever changing contexts. In practice, these approaches have directly resulted in SRHR being considered "a foreign intervention/interference" because of their failure to contextualise socio-economic, cultural, and political conditions in the societies they operate. In Afghanistan, one feminist explained how "when local traditions were kept in mind, and aid workers steadily worked to build community relationships, they gained the respect of local communities and SRHR projects were well-received. But what made things worse were quick-fix, rapid-rollout

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[26]*Participant, Convening 3.*

approaches without co-partnership with local rightsholders, which could then easily result in increased GBV. Participants also explained that if programmes are led by classist INGOs, or members of elite groups, without grassroots movements, activists, and feminist collectives, it was highly likely there would be no subsequent local ownership or uptake of the SRHR narratives".

When Northern donors continue to elevate the superiority of "technical expertise" above lived experiences, similar limited or risky outcomes can be expected. In these circumstances, (outside) experts typically do not involve end users i.e., communities, and de-prioritise deeper community engagement in adapting and co-creating interventions (tick-box consultation). One example given by participants explained how donors insisted on delivering menstrual cups to a region with no running water, demonstrating just how out of touch funder-prescribed interventions can be as opposed to when interventions are community-driven and centred.

Feminists flagged that by failing to adequately make time and appropriately adapt based on critical community conversations, it is unlikely that implementing agencies will sufficiently understand how a project will (or will not) be accepted by communities. An example offered from a project countering Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), illustrated how even though local research was commissioned, interventions were still largely targeted at eradication. Feminists argued

that a more effective and sustainable approach would have been adapting to the research findings and following the lead of the advocacy work of FGM survivors in the community, which showed that more suitable interventions would aim to address the systemic patriarchal social norms which undervalued girls. Examples such as this underline the importance of not imposing Eurocentric research agendas and timelines, and instead focusing on root issues such as patriarchal social norms, which local feminists often readily identify and have ways of safely shifting.

The integration and anticipation of counter-narratives was also frequently raised as something development projects have often failed to learn and model from activist movements. These movements are by far more successful at shifting narratives, building campaigns and broad coalitions that work within more relevant local normative frameworks, pinpointing where counter-narratives will come from. One example raised was a campaign SRHR activists ran to promote access and uptake of human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccines while predicting the opposition from religious groups. Feminist participants shared the importance of engaging across movements, e.g., connecting SRHR, pro-vaccine, and feminist climate movements, to exchange and learn from each other's strategies, in this case with pre-emptively commissioning and promoting expert narratives to counter religious opposition.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Clearly map local SRHR legal contexts and support feminist civil society and human rights defenders, amplifying their messages as they bridge SRHR and civic space defense work.

→ Recognise and plan how to counter colonial-era homophobic sodomy laws inherited from colonial powers like Germany.

→ Contextualise socio-economic, cultural, and political conditions in the societies to avoid the portrayal and dismissal of SRHR promotion as foreign intervention.

→ Work with and centre grassroots movements to ensure uptake of activities as well as to anticipate and prepare for counter-narratives.

2.5. Protecting Minority Rights

Grassroots feminist and queer organisations are connected in strong cross-cutting networks and community organising that bridge organisations, informal groups, collectives, and formal power holders.

In the German context, this is also particularly important given the existing LGBTQI+ Inclusion Strategy, co-developed by the BMZ and the German Federal Foreign Office. The strategy commits to providing, "structurally sustainable support to the LGBTQI+ human rights work undertaken by civil society, with particular attention to specific vulnerabilities and multiple discrimination" (Federal Government of Germany 2021, p. 6). The commitment of the German government to involve embassy staff and representatives to mainstream human rights protection across development cooperation, with country–specific strategies, is welcomed.

The following recommendations build upon this commitment, particularly to illustrate how a German Feminist Development policy could do this with feminist civil society acting not as a consulted party, but as a full partner and co-lead in protecting human rights. The wide diversity of participants' vantage points provided many deep insights about how Global North donors and implementing agencies can respectfully and locally-centre and support politically marginalised groups' rights. Often, these insights are about promoting mindsets, behavioural, and procedural shifts within development institutions. However, given the precarious safety of many politically marginalised groups, participants also insisted on donors leveraging both their soft power and their strategic programmatic focuses, to protect and strengthen minority groups whose fundamental human rights are often directly threatened.

"The German government needs to be bold and account for shrinking democracy in countries, where certain groups (such as Indigenous Peoples) are labelled as terrorist organisations. Instead of creating a difficult situation for funding (by outright barring eligibility), German mechanisms need to be able discern and be more flexible in countries that have shrinking spaces of democracy." [27]

Ensure that politically marginalised groups have full ownership of interventions concerning them, and prioritise sustainable societal transformation

Feminists from politically marginalised communities explained how tick-box consultations strongly affected their ability to survive and thrive in precarious environments. They advocated for donors to go beyond listening and learning check-ins, or seeking ex-post approval of already drafted policies and strategies. To develop interventions which can transform power inequalities, a feminist development policy should create safe spaces from the outset, where policies can be meaningfully co-created (see chapter 1). One practical step in this direction is funding and supporting locally led research which moves from the margins of societies to the centre, capturing the lived experiences and realities of marginalised groups while avoiding appropriation, research fatigue, or undignified representation.

Such an approach can avoid the unintended causing of harm, for instance through the use of sanctions or blanket cutting of aid as political statements in support of women, LGBTQI+ communities, and other marginalised groups. Participants suggested that in many cases, broad sweeping sanctions are more likely to exacerbate average citizen hardships, especially impacting politically marginalised groups. For instance, regarding Afghanistan, participants reflected how "millions of people are malnourished due to sanctions...what happens to minorities in this context, if they cannot access aid? And

humanitarian organisations stop all activities?"[28] Moreover, there is a risk of providing repressive governments with an opportunity to scapegoat already persecuted groups for the resulting widespread economic hardship and link their struggle for fundamental rights with Western (neo) colonialism. In the same vein, public support can also be dangerous for Indigenous communities that are at risk of extrajudicial violence, or direct discrimination and persecution from the state.

Such complex contexts should not be used as an excuse to do nothing, however.
Instead, it is a call for donors to better engage with politically marginalised groups which can contextualise and translate feminist development policy, and better anticipate and prepare for any worst-case scenarios that could result in (further exacerbated) persecution of minority groups. The Swedish and Canadian approach to feminist development policy has generated positive experiences with mandating and training embassies to do such conscious outreach.

To ensure that programming on minority rights results in long-term system change rather than treating symptoms of inequality, a feminist development policy should also support the essential democratisation work done by marginalised groups. This means recognising their community leadership and

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[27] *Participant, Convening 3.*
[28] *Participant, Convening 3.*

network-strengthening work across all levels – at the grassroots, in social movements, informal groups, and formal political structures. Beyond the imperative to fund feminist groups directly as a key way to support leadership of politically marginalised groups sustainably and humbly, at the formal political level which is more exclusive to politically marginalised groups who face discrimination in electoral periods a Feminist Development Policy should ensure that these groups are more consistently supported, also outside of election cycles. This supports their ability to advocate on behalf of their own communities and sustainably transform oppressive societal norms.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Include Trans organisations and sex worker organisations in all strategy meetings and national project planning.
→ Harmonise Feminist Development Policy with migration policy and provide a clear and expedited path for queer asylum seekers.
→ Promote collaborations between embassies, political foundations, and local LGBTQI+ groups to co-develop rollout of action plans for LGBTQI+ protection in case there is need for rapid deployment.
→ Conduct thorough case-by case analyses with local and regional feminist, particularly LGBTQI+ networks acting in advisory capacity, in weighing the potential use of sanctions.
→ Support researchers who are part of the (affected) community, provide tools, technology, and resources that can allow them to tackle their own issues. For example, African feminist research led and determined by African feminist researchers.
→ Pursue and invest in bridging policy research approaches, e.g., linking LGBTQI+ research to migration policy and research displaced youth LGBTQI+ migrants.
→ Endorse locally led decolonial legal and socio-cultural analyses of local history (including pre-colonisation histories of LGBTQI+ and third gender coexistence) to counter anti LGBTQI+ narratives that came through colonialism and continue to be weaponised by anti-rights actors and movements.
→ Commission locally led action-research into homophobic German colonial laws, publicly acknowledge their far-reaching impact and materially support LGBTQI+ advocacy particularly in Namibia, Cameroon, Togo, Papua New Guinea, and the Federated States of Micronesia.

Re-examine project and funding guidelines and requirements to ensure they are accessible for, and do no harm to politically marginalised groups

In situations where minorities (e.g. LGBTQI+ or Indigenous Peoples) experience conflict and/or direct endangerment from their domestic governments, feminists called on the German government to be much more flexible in the opportunities for supporting local feminist work where safe spaces are shrinking and fundamental human rights protections are being eroded.

It is critical to problematise what is referred to as learning in donor language, which often comes down to theories of change and log frames and recognising that grassroots work on politically marginalised groups does not neatly fit these Eurocentric project management models. Instead, feminists advocated for donors and implementing agencies to formally recognise failures as successes, and as key steps to learning. Donors must reframe their understanding of impact as the headcount of people reached which often leave politically marginalised groups behind. Participants shared that with politically marginalised groups, learning may take more time, because it is more about trial and error to develop approaches towards social transformation than tangible project outputs which can be completed within a typical project timeline of a year or two. A feminist development policy should prioritise spaces where politically marginalised groups can feel safe to fail and re-strategise, without donor pressure and fear of failure resulting in revoked funds or loss of credibility.

Donor visibility requirements should also be contingent on context and responding to the needs of politically marginalised groups. In many cases, politically marginalised groups are under severe threat or risk if they are too visible. Consequently, donor and implementing agency-driven demands for organisations to be highly visible, for example, publicly acknowledging funding, can result in an extremely high risk of violence. As discussed above, high donor visibility may also support narratives that the fight for fundamental rights for politically marginalised groups is a Western imposition.

Finally, as discussed above in 1.2., when it comes to regranting and implementing partners, a 'values check' is a crucial element of a Feminist Development Policy to avoid perpetuating harm against politically marginalised groups. A Feminist Development Policy must ensure that INGOs, regranting organisations, and religious organisations, are not endorsing or proliferating harmful rhetoric or pathologising narratives against minority groups, such as anti-LGBTQI+ or anti-trans. Such an approach of cherry-picking rights at the expense of other minority groups significantly waters down commitments to intersectionality.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Provide core funding for queer movements, including funding queer mental health providers, security for LGBTQI+ and disability activists, and activist rest periods.
→ Resource and quietly facilitate South-South politically marginalised support networks, with no-strings attached funding to determine their own operational and project priorities.

2.6. Education

In 2021, Germany was the largest donor among DAC countries for education. Compared to other DAC donors, Germany allocated a slightly higher percentage of its total ODA to education (10% compared to the 9% DAC average). The majority (91%) of Germany's ODA for education was reported to be bilateral. However, 53% of Germany's education ODA was spent in-country in the form of scholarships. Excluding these costs, Germany only spent 5% of its total ODA on education in 2021 (DonorTracker n.d.). The Feminist Development Policy strategy highlights support for the right to education and lifelong learning for girls and women, recognising it as central to empowerment, social cohesion, and individual development (BMZ 2023b). The Strategy aims to challenge harmful gender norms and ensure equal access to education, formal employment, and decent work while also working to strengthen the care sector, protect labour migrants, and develop social protection systems that address gender-specific risks and inequalities, including unpaid care work. By further emphasising the essential nature of SRHR in the context of education, the strategy appears promising for the formulation of a cohesive, intersectional

approach to education by the BMZ. This is further encouraged by the focus on equitable digital transformation. In its Africa strategy, the BMZ commits itself further supporting basic education, especially through the EU and multilateral development programmes (BMZ 2023c).

Convening participants highlighted the need for intersectional, decolonial, and anti-racist approaches to be meaningfully embedded in education policy design and implementation. They specifically reflected on the complex factors that limit access to quality education in very different contexts across Global South countries. Broadly speaking, they flagged poverty, negative cultural norms and stereotypes, entrenched (neo)colonial attitudes, and conflict as top-level factors that disproportionately affected women and girls, persons with disabilities, LGBTQI+, Indigenous Peoples, rural communities, and other politically and structurally marginalised or overlooked groups.

Four key elements were flagged by feminist participants as vital to a more feminist approach to education in development policy.

Ensure that education development cooperation centres and responds to local needs

Education projects are frequently undertaken in very narrow ways, leading to the construction of schools without adequately addressing barriers to access for instance. It is essential to view education holistically and recognise that schools often serve as crucial providers of various other services. Development policy approaches often crowd out and sometimes compete with pre-existing grassroots and community solutions which are already filling gaps in the formal

education systems of partner countries. In particular, when tackling detrimental social norms, it is important to prioritise local language, experience, and approaches over donor's rhetoric or need for visibility regarding the expansion of rights. Donor countries like Germany should utilise their leverage in multilateral spaces (such as the Global Partnership for Education or Education Cannot Wait initiatives) to ensure that countering harmful social norms, promoting

equality, and supporting community-based solutions is firmly embedded in multilateral education programming.

Participants underscored how in Africa in particular, inadequate access to quality education and educational opportunities, linked with broader conditions of oppression such as entrenched gender inequality and prevailing (neo)colonial attitudes has resulted in significant brain drain to Western countries. Formal educational institutions have been formed based on economic and cultural needs of the former coloniser and the neo-coloniser, which means a deep understanding of what the country needs are, opposed to donor needs should be the primary departing point of funding formal, non-formal, and informal education efforts within the country.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Centre local perspectives in defining the approach in development funding for education, avoiding prescriptive and potentially biased funding. Conversely, support local approaches in changing harmful stereotypes and social norms to avoid stigmatisation of these efforts as colonial ideas.

→ Consider that in many contexts, formal education institutions, especially basic education providers are also key spaces for the provision of a broader set of key services and when properly developed can respond to equitable access to food, mental health services, and clinical services for children.

→ Ensure that interventions respond to broader needs and barriers to accessing education rather than just supporting the symbolic building of a school.

→ Develop interventions in consultation with local marginalised populations to ensure they respond to local needs. Formal education systems in partner countries should not be shaped for the needs of donor market.

→ When development aid is given in the form of scholarships to pursue education in the donor country, these should be made accessible to the broadest possible range of people, for instance pre-existing knowledge of German should not be a condition to apply for a scholarship.

→ Utilise Germany's leverage as the ninth largest donor in the GPE to advocate for gender transformative education, and particularly emphasise funding for comprehensive sexuality education and social emotional learning.

Recognise and resource the grassroots feminist organisations provision of comprehensive sexuality education and community education

Feminist civil society and community-based organisations usually work within the informal and non-formal educational realm, which is largely underfunded, especially if they are working on politically controversial topics such as body autonomy or land rights.

Southern feminist leadership is already at the forefront of providing comprehensive sexuality education, especially in the face

of rights rollbacks or severe restrictions of sexual education provision. Provision of these educational services may often be in direct opposition to government-delivered curricula, which means that feminist civil society do essential counter-narrative and coalition-building work countering mainstreaming media and social narratives that may be perpetuating gender stereotypes and exclusion. Youth activists in particular play a critical role in this regard. A feminist approach to education policy would recognise the critical role of grassroots and youth feminist activists in their efforts to fill the gaps left by government policy.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Acknowledge and resource community education and grassroots comprehensive sexuality education (CSE) provision as key to challenging social norms and educating about rights more broadly, including civic and political rights. Specifically, support CSE Programs and curricula that unpack the (patriarchal) manifestations of sexuality, education, bodies, and safety online.

→ Consider how to remove funding restrictions in dynamic and volatile contexts such as conflict areas and focus on funding what is already happening (formally or informally) in these contexts. At the same time make sure that protection policies are attached to development funding for those who provide basic education for young women and girls in areas where this is illegal or dangerous (e.g Afghanistan).

→ When working on sensitive and controversial topics like queer rights and SRHR, prioritise local experiences over donor needs for visibility where those that the policy is engaging could be put at risk.

→ Proactively create resourced partnerships with youth activists in recognition of the fact they are often un- or underpaid for critical sensitisation and community organising work and face burnout and economic anxieties.

Expanding notions of education, learning, knowledge and supporting Indigenous expertise

In keeping with German Feminist Development Policy Strategy to centre and recognise the needs and rights of Indigenous Peoples, participants also echoed the need for Indigenous ways of knowing to be valued as part of broader support towards education. Particularly conceptualising knowledge, and knowing beyond ways familiar to European or Northern audiences, but in ways that affirm that learning is connected to wisdom related to land and water struggles. Participants shared how a feminist education policy would prioritise these ways of knowing and make linkages between Indigenous-led, youth-led, and climate-focused education, as being a core part of relevant scientific curriculums, particularly for those whose educational rights had been eroded by

colonial forms of education and its long-reaching consequences in shaping curriculum and limiting educational reform. Discussions explored how education projects must recognise that education policies and curriculums have often erased minority history as a way of desensitising masses to a whole different way of looking and being including more gender-egalitarian societies.

However, feminists noted the many opportunities that arise from a respectful and 'leading from behind' approach to centring Indigenous ways of knowing, namely harnessing the power of popular community education forms, including Indigenous teachings and 'nomadic universities', and rural and Indigenous vocational training.

Specifically, Germany's feminist development policy should:

→ Fund archival activism as a way of preserving Indigenous knowledge.
→ Ensure that in-country, there are indigenous representatives that the fund is accountable to when working to preserve indigenous knowledge to avoid an extractive way of preserving, which puts more of a burden on indigenous populations to educate more broadly, rather supporting existing communities and their need to keep both tangible and intangible culture alive.
→ Fund Mental Health programmes in recognition that education systems hardly ever prioritises the mental health of Indigenous communities.
→ Avoid funding simply translating educational material into indigenous languages and instead consider supporting alternative forms of indigenous knowledge transfer.

CONCLUSION

The essence of the preceding chapters can be summarised in one powerful and urgent statement: "Leave no one behind and pay attention to the small organisations doing little things well, including youth activists."

Preceding the Feminist Development Policy, the BMZ had made a rhetorical adjustment in its terminology, shifting from speaking of development *aid* to development *cooperation*, intending to signal a new relationship between Germany and recipient countries, recognising them as equal partners. However, as Global South feminists have argued consistently across the convenings, Germany still fails to meaningfully acknowledge the inherent power imbalances that exist between Germany and its "partner countries". CFFP's 2021 Manifesto for a Feminist Foreign Policy for Germany warned against the continual portrayal of this financial support as a voluntary relief campaign, which diminishes Germany's responsibility as a former colonial power.

Despite rhetorical commitments to meaningfully rebalancing the asymmetrical power relationship in the feminist development policy strategy, there continues to be a pressing need for significant improvements in creating meaningful co-creation structures that actively engage local populations and civil society in the process of defining cooperation goals and interventions. The voices and perspectives of those directly affected by development policies must be heard and integrated into decision-making, and this input cannot be expected without compensation. Throughout the four convenings and extensive desk research conducted, a resounding message emerged: the efforts to shape and mainstream feminist development policy must be a collaborative endeavour between Global South and North feminist organisations. Global North organisations need to use their privilege, position, and fundraising opportunities to make space for Global South voices to be heard by donor countries. A Feminist Development Policy should wholeheartedly support this notion. Feminist organisations based in the Global North have significant power in the form of networks, political and social capital, fundraising opportunities, and ability to access donor governments: these should be leveraged to better support feminist organisations based in the Global South. They must prioritise feminist advancing anti-racism and decolonisation initiatives as a key condition for Southern feminist organisations to be able to conduct their work and be treated equally as experts. They must also hold Northern governments to account.

They must learn to lead from behind, by allocating resources equitably, ceding decision-making power, and amplifying policy priorities of Southern Feminists. Global North feminists should co-develop the ideas of feminist foreign and development policies with Southern feminists, noting the existing significant policy and research expertise as well as advocacy efforts underway by Pan-African feminists to shape and influence what a regional or multiple regional African feminist foreign policies should look like. Northern feminist climate organisations and movements must be vocal in maintaining the focus on loss and damage and mitigation discourses but also integrate into their efforts work on progressive taxation, debt cancellation, and broader tax and trade justice, as one of the most significant means of addressing and redressing the

climate crisis and acting in solidarity with Southern feminist movements, recognising the increasing difficulty to neatly separate the policy areas of climate justice, economic justice, and food sovereignty.

Listening and learning is no longer an option. Humility as an alibi to avoid meaningful change or progress at a snail's pace is simply unacceptable. Wanting to do no harm can no longer be an excuse for not doing anything at all. The lessons learned from Sweden and Canada clearly demonstrate that the impact of a Feminist Development Policy, the change it brings, and the real stories of transformation from feminists must be effectively communicated. This is particularly crucial when engaging with the electoral base and bureaucratic systems in Germany that may not fully comprehend the significance of feminist approaches to foreign and policy.

While Germany hesitates, the landscape of international donors is rapidly evolving around it. Look no further than Canada, the Netherlands, and the thriving ecosystem of feminist funders across every region. Organisations like: Lead from South, AWDF,

Mama Cash, FRIDA, Pacific Feminist Fund, We Are Purposeful, Doria Feminist Fund, Urgent Action Fund, Sister Funds, Women's Fund Asia, Equality Fund, Astraea Fund, Fondo de Mujeres del Sur (FMS), Fondo Semillas, Xoese The Francophone Women's Fund, South Asia Women's Foundation India, Women's Fund in Georgia, Bulgarian Fund for Women, and Collaborative Fund for Central and Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central and North Asia (Ceeccna) are setting a remarkable precedent.

Germany has the opportunity to be a beacon for feminist development policy, and we believe that it has the potential to live up to this role. This paper is not just a plea; it is a clarion call, a manifesto demanding immediate action. We present ready-made recommendations directly from global South feminists to facilitate the necessary change and complement these with an action inventory for donors. Minimum standards are clearly outlined in this document, but they are just that: minimum standards. The time for rhetoric and delay is long past. It is our collective responsibility to support small, grassroots organisations and empower youth activists, leaving no one behind.

ANNEX I ACTION INVENTORY

High-Level Policymaker and Programme Portfolio Level

➜ 4I approach
  ➲ Inclusive across all social groups:
    • How inclusive is the policy? Has it been designed participatory?
    • Who is actually benefiting?
    • How do we ensure that aid does not contribute to endangering women's and LGBTQI+ rights?
  ➲ Intersectional:
    • Which politically marginalised groups are you targeting?
    • How are you doing that safely and being led by their needs and expertise?
  ➲ Implementable:
    • How will you implement the policy so that it reaches the intended groups?
  ➲ Intentional investment:
    • How will you invest into reaching groups you have not historically engaged?
    • How will you invest in adapting a project or policy if it has unintended consequences or fails to meet its feminist outcomes?

Processes at the Programme Design and Grant Proposal Level

➜ How were selections made about what subject areas you would fund?
➜ What biases or filters may have contributed to the proposed project direction?
➜ What underlying assumptions need to be acknowledged?
➜ How have with local feminist experts who may offset these biases and assumptions been meaningfully consulted?
➜ How have power imbalances which may make open and honest conversations with feminists difficult been addressed?
➜ In what ways is safe space enabled for to share and learn in feminist consultation processes?
➜ Where are events hosted? Are they hosted in major (unaffordable) hotel and conference venues? How will those outside capital cities access? Is there a comfortable space for feminists to gather?

Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion and Decolonisation as Praxis in Development Cooperation – Internal Organisational Level

➜ What are the resources that have been allocated for racialised women to do anti-racism and decolonising work within development co-operation?
➜ What will be the internal policies and protections in place to enable this in both the medium and long-term?
➜ How many racialised women and LGBTQI+ persons are there in the gender advisory teams? How many of these women and LGBTQI+ persons are in decision-making positions?

MEAL (monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning approach)

→ How are the MEAL processes feminist? What are examples of bottom-up accountability in the work? How does the MEAL plan make space for "failure"? What parts of the current MEAL practices will be deprioritised for the institution to be more feminist and decolonial partner?
→ How will more flexibility be built into timelines?

Funding

→ What non INGOs and Global North-based organisations is there cooperation with and how are they paid and compensated for their expertise? What salary, labour rights, pension and other entitlements disparities exist between staff in Global North and staff in Global South? How will future budgets close these gaps?
→ What is the percentage breakdown of grassroots or regional-national CSO/NGOs to INGOs being partnered with? Of those grassroots or Southern regional or national CSO/NGOs, how many are LGBTQI+, sex worker or disability focused?
→ How is locally led research and evidence gathering being funded? How much of the research efforts and budgets are led by local feminists and researchers? How are funding barriers removed? What mechanisms will be changed or created to better fund small or unregistered feminist organisations rapidly?

In Partner Countries

→ How have developed local networks of feminists been developed over time? What are examples of consistent engagement beyond International Women's Day or the 16 Days of activism?
→ How are these networks compensated for sharing their expertise with German agencies? How are embassies cultivating long-term networks of local feminists?
→ How are they supporting feminists in areas with shrinking civic space? How much of local research efforts and budgets are led by local feminists and researchers? How will local feminist research and leadership be incentivised in all future projects? Where will the institution step back, acting as a silent partner sharing space and resources with more qualified feminist local experts?

ANNEX II FEMINIST FUNDING

The following examples from feminist funds, Canada, and the Netherlands provide points for reflection on how to concretely resource a feminist development policy. They demonstrate substantial investments in aid, specifically aimed at strengthening feminist movements, with such strong outcomes that they continue to grow in size and have received positive feedback directly from feminists. Notably, each has its own mechanisms with their relative strengths in providing, flexible, rapid, direct, and no-strings attached funding to diverse feminist organisations, which can act as a roadmap for German's feminist development policy.

The Netherlands

Despite being one of the most recent states to commit to a feminist foreign and development policy, the Netherlands has a long track record of feminist funding practices through Southern feminist relationship-building and routinely collaborating with and being open to Dutch feminist civil society. Participants noted that although the Netherlands recently declared an FFP, in their experiences, the Netherlands has been a leader in flexible and direct funding mechanisms and with one of the largest amounts of ODA that has gender equality as a principal objective (ICRW 2022).

The Netherlands directly funds Southern feminist civil society, through mechanisms like the Lead from the South Fund, which includes the African Women's Development Fund, the International Indigenous Women's Forum, Fondo de Mujeres del Sur, and Women's Fund Asia. These are all Global South based feminist funds that distribute the grants directly to local WROs. The first phase of Leading from the South in 2017 had a budget of EUR 42 million over 4 years, before being scaled up in 2020 with funding of EUR 80 million over 5 years (Channel Foundation 2021).

On top of these relatively sizeable funds, they also fund many other feminist Consortia, such as the Global Alliance for Green & Gender Action (GAGGA), which includes Mama Cash, FCAM and Both Ends, and, "works to strengthen and unify the capabilities of community-based women's rights and environmental justice groups and movements" and generally uses a trust-based model when working with Consortia. Participants offered examples noting how Dutch funders worked to foster open and respectful dialogues with grantees, and proved to be receptive to criticism. Some participants also shared how when issues were raised around feminist practices not being followed by private sector actors that also receive Dutch funding, government officials had been open to listening, responding, and reacting accordingly. Anecdotally, several participants shared how upon following alarming updates on LGBTQI+ safety and human rights violations, Dutch donors exemplified their solidarity and trust-based approach, by reaching out to local feminist organisations and offering their tangible (financial or resource) support in these circumstances. This is of course only possible and predicated on a) well-developed and well-respected Southern feminist relationships and b) funding mechanisms that allow for rapid and flexible disbursements, which can be more responsive and adaptive.

Canada - Women's Voice and Leadership Programme

As part of the Canadian Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), the Women's Voice and Leadership (WVL) Programme was established as a flagship programme within FIAP, that would run over 5 years, channelling CAD $150 million across 30 countries. WVL was intended to respond to the significant funding and capacity gaps facing women's rights organisations (WROs) in the global South, by providing them and the movements they represent with direct funding, and capacity building support to advance the rights of women, girls, and gender-diverse people. All WVL projects had common design features, including the provision of four types of support: multi-year core grants; fast, flexible, and responsive grants; organisational capacity building support; and network and alliance strengthening. In addition, all WVL projects had to ensure that as much funding as possible would flow to WROs, with a 50 percent floor on direct/indirect funding going to WROs and a 37 percent cap on project management costs. Crucially, unlike almost all major donors, the WVL programme was remarkably not driven by donor-selected priorities. Instead, a cornerstone of the programme was aiming for high context-relevance and flexibility. For example, in one context, WVL supported the initiation of a well-being fund for feminists.

Feminist Funds

While participants did not name specific funds, there are numerous ones that have been working for decades, proving that flexible feminist funding is not only viable, but that it is often more successful, more participatory, more locally led and more transformative, than conventional aid funding. Participants shared that feminist funders have been successful at mobilising large amounts of money from larger private progressive philanthropic organisations and then serve as funders themselves, enabling them to fund even more organisations, with (relatively) no strings attached or micro management.

With decades worth of donor education, often citing their established evidence base of gender-transformative outcomes, and demonstrating their well-developed regional and international feminist networks, feminist funders can sub-grant small and large pots of funding to systematically under-resourced feminist movements. In practice, this means feminist funders have been able fund more intersectionality, e.g., reaching youth, Indigenous peoples, Black and Brown-led racial equity organisations, sex worker organisations, disability justice organisations, and LGBTQI+ organisations. This is a huge strength that was noted of feminist funders, and something that INGOs simply cannot do to the same scale or level of wide-reaching impact, because of credibility, bureaucratic, and local legitimacy issues. Some examples of feminist funding trailblazers in terms of the volume of money they move, and the quality of funding, underpinned by feminist processes, are the Red Umbrella Fund, the Black Feminist Fund, UHAI EASHRI, Mama Cash, Urgent Action Fund and its Sister Funds in Asia and Africa, among many others. These funders provide ample evidence and documentation of their many successes and their lessons learned, highly topical for any states pursuing a feminist foreign or development policy.

ANNEX III PARTICIPANTS

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And dozens of other feminists who preferred to stay anonymous. Thank you!

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
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