


**MAKE  
FOREIGN  
POLICY  
FEMINIST**

A Feminist Foreign Policy  
Manifesto for Germany

---

**A Feminist Foreign Policy  
is the most promising response  
to the biggest challenges  
of our times.**



<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b>	03
<b>GLOSSARY</b>	08
<b>1 PURPOSE AND DEFINITION</b>	
1.1 Purpose of the Manifesto	12
1.2 Definition of a German Feminist Foreign Policy	13
<b>2 PRINCIPLES</b>	14
<b>3 POLICY AREAS</b>	
3.1 Feminist Approach to Peace and Security	16
3.2 Feminist Approach to Human Rights and the Rule of Law	19
3.3 Feminist Approach to Demilitarisation, Disarmament, and Arms (Export) Control	24
3.4 Feminist Approach to Climate Justice	27
3.5 Feminist Approach to Development Cooperation	31
3.6 Feminist Approach to Asylum and Migration	36
3.7 Feminist Approach to Health	40
3.8 Feminist Approach to Trade and International Investment	43
3.9 Feminist Approach to Decolonising Foreign Policy	47
3.10 Feminist Approach to Countering the Anti-Gender Movement	50
3.11 Feminist Approach to the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda	54
<b>4 STRUCTURAL CHANGES</b>	
4.1 Feminist Approach to Communication	56
4.2 Feminist Approach to Participation and Leadership	59
4.3 Feminist Approach to Cooperation with Feminist Civil Society	61
<b>5 CONCLUSION</b>	63
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	64

The authors would like to thank Cornelius Adebahr, Louise Arimatsu (London School of Economics), Leonie Bremer (Fridays for Future Germany), Sophie Gepp, Alexia Knappmann (Amnesty International), Sarah Kohrt (Hirschfeld-Eddy Foundation), Hannah Lang (ONE), Line Niedeggen (Fridays for Future Germany), Paul Schnase (Universities Allied for Essential Medicines), Silke Trommer (University of Manchester), Nicola Popovic (Gender Associations), Allison Pytlak (WILPF) and Ariane Wolf (Violence Prevention Network) for providing valuable comments and feedback.

---

## **IMPRESSUM**

Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy CFFP gGmbH  
Langenscheidtstraße 12B  
10827 Berlin, Germany

Make Foreign Policy Feminist. A Feminist Foreign Policy Manifesto for Germany

**Authors:** Nina Bernarding, Kristina Lunz, Sheena Anderson, Antonia Baskakov, Damjan Denkovski, Annika Kreitlow, and Anna Provan.

**Editors:** Katie Washington, Janika Lohse

**Design:** Corissa Bagan

Copyright ©2021 Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy

Copies of the Manifesto can be downloaded from the CFFP website at:

**[www.centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/reports](http://www.centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/reports)**

**Suggested Quotation:** CFFP (2021). Make Foreign Policy Feminist. A Feminist Foreign Policy Manifesto for Germany. Available at: [www.centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/reports](http://www.centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/reports).

Please contact CFFP for permission to reproduce any part of the content of this report.

**Email:** [nina@centreforffp.org](mailto:nina@centreforffp.org) | [kristina@centreforffp.org](mailto:kristina@centreforffp.org)

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The upcoming federal elections offer the opportunity for a substantial and welcome change in German foreign policy. We believe that a Feminist Foreign Policy can provide solutions to increasing inequalities, increasing militarisation and (nuclear) armament, the climate emergency, unprecedented attacks on the rights of women and LGBTQI\* people, and the rise of authoritarian political leaders around the world.

A Feminist Foreign Policy acknowledges that the historical practice of foreign and security policy has led to a most insecure, unequal, and destructive global status quo that is failing most people. A Feminist Foreign Policy re-envision a country's national interests by prioritising feminist understandings of security and shifting the focus from the state to the individual as the primary referent of security. A Feminist Foreign Policy questions who has power and why. In doing so, a Feminist Foreign Policy proactively seeks to eradicate the injustices, oppression, and exclusion, which uphold dominant and oppressive power structures. It recognises that existing foreign policy is influenced by patriarchal and racist stereotypes and colonial legacies, and it works to overcome these influences.

## A Feminist Foreign Policy for Germany

A German Feminist Foreign Policy would define its interactions with other states, supranational organisations, multilateral forums, civil society, and social movements in a way that prioritises - across all foreign policy areas - feminist peace, gender equality, climate justice, and the eradication of inequalities as it would acknowledge those as the key obstacle to achieving sustainable peace. It would promote and protect human rights and elevate the everyday lived experience of marginalised communities. It would disrupt colonial, racist, patriarchal, sexist, exploitatively capitalist, and militarised power structures. It would be accountable to those it impacts and would allocate significant resources to achieve this vision.

This manifesto intends to encourage and support those inside the next government to begin the process of systematically changing how Germany's foreign policy operates, whom it is made for, and whom it is informed by. It introduces what a Feminist Foreign Policy would look like for Germany, including a proposed definition of a German Feminist Foreign Policy. We analyse existing German Federal Foreign Policy and outline principles of a German Feminist Foreign Policy and its priority areas, presenting action items (recommendations) for a radically different way of conducting foreign policy.

## **Key Priority Areas**

### **1. Peace and Security**

A Feminist Foreign Policy prioritises feminist understandings of security over militarised conceptions of state security. It strives for more than the absence of violent conflict, inter-state or otherwise. It actively commits resources to overcome structural inequalities and transform violent militarised power relations. A Feminist Foreign Policy insists on inclusivity and transparency in decision-making processes from the local to the global in all matters of peace and security. Germany currently anchors its foreign policy priorities and decision-making in a central concern for the 'territorial integrity' and 'sovereignty' of the state. The German government has steadily increased its military expenditure since 2015, spending nearly 45 billion euros in 2020. Comparatively, Germany spent only 40 million euros on disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control, and only 400 million euros on crisis prevention, stabilisation, and peace support in 2020. Germany also lacks transparency and inclusivity in who influences peace and security decisions. Implementing a German Feminist Policy would include developing a national strategy for peace, outlining concrete steps to overcome structural inequalities, militarised power relations, and militarisation, and limit the influence of the defence industry, increase transparency and improve accountability towards civil society.

### **2. Human Rights and the Rule of Law**

A Feminist Foreign Policy is informed by international human rights law (IHRL) and understands human rights through an inclusive and intersectional lens. A Feminist Foreign Policy acknowledges that to push for human rights credibly and effectively at an international level, Germany also needs to fulfil its obligations under IHRL in a domestic policy that exercises the same values within the country's borders it does outside. Whilst Germany has ratified most international human rights treaties and is an outspoken supporter of international human rights law, critical gaps remain. For example, there are discrepancies between Germany's human rights obligations under international human rights law and Germany's implementation of these obligations, especially regarding sexual reproductive health and rights (SRHR) at home and abroad. There is also a lack of consistency, strategy, and coherence within the German government. A German Feminist Foreign Policy would include, at a minimum, ensuring that the German law fully reflects Germany's obligations under IHRL, committing significant resources to prioritise, strengthen, and implement IHRL.

### **3. Demilitarisation, Disarmament, and Arms (Export) Control**

International demilitarisation, disarmament, and arms (export) control are central pillars of a Feminist Foreign Policy. With an explicit emphasis on pursuing and promoting feminist security, a Feminist Foreign Policy rejects the notion that peace and security can be achieved through subordination, violence, and war. Instead, a Feminist Foreign Policy sheds light on militarised security structures' role in generating violent conflict. A Feminist Foreign Policy envisions an international system where power is not determined by the military capacity and potential for profit does not eclipse humanitarian concerns. Germany also continues to be the fourth-biggest exporter of arms globally and actively resisted international disarmament efforts, refusing to sign or ratify the *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)*. Implementing a Feminist Foreign Policy would require Germany to take more responsibility internationally for disarmament and arms control. It would require the government to end arms production and export and take meaningful steps towards investing in peace and not in war.

#### 4. Climate Justice

A Feminist Foreign Policy is committed to mitigating the climate crisis as much as possible, strengthening climate justice, and supporting people in adapting to new circumstances. A Feminist Foreign Policy recognises the existing intersecting inequalities and power dynamics and imbalances – between states and within states – as one of the biggest issues to tackle in the pursuit of climate justice. Germany only reached its climate goals in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, with greenhouse gas emissions rising again in the first quarter of 2021. Existing German climate legislation is significantly lacking. It is missing concrete plans to achieve a coal phase-out, generally moving too slowly, mission after 2030 remains vague, greenhouse gas emissions linger on a high level, and some areas were not touched enough or at all. A German Feminist Foreign Policy would consider the climate crisis as one of the biggest threats to both international and national security and act accordingly. This includes acknowledging and addressing the power inequalities inherent in the climate crisis and recognising Germany's responsibility in contributing to the crisis as a wealthy and industrialised nation and former colonial empire.

#### 5. Development Cooperation

A feminist approach to development cooperation prioritises intersectional (gender and racial) equality and justice over focusing on poverty reduction measured through economic indicators. It closely supports and works with feminist civil society, particularly in the Global South. Currently, Germany only ranks 15th among DAC countries in terms of its ODA spending on gender equality relative to the size of its economy. The share of projects with a principal

gender focus is minuscule (1.9 percent) and far behind the DAC average (5.5 percent). Recently, the BMZ has rhetorically adjusted its terminology from Development Aid (*Entwicklungshilfe*) to Development Cooperation (*Entwicklungszusammenarbeit*). However, the German government has not publicly stated that it recognises that development cooperation continues to be influenced by colonial thinking and knowledge production. Consequently, it fails to acknowledge the inherent power inequalities between Germany and 'partner' countries. A German Feminist Foreign Policy would acknowledge that development aid is fundamentally a colonial structure and work towards decolonising this policy area. Germany should also increase financial commitments to decrease inequalities, increase gender spending in education, production, health, water and sanitation, government and civil society, and economic infrastructure, and strengthen internal capacities to implement feminist development cooperation.

#### 6. Migration

A Feminist Foreign Policy strives to tackle the underlying conditions of inequality and insecurity that can drive (forced) migration. A Feminist Foreign Policy understands (forced) migration as a human concern and challenges widespread depictions of (forced) migration as a 'hard', militarised security issue. It recognises the inherent violence of border checks, detentions, returns, profiling, and surveillance that often reinforce unequal power relations, reproduce colonial hierarchies, and increase circumstances of insecurity, particularly for women, children, and LGBTQI\* individuals. Until last year, Germany remained the most accommodating country for asylum seekers in the European Union (EU). It now occupies the second position in the EU and is home to the fifth-largest refugee population globally. However, the current German government continues to promote discourse that characterises migration as a security issue. Implementing a Feminist Foreign Policy would radically reform migration and asylum policies and practices at domestic and international levels.

## 7. Global Health

A Feminist Foreign Policy advocates for global health free from discrimination and power inequalities within and among states. It is informed and guided by the principle of the human right to health. A Feminist Foreign Policy provides considerable resources to secure access to health and well-being for everyone. It puts the needs of the most marginalised at its centre – both at home and abroad. The feminist values of this approach are equally prioritised in a country's international and domestic health policies. Germany seeks to be a major player within the international field of global health, but critical gaps remain in both policy and practice. A German Feminist Foreign Policy would ensure Germany's global and domestic health policies are guided by the principle of health as a human right and end all forms of discrimination within Germany's domestic healthcare system.

## 8. Trade and Investment

A Feminist Foreign Policy acknowledges that trade and investment policies are highly gendered. It highlights that trade and investment policies can negatively contribute to rising in-country and country-country inequalities, increasing the care burden on women, or block states from enacting policies to combat inequality. A Feminist Trade Policy actively invests human and political resources to address the unevenly distributed effects of international trade and globalisation to overcome structural inequalities through redefining the purpose of global trade away from economic growth and towards a feminist understanding of security, including economic justice. The German government still primarily defines the goal of trade as economic growth (measured in GDP/GNI) and believes that this is the best way to foster prosperity for all. Implementing a German Feminist Policy would include strengthening internal capacities and resources to design and implement feminist trade policies, promoting equality through international feminist trade policies, advocating for feminist international trade law at the EU level, and decolonising German and international trade.

## 9. Decolonising Foreign Policy

A Feminist Foreign Policy of a former colonial power like Germany takes full responsibility for all colonial crimes and their impacts today. This means allowing people in former colonies to reclaim what was taken from them and their communities and fully honour their roots and heritage; return stolen objects and arts; and actively tackle postcolonial structures and systemic violence that keep racism, white supremacy, and unequal power relations. It means understanding and facing the colonial and racial histories, and trauma people and entire countries have been suffering from and still do. Germany's Foreign Policy must genuinely address its colonial past and engage in decolonising foreign policy discourses. As a former coloniser, Germany should actively counter colonial structures and processes within government institutions and prioritise relations with former colonies and descendants of affected communities.

## 10. Countering Anti-Gender Movements

A Feminist Foreign Policy acknowledges that anti-gender campaigns are not an academic or policy debate but a concerning global development that renders many politically marginalised individuals and communities around the world insecure through initiatives and efforts to (further) restrict the rights of women, LGBTQI\*, and migrants and racialised communities, among others. A Feminist Foreign Policy commits to countering the increasingly transnational efforts of anti-gender activities driven by governments, think tanks, parties, concerned citizens' groups and religious groups and actively promote the rights of women and LGBTQI\* individuals and communities, both at home and abroad. Implementing a German Feminist Foreign Policy means committing significant resources to counter-anti-gender movements, including strengthening internal capacities to advance women's and LGBTQI\* rights domestically; investing political capital and leverage Germany's position internationally towards promoting gender equality; supporting feminist civil society; and enabling continued knowledge-building on anti-gender campaigns globally.



### **11. Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)**

A Feminist Foreign Policy recognises the transformative approach of the WPS agenda. Above all, a Feminist Foreign Policy upholds the original aims of the WPS agenda of conflict prevention and rolling back escalating levels of militarisation. A feminist approach to WPS calls out the increasing militarisation of security and coherently implements the domestic and foreign policy agenda in an intersectional and decolonised manner. In recent years, the German government has increasingly been willing to invest political and human resources to advance the agenda nationally and internationally. It is currently implementing its third WPS National Action Plan (NAP), which represents progress. However, Germany's NAP focuses predominantly on initiatives outside Germany's state borders. Further, Germany does not commit to an explicit feminist peace policy agenda, including disarmament and ending arms exports. A German Feminist Foreign Policy would explicitly pursue a feminist conflict prevention and peace agenda, implement the WPS agenda within domestic policies, and institutionalise cooperation with civil society, including from conflict-affected societies.

### **12. Inclusive Communication**

A Feminist Foreign Policy prioritises anti-racist, inclusive, gender-responsive language. Communicating effectively to people domestically and abroad and actively addressing power inequalities perpetuated through exclusive language is imperative. This means acknowledging the diverse experiences of different people, being aware that language and the way language is used is not free of discrimination and power relations. It means adapting societal and public discourses to anti-racism, equality, and inclusivity and communicating clearly and accessibly for everyone. Implementing a German Feminist Policy would require ensuring that every form of communication and publication, internal or external, is reviewed with a specific focus on anti-racist, inclusive, and gender-responsive language. A Feminist Foreign Policy also requires the active communication of gender equality and racial justice aspirations in statements, speeches, and external communication materials. This is a crucial step towards raising awareness of inequalities and changing the exclusive narrative of current foreign policy formulation.

### **13. Participation and Leadership**

A Feminist Foreign Policy must be based on the equal and fair distribution of power in all institutions and across all levels to ensure equal representation of all people's needs, lived experiences, and perspectives. Equal representation results in better policies and means that the government will represent the diverse populations it serves. A Feminist Foreign Policy puts the responsibility on those in power to explain or change the overrepresentation of white cisgender men in power instead of asking the marginalised to justify their inclusion. A German Feminist Foreign Policy would require acknowledging and committing to changing structural power hierarchies and strengthening institutional capacities to drive feminist change and gender and racial equality throughout Germany's foreign and security policy.

### **14. Cooperation and Feminist Civil Society**

A Feminist Foreign Policy must cooperate with, support, and enhance the capacities of feminist civil society. Feminist civil society continues to be the key driver of social justice, particularly regarding the protection and advancement of the rights of marginalised groups. The German government acknowledges the importance of civil society for social cohesion and the rights and needs of marginalised actors, but quantity and quality of exchange between the German government and feminist civil society vary enormously across the foreign policy sphere. The German grant law (*Zuwendungsrecht*) also complicates financial support for civil society. It often impedes long-term, easy-to-administer funding, particularly for smaller women's rights organisations and movements to work towards public and policy change. Implementing a German Feminist Policy would include protecting and encouraging civil society engagement by strengthening accountability towards civil society, promoting dialogue between civil society and government, and ensuring funding is available and accessible for activists and movements (instead of only fully established organisations).

## **ANTI-GENDER MOVEMENT**

The anti-gender movement is a highly organised (but not centralised), well-funded, transnational movement working on the domestic and international level to undermine women's rights, LGBTQI\* rights, and civil society participation. Anti-gender actors include governments, think tanks, parties, concerned citizens' groups and religious groups. While they position themselves in opposition to 'gender' or related concepts and rights, their efforts are about maintaining or promoting social and political hierarchies in the face of their (perceived) decline. Their efforts aim at advancing an alternative understanding of the world order, one where the rights of certain groups take precedence over others. Further, while we argue that we are witnessing a non-centralised movement, we believe that all anti-gender campaigns can be understood as part of a (loosely defined) anti-gender movement. Therefore, we will refer to the singular anti-gender movement, with the caveat that it is an umbrella term for various individual campaigns. For more information, please see Denkovski et al. (2021).

## **DISCRIMINATION**

As an organisation that puts people at the heart of its work, we understand discrimination primarily in terms of the prejudicial treatment of individuals and groups based on characteristics such as race, class, gender, age, disability, and sexual orientation, as well as many others. Discrimination serves as an umbrella term capturing discriminatory thinking, practices, and structures that manifest in subtle and/or visible ways to perpetuate inequality and oppression. It is employed as a dividing tool that creates hierarchies to legitimise the unequal distribution of opportunities, resources, and power in societies. As individuals, we might experience discrimination or multiple forms of discrimination as an everyday reality in the form of subtle 'microaggressions'. This is particularly true for marginalised groups and people facing intersectional oppression such as queer Black, Indigenous and People of Colour (BIPoC).

## **FEMINISM**

Feminism refers to a set of philosophies that drive political organising. Its primary goal is to end all types of oppression, injustices, and power hierarchies, including sexism, racism, classism, colonialism, and imperialism, among others. Feminism serves as a tool to both analyse and question existing power hierarchies and present new and alternative visions for equal and just societies for all. For us, intersectionality is a core tenant of feminism, meaning the everyday lived experiences of marginalised people with diverse backgrounds, experiences, and identities are taken into account. By basing CFFP's work on the principles of intersectional feminism, which include equality, justice, solidarity, and transparency, among others, we acknowledge the movements, organisations, and individuals that came before us and on whose shoulders we stand today.

# **GLOSSARY**

## **GENDER**

Gender is a societal construct with associated traits used to differentiate people based on their sex assigned at birth. The distinction between 'gender' and 'sex' (the biological characteristics a person is born with) was first employed by feminist scholars in the 1970s. Gender is influenced by laws, politics, media, family structures, and religion, and more. However, gender is more than a set of ideas; gender acts to organise power relations. It hierarchically structures human relationships and activities within society and labels them as 'masculine' and 'feminine', thus categorising people. Simply put, gender acts as a determinate regarding our positions and roles in society to sustain power hierarchies amongst people, communities, and states. When talking about gender in international politics, we do not necessarily refer to the gender of policymakers and decision-makers, but rather to the gendered dimensions of who has access to power and why and whose needs are being accounted for and whose are not.

## **INTERSECTIONALITY**

Intersectionality is both a concept and analytical tool to describe how systems of oppression like racism, sexism, classism, ableism, among others, are interconnected and can be mutually dependent. Coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989, the term was originally used to describe the oppression that Black women experience due to both their gender and race. The concept has since expanded in its usage to encompass a wide variety of forms of oppression. To effectively tackle discrimination, all aspects of identity, privilege, and oppression must be considered in conjunction rather than in isolation. The principles behind intersectional thought have been developed and emphasised for more than 150 years, rooted in the experiences and struggles of Black women. Accordingly, whenever one talks about intersectionality, it is essential to centre intersectional thought in Black feminism.

## **MILITARISATION AND MILITARISM**

Militarisation describes the gradual cultural, symbolic, and material preparation for armed conflict (Enloe, 2000). If a state militarises its foreign policy, it invests in military strength and capability – for example, by building up its armed forces and weaponry and by seeking military bases and allies. Albeit most visible, military power depends not only on the size of a state's army or the number of (heavy) weapons it possesses but also on the naturalisation and normalisation of the military in all parts of society (Reardon 1996; Enloe, 2000). It also depends on "non-material, cultural or psychological aspects like moral values, behaviour patterns, [and] emotional appeals" known as militarism – a way of thought that acts on discursive and symbolic levels (Naidu, 1985, p.1). Militarism is guided by the idea that force is an appropriate option to pursue state interest (Ibid). It is accompanied by and reinforces militarisation – and vice versa. The state's constant militaristic preparation for war is sustained not only through the discursive construction of 'enemies' and 'threats' (such as competing states, terrorism, or crime) in security rhetoric but also through the integration of militarism into other spheres of everyday life, for example, with children toys, games, advertisements, food labels, movies, and camouflage patterns in clothing (Enloe, 2000). Societies are prepared for the possibility of war from childhood onwards through the messaging they receive during education, in the media, and through cultural norms as the state works to continuously reinforce the notion that "military capability is the most meaningful and effective instrument for achieving any or all national goals, and that soldiers, weapons and wars are the most necessary and noble tools for national protection and advancement" (ibid, p.3). This process is so pervasive and taken for granted that it becomes normalised, thus forming an unconscious part of everyday life (Enloe, 1983; 2007).

## MARGINALISED GROUPS/MARGINALISATION

Marginalised groups consist of people who are assigned or assign themselves to certain groups that are historically, systematically, and traditionally excluded from positions of power. These groups are placed at the margins of society and are most impacted by inequality, oppression, and discrimination. The experiences of marginalised groups and the process of marginalisation are conditioned by social, political, economic, and cultural hierarchies, as well as violence that (in)visibly impact the everyday lives of people. This is experienced, for instance, through police brutality and by being deprived of the right to vote. Such hierarchies do not only exist outside but further within and between marginalised groups. The process of marginalisation serves as an instrument of power for those benefiting from a system of oppression and exclusion that privileges individual gains over solidarity and community. At the same time, marginalisation is a reminder to incorporate the disruption of unequal power structures in our everyday being and activism. It has served as a point of departure for revolutionary movements such as anti-colonial struggles in the past and present.

## PATRIARCHY

Historically, patriarchy described a societal structure in which status, land, property, and rights are managed by fathers and passed on to their sons. Although this system is seen in fewer and fewer places worldwide, society is still organised around sustaining men's power. We, then, understand patriarchy as institutionalised sexism that perpetuates male privilege and hegemonic masculinity. It is important to note that not all men benefit equally from the patriarchy due to factors like race, class, sexuality, or ability. It, therefore, cannot be simplified as the 'rule of men' but a social system that values and upholds certain racist, classist, and ableist ideas about hegemonic masculinity, which women and marginalised people are also capable of upholding.

## PEACE

Peace is more than the absence of war; it is the absence of all forms of structural violence and oppression. Applying an intersectional feminist perspective, peace advances demilitarisation, equality, justice, and the dismantling of discriminatory structures. To adapt to constantly changing circumstances, peace requires a constant reflection

of how we think and approach it, questioning the historically masculine and Western understanding of peace. Feminist peace must offer alternatives based on the knowledge and needs of the most marginalised members. The absence of women and marginalised groups at peace negotiations have led to the continuation and reinvigoration of systems of exclusion and injustice. Without the various and diverse perspectives of women and marginalised groups, human rights and the agency of women and marginalised groups are neglected.

## POWER

Power is a multidimensional phenomenon exercised by actors like individuals, groups, organisations, or states to influence the behaviour and actions of individuals, groups, organisations, and states. Depending on the context and setting, power can manifest as communication, influence, opportunity, responsibility, or coercion. Power is an intrinsic element of any given society and is continually in flux on political, social, ethical, and educational levels. Power also adapts and shifts, meaning what might constitute a position of power in one situation is not necessarily the case for another.

## RACISM

Racism is a discriminatory system of oppression that chronically disadvantages individuals and groups based on race. Whereas there are no different biological races, race exists as a social construct to filter access to choice, opportunity, resources, status, and power. The racial categories that people are assigned (or rather, we assign to ourselves) shape lived experiences and can even determine the difference between life and death. Primarily manifesting as white supremacy in our society, racism creates racial hierarchies and inequities which unjustly favour white people over Black, Indigenous and People of Colour (BIPOC). As an intersectional feminist organisation, it is key for us to constantly work on dismantling the oppressive structures that prevent racial justice.

## SECURITY

Over the past century, mainstream understandings of security have been dominated by realist political thinkers who centre the abstract state as the most important actor within an anarchic international system. This perspective sees the primary purpose of security as protecting the state against 'outside' threats, mainly relying on military and defence policies to mitigate them. Feminist perspectives challenge these understandings by questioning whose security concerns are being taken into account and how this security is being fostered. Feminist researchers and activists conceptualise security as a transformative and people-centred approach, broadening the concept of human security. Like human security, feminist approaches to security prioritise the advancement of rights, the protection of the environment and ecosystems, access to food and health services, and economic and cultural justice. However, although the concept of human security prioritises the needs and aspirations of people overstates (United Nations, 2021), it fails to address gender inequality and other forms of discriminatory power relations (such as racism or colonialism) – because it uncritically accepts a universal understanding of the term 'human'. By contrast, a feminist understanding of security makes visible the multiple and intersecting identities that are often overlooked, marginalised and/or intentionally erased in security analysis (Hudson, 2005). This approach

provides a comprehensive analysis of the complex and interdependent root causes of conflict and their gendered effects. It does so by amplifying the voices of civil society, peace advocates, movements, and marginalised communities to ensure just access to and fair distribution of resources and rights (WILPF, 2021). Consequently, a feminist understanding of security seeks to eradicate all forms of oppressive structures (including militarised foreign policy), rejects nuclear and conventional deterrence, and promotes inclusive decision-making processes at the national and international level (CFFP and WILPF, forthcoming).

## SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RIGHTS (SRHR)

The concept of sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) encompasses sexual health, sexual rights, reproductive health and reproductive rights. Sexual and reproductive rights, which are necessary to achieve sexual and reproductive health, are part of the human right to health. SRHR includes, among others, efforts to ensure quality sexual and reproductive health services, eliminate preventable maternal mortality, facilitate access to contraceptives, guarantee the bodily integrity of each individual and respect the personal autonomy of each individual regarding their sexuality, gender identity and expression (Guttmacher-Lancet Commission, 2018).

# PURPOSE & DEFINITION

## 1.1 Purpose of the Manifesto

This publication aims to support the next German government(s) following September 2021's election and beyond by paving the way towards a German Feminist Foreign Policy. It directly addresses all democratic parties that will form part of the next governing coalition and those responsible for holding the government accountable from the seats of the opposition.

Like an increasing number of governments around the world, we believe that a Feminist Foreign Policy is the most promising response to the biggest challenges of our times. Providing a vision for a more just world and linking individual and collective emancipation to societal transformation (including the redistribution of power and resources), Feminist Foreign Policy can provide solutions to increasing inequalities, increasing militarisation and (nuclear) armament, the climate emergency, unprecedented attacks on the rights of women and LGBTQI\* people, and the rise of authoritarian political leaders around the world. Research shows that the higher the level of gender inequalities within a state, the greater the likelihood such a state will experience internal and interstate conflict, fragility, or terrorism (Hudson et al., 2014; 2020).

Starting the journey towards a Feminist Foreign Policy, Germany would join countries like Sweden, Canada, Mexico, and Spain that have acknowledged that the status quo of how foreign policy operates is failing the majority of people and is reinforcing structural discrimination against traditionally marginalised groups: women; Black, Indigenous and People of Colour (BIPoC); LGBTQI\* people; refugees; poor people; and many more. By doing so, Germany can build on existing commitments. This includes the recently launched third National Action Plan for the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, the Elisabeth-Selbert-Initiative for the protection of women human rights defenders, the German-Franco founded Alliance for Multilateralism, the UN Security Council Informal Expert Group on climate-related risks to peace and security initiated by Germany, or the Federal Government LGBTI Inclusion Strategy for Foreign Policy and Development Cooperation - to name but a few. These examples show that a solid base for the development of a comprehensive German Feminist Foreign Policy already exists.

## **The higher the level of gender inequalities within a state, the greater the likelihood such a state will experience internal and interstate conflict, fragility, or terrorism.**

We are aware of the limitations of the manifesto. An 80-page publication cannot do justice to the fundamental transformation of foreign policy structures, priorities, and means – that a feminist approach would necessitate. Moreover, the manifesto has been drafted with limited consultations with (feminist) civil society organisations in Germany and beyond. However, listening to the voices of and being accountable to those impacted, positively and negatively, by Germany’s foreign policy is crucial for a Feminist Foreign Policy. We strongly recommend that the incoming government hold inclusive consultations on a Feminist Foreign Policy for Germany with representatives of feminist organisations worldwide. By providing concrete policy recommendations, we are confident that this manifesto serves as a starting point, encouraging and supporting those inside the next government to begin the process of systematically changing how Germany’s foreign policy operates, whom it is made for, and whom it is informed by.

For this purpose, the manifesto will first elaborate on the principles of German Federal Foreign Policy. Secondly, it will outline the principles of a Feminist Foreign Policy and its priority areas, and thirdly it will present action items for structural change. By doing so, we build on and reference the work of feminist civil society across the world, such as the Canadian Feminist Foreign Policy Working Group, the International Center on the Research of Women (ICRW), the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).



## **1.2 Definition of a German Feminist Foreign Policy**

A German Feminist Foreign Policy would define its interactions with other states, supranational organisations, multilateral forums, civil society, and social movements in a manner that prioritises – across all foreign policy areas – feminist peace, gender equality, climate justice, and the eradication of inequalities as it would acknowledge those as the key obstacle to achieving sustainable peace. It would promote and protect human rights and elevate the everyday lived experience of marginalised communities. It would disrupt colonial, racist, patriarchal, sexist, exploitatively capitalist, and militarised power structures. It would be accountable to those it impacts and would allocate significant resources to achieve this vision.

Implementing a Feminist Foreign Policy will require a substantial shift for Germany. A radical reordering of the priorities that have informed decision-making processes for decades and a change in how policy is conceived and created is required to centre the perspectives of the historically underrepresented, marginalised, excluded, or negatively affected in the policy sphere.

Regardless of how daunting this task may seem, countries that are already implementing Feminist Foreign Policies have proven that the approach is both actionable and effective in recent years<sup>1</sup>. Since announcing a commitment to feminist approaches, these governments have taken concrete steps to place the eradication of inequalities at the centre of their external action. These frameworks provide promising starting points to push for bolder, more expansive visions and effective policy implementation. At CFFP, we believe that policymakers must incorporate at least nine fundamental principles to build a **truly transformative** Feminist Foreign Policy.

Feminist Foreign Policy must be (1) **based on a comprehensive understanding of gender**. Policy frameworks that use the term 'gender' to refer only to (heterosexual, cisgender) women are fundamentally exclusionary. They reinforce traditional gender binaries that often fail to account for the experiences of gender non-conforming individuals and sexual and gender minorities. Furthermore, by reducing our discussion of gender to a conversation about 'men' and 'women', these frameworks overlook the complexities of gender as a "structural power relation" (Cohen, 2013, p.3). Gender is not merely an identity marker but also a way of organising individuals and sustaining power relationships and hierarchies. 'Gender' draws distinctions between different categories of people, behaviours, and activities based on symbolic ideals of masculinity and femininity, affording increased power, privilege, and influence to the former (ibid.).

Feminist Foreign Policy must be (2) **intersectional**. In other words, it must consider how identity markers such as race, class, (dis)ability, gender, sexual orientation, and other individual characteristics can 'intersect' to affect lived experience and, in some cases, create new and more concentrated circumstances of oppression.

---

<sup>1</sup> Such as Sweden, Canada, Mexico, and Spain.

# PRINCIPLES



Feminist Foreign Policy is (3) **anti-racist** and critical of the influence of white supremacy in the field of foreign policy. It strives to dismantle exclusionary structures to build inclusive and actively anti-racist institutions. Feminist Foreign Policy also acknowledges the influence of colonial legacies in the international system and their contribution to racist and gender-based discrimination as well as racist knowledge production. Feminist Foreign Policy works to overcome these structures and to address the harm done in the past.

Feminist Foreign Policy is (4) **coherent** in its approach, grounded in a domestic policy that exercises the same values within the country's own borders as it does outside. It is (5) **human-rights based and informed by (feminist) civil society and wider social movements**, recognising that (feminist) civil society has historically been the main driver of progress for human rights, in particular for minority rights.

Feminist Foreign Policy is (6) **anti-militaristic**, prioritising the pursuit of feminist peace and security<sup>2</sup> over the expansion and expression of military power. It prioritises (7) **co-operation over domination** – in bilateral relations as well as in multilateral fora.

Feminist Foreign Policy is further (8) **climate justice-focused**, acknowledging that a justice-focused response to the climate emergency is crucial for a liveable future for humanity.

Feminist Foreign Policy is (9) **transparent and accountable**. It has its roots in precise, measurable objectives, making it possible for civil society and those tasked with implementation to understand exactly what the state hopes to accomplish with its foreign policy strategy, in what time frame, and by what means (ICRW, 2020).

Feminist Foreign Policy acknowledges that the historic practice of foreign and security policy has led to a most insecure, unequal, and destructive global status quo that is failing most people. We cannot continue with 'business-as-usual' foreign policy-making. Only new approaches, perspectives, and rebalanced power dynamics – a Feminist Foreign Policy – can achieve sustainable peace and development and a world where no one is left behind. In short, there will be no peace without feminism.

---

2 A feminist understanding of security makes visible the multiple and intersecting identities that are often overlooked, marginalised and/or intentionally erased in security analysis (Hudson, 2005). This approach provides a comprehensive analysis of the complex and interdependent root causes of conflict and their gendered effects. It does so by amplifying the voices of civil society, peace advocates, and movements as well as marginalised communities to ensure just access to and fair distribution of resources and rights (WILPF, 2021). Consequently, a feminist understanding of security seeks to eradicate all forms of oppressive structures (including militarised foreign policy), rejects nuclear and conventional deterrence, and promotes inclusive decision-making processes at the national and international level (CFFP and WILPF, forthcoming).

# POLICY AREAS

## 3.1 Feminist Approach to Peace and Security

A Feminist Foreign Policy prioritises feminist understandings of security over militarised conceptions of state security. It strives for more than the mere absence of violent conflict, inter-state or otherwise. A Feminist Foreign Policy is concerned with investing in peace. This includes the advancement of human rights, the fulfilment of economic and social justice for all, and the protection of the environment and ecosystems. It actively commits resources to overcome structural inequalities and transform violent militarised power relations, for example, by supporting international disarmament efforts. A Feminist Foreign Policy insists on inclusivity and transparency in decision-making processes from the local to the global in all matters of peace and security.

### STATUS QUO IN GERMANY

In the prominent policy papers published by the German government (such as the 2016 *White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*), security is defined and delineated in almost exclusively nationalistic terms (CFFP & WILPF, forthcoming). In other words, Germany anchors its foreign policy priorities and decision-making in a central concern for the 'territorial integrity' and 'sovereignty' of the state. In doing so, the government adopts an approach that obstructs the path towards feminist security, characterising humanitarian concerns such as the climate emergency, global pandemics, and forced migration as "threats" to the stability of its borders (The Federal Government, 2016). Germany, therefore, refuses to take responsibility for the human impact of its militarised action or to consider the root causes of violent conflict in the international system.

Despite reemphasising the restrictive nature of its export policies of military goods, Germany continues to be the fourth-biggest exporter of arms (2015–2019) (SIPRI, 2020) in the name of “[l]egitimate security policy and alliance policy interests” (BMWI, 2021, para.2). This prioritisation of a militarised state-centric conception is also reflected in the government’s allocation of funds. With a budget of 45 billion euros, the Ministry of Defence had the third-largest budget of all federal ministries in 2020 (BMF, 2021a). The Federal Foreign Office only had a budget of about 6.6 billion euros (1.3 per cent of the overall budget) (ibid.). The Foreign Office lists disarmament and arms control, humanitarian aid and crisis prevention and stabilisation, including peace mediation, as key components of Germany’s contribution to peace and security. However, in 2020, Germany spent only 40 million euros on disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control, and only 400 million euros on crisis prevention, stabilisation, and peace support (BMF, 2021b). Moreover, the Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, responsible for tackling the climate crisis (which is already rendering millions of people insecure), allocated only 776 Million euros of the 3.2 billion euros budget on climate change (or 0.59 per cent of the overall budget) (BMF, 2021c).

The prioritisation of a militarised state-centric conception of security over feminist understandings of security is also demonstrated in other policy choices of the German government. The new National Action Plan (NAP) on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS), adopted in early 2021, does not include any commitments to disarmament and arms export control, despite the NAP’s focus on conflict prevention (see also chapter 3.3 and 3.11). The climate law, passed in 2019, which translated the Paris Agreement into national law, was declared partly unconstitutional by Germany’s Constitutional court because “the government’s climate protection measures are insufficient to protect future generations” (Olterman and Harvey, 2021, para.1). The reworked Climate Protection Act, passed in May 2021, proposes a net-zero deadline of 2035 instead of 2050 but does not specify the measures that must be taken (ibid.). Moreover, even during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry for Health received fewer funds than the Ministry of Defence (BMF, 2021a).

Germany has been criticised for lacking transparency and inclusivity on who influences peace and security decisions. Specifically, the defence industry actors have been accused of attempting to exert inappropriate influence on the security agenda. In their 2020 report, the NGO Transparency International notes that, through money, ideas, and humans, the German defence industry “can wield influence over defence and security policy [as well as procurement], despite the constitution demanding strong parliamentary and government control over policy and procurement” (Transparency International, 2020, p.1). Only in 2021, the German parliament introduced a statutory register. However, it will not provide information about important aspects, for example, the different laws or policies that lobbyists engaged with (Lange, 2021). In addition to the defence industry, the car lobby enjoys privileged access to German decision-making while civil society struggles to get its voice(s) heard. Between 2015–2017, high-level government representatives met representatives from automobile companies almost nine times as often as representatives from environmental associations (Deckwirth, 2017).

**WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING  
ACTION POINTS:**

**Focus (politically and financially) on advancing  
feminist understanding of security**

- Develop a national strategy for peace, outlining concrete steps to overcome structural inequalities, militarised power relations, and militarisation. Ensure that structural inequalities, including gender inequality and racism, are identified as key drivers of violence and conflict.
- Replace the Ministry of Defence with a Ministry for Peace and adopt a policy framework prioritising feminist understandings of security over a militarised state-centric conception of national security.
- Redirect financial and human resources from the budget of the Ministry of Defence to address feminist security threats, above all the climate crisis (see chapter 3.4), pandemics (see chapter 3.4), disarmament and arms control (see chapter 3.3), and counter the global anti-gender movement (governments, parties, individuals, think tanks, and religious organisations) that actively work to undermine the rights of women and LGBTQI\* individuals.
- In policy documents and official statements challenge the theory of nuclear and conventional deterrence, highlight the adverse humanitarian and ecological consequences of armament, and work within NATO to reject the theory of nuclear deterrence.

- In particular, ensure Germany takes full responsibility to survivors of gender-based violence and violence facilitated by German arms exported to other countries, both in peace and wartime. This includes the protection of civilians, gender-sensitive peacebuilding efforts, and gender-sensitive relief and recovery in violent conflicts facilitated or committed by German arms, e.g., financial support to survivors of intimate partner violence in non-conflict settings (Bernarding et al., 2020).

**Limit the influence of the defence industry,  
increase transparency and improve  
accountability towards civil society**

- Conduct a regular national peace and security strategy review, including an assessment of the identified security threats, priorities, and tools. Ensure that independent experts, and feminist civil society, are part of this process (based on Transparency International, 2020).
- Revise the existing statutory register of lobbyists to ensure it is applicable to *all* members of the government and ministries and that it includes details of the government policy, or legislation lobbyists have engaged with (Lange, 2021; Transparency International, 2020).
- Ensure that (civil society) organisations advocating for feminist understandings of security, disarmament, and arms control are considered important stakeholders that need to be involved in peace and security decision-making.
- Introduce a permanent government outsourcing review board to verify the necessity of external consultancy services (Transparency International, 2020).



## 3.2 Feminist Approach to Human Rights and the Rule of Law

A Feminist Foreign Policy is based on and informed by international human rights law (IHRL). It understands human rights through an inclusive and intersectional lens. A Feminist Foreign Policy acknowledges that to push for human rights credibly and effectively at an international level, Germany also needs to fulfil its obligations under IHRL and ground its efforts in a domestic policy that exercises the same values within the country's borders it does outside. A Feminist Foreign Policy commits significant resources to prioritise, strengthen, and implement IHRL.

### STATUS QUO IN GERMANY

Germany has ratified most international human rights treaties and is an outspoken supporter of international human rights law<sup>1</sup>. However, criticism remains, as articulated by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (Amnesty International, n.d.; Human Rights Watch, n.d.), amongst others. For example, criticism focuses on the discrepancies between Germany's human rights obligations under international human rights and Germany's implementation of these obligations, especially regarding sexual reproductive health and rights (SRHR) at home and corporate accountability abroad. Moreover, there is a lack of consistency, strategy, and coherence within the German government and thus a need to acknowledge that all ministries and implementing organisations need to follow a binding human rights-based approach towards any international cooperation to be consistent in the efforts to implement and defend international human rights law.

### WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ACTION POINTS:<sup>2</sup>

#### Ensure that the German law fully reflects Germany's obligations under international human rights law (IHRL)

- Withdraw the reservations to the *Istanbul Convention* concerning residence permits for survivors of (domestic) violence on humanitarian grounds (Article 59, Paragraph 2) and extended residence permits for survivors of violence (Article 59, Paragraph 3).
- Explicitly include children as bearers of rights in the *German Basic Law* (Grundgesetz) and acknowledge children's rights in the German Basic Law following the requirements of the *United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child* and the *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union*.
- Amend §45b Paragraph 3 of the German *Personenstandgesetz* to enable first name and civil status changes without the interference of third parties - the requirement of psychiatric reports or medical certificates as a prerequisite - in accordance with the *Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' Comment No. 20* demand for non-discrimination (Markwald, 2020).
- Amend the prohibition of discrimination in Art. 3 Paragraph 3 of the *German Basic Law* (Grundgesetz) to include the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in accordance with the *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union* Art. 21 (1).

<sup>1</sup> For an overview of the international human rights law framework that applies to Germany, see: Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte (n.d.). *Deutschland im Menschenrechtsschutzsystem*.

<sup>2</sup> Please also see chapter 3.3 Feminist Approach to Demilitarisation, Disarmament, and Arms (Exports) Control, 3.6 Feminist Approach to Migration, and 3.8 Feminist Approach to Trade and International Investment on how Germany can strengthen human rights internationally and at home.

- In accordance with the internationally recognised human right of any woman to “freely and responsibly [decide] on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights” granted by Art. 16 of the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)* repeal the *German Criminal Code’s* Art. 218, which criminalises abortion and Art. 219a prohibiting doctors who perform abortions from providing information about abortion procedures.
  - In accordance with Art. 4 of the *International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance* as well as Art. 2 of the *Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* and following the recommendations of the UN Committee against Torture and the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, criminalise torture and enforced disappearance under national law.<sup>3</sup>
  - Stop deportations to war zones and crisis countries. In particular, renew the deportation stop to Syria in accordance with Art. 3 of the *European Convention on Human Rights*.
  - Establish a national advisory body at the ministerial level within the Federal Ministry for Justice and Consumer Protection consisting of feminist civil society actors and legal experts that identify legal gaps between Germany’s IHRL obligations and German national law, followed with concrete legal amendment recommendations and a clear timeline, indicators, and accountability measures as to how these amendments can be implemented by whom and when.
- Insist that all states protect and guarantee universal human rights and compliance with the rule of law, including at any time, even under exceptional circumstances such as the Covid-19 pandemic**
- Criticise all human rights violations based on objective human rights standards, e.g., those proposed by Ireland in the 32nd session of the UN Human Rights Council (Department of Foreign Affairs Ireland, 2016).
  - Contribute to establishing comprehensive domestic, regional, and international civil society protection mechanisms to ensure that civil society, human rights defenders, and activists can safely continue their human rights commitment and efforts even under exceptional circumstances such as a pandemic or in often militarised policy fields such as preventing and countering violent extremism (ibid.).<sup>4</sup> This includes capacity building within EU delegations and within the German embassies and the facilitation of expedited visa processes for human rights defenders, in accordance with the *EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders*. Such mechanisms must be developed in cooperation with civil society actors, informed by their individual and collective needs and contexts, and secure long-term funding and guaranteed access to information.
  - Ensure that global efforts to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism fully comply with obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, and the *UN Charter*, and do not have negative consequences for human rights, civil liberties, and fundamental freedoms. Germany should play an active leadership role in strengthening

<sup>3</sup> This recommendation has been developed in cooperation with Alexia Knappmann, Senior Policy Adviser & Advocacy Coordinator at Amnesty International Germany.

<sup>4</sup> This recommendation has been developed in cooperation with the Violence Prevention Network.

human rights, the rule of law, and fundamental freedoms as the core pillars of global efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE) and actively advocate for global P/CVE measures to avoid stigmatisation and marginalisation of groups and individuals along ethnic, religious, gendered, and social divides to ensure equal and just treatment and to prevent contributing to conditions conducive to radicalisation and violent extremism.<sup>5</sup>

- In cooperation with civil society, establish mandatory human rights assessments based on international human rights treaties (e.g., the *Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*) of any German foreign policy decisions to ensure that they do not endanger civil society on the ground and that German foreign policy measures do not contribute to human rights violations (Verband Entwicklungspolitik und Humanitäre Hilfe, 2021). Adjust and/or discontinue projects Germany is involved in that fail to meet this threshold (Amnesty International, 2021).
- Push for governments to end the persecution and acts of violence, including but not limited to targeted surveillance, enforced disappearance, imprisonment, targeted killings, against human rights defenders. Push for targeted sanctions against those in power if no or too little progress is made.

**Strengthen national and international efforts to hold perpetrators of human rights violations accountable and end impunity for international crimes**

- Prioritise and strengthen the criminal prosecution of gender-based violence and violence against women through law enforcement agencies in trials in Germany in accordance with the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction (Bernarding et al., 2020).
- Continue to strengthen the International Criminal Court (ICC) politically and financially to effectively hold states accountable for violations of international law and end impunity for international crimes. At a multilateral level, push for ending the exclusion of nationals of non-ICC member states from the ICC's jurisdiction in referrals.
- Support the establishment of a treaty against crimes against humanity. Support the convening of a conference of plenipotentiaries – diplomats invested with the full power of independent action on behalf of their countries – to debate and adopt the draft *Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity*, based on the draft text adopted by the International Law Commission in 2019. At the moment, such a convention is missing. It is currently being negotiated in the 6th Committee of the UNGA, and as it needs unanimity, it is in deadlock.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> This recommendation has been developed by the Violence Prevention Network.

<sup>6</sup> This recommendation has been developed in cooperation with Alexia Knappmann, Senior Policy Adviser & Advocacy Coordinator at Amnesty International Germany.

- Ensure full judicial accountability of German nationals involved in foreign terrorist activities in legitimate court proceedings. This accountability must include a focus on sentences and ensure appropriate conditions of imprisonment in accordance with international standards, such as the *Nelson Mandela and Bangkok Rules*<sup>7</sup> and *UNODC Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons*<sup>8</sup>, as well as access to disengagement, deradicalisation, and rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.<sup>9</sup>
- Advocate internationally against actions that undermine international human rights and the rule of law, such as the practice of revoking citizenship from dual citizens in the context of addressing the travel of foreign terrorist fighters and their family members to conflict zones.
- Advocate for and develop comprehensive quality standards for the planning and implementation of appropriate P/CVE efforts that are based on evidence and gendered needs assessments and a robust human rights-based monitoring and evaluation.

**Strengthen whole-of-society action<sup>10</sup> to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE) in compliance with international human rights, the rule of law, and fundamental freedoms<sup>11</sup>**

- Strengthen the role and inclusion of civil society in global P/CVE efforts and work towards strengthening local, national, and international efforts to foster whole-of-society approaches against violent extremism, including by building on and strengthening relevant international commitments and guidelines.<sup>12</sup> In particular, support the involvement of civil society in designing and implementing programmes to prevent and counter violent right-wing extremism at the local and transnational level.
- Ensure and advocate for the safe and timely repatriation and return of foreign terrorist fighters and their family members from the camps in Northern Syria and Iraq as a matter of legal, moral, and security obligations. Consider that these individuals continue to experience inhumane conditions, sexualised violence and violence against women and children and the longer they remain there, the more susceptible they become to further radicalisation.
- Adopt and strengthen a gender-sensitive approach in addressing the return of foreign terrorist fighters and family members. This includes establishing disengagement, reintegration

7 UN Nelson Mandela Rules – UN A/Res/70/175. (first adopted in 1957, revised in 2015) and Bangkok Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners (2010) – UN A/RES/65/229.

8 UNODC Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons (2016).

9 This recommendation has been developed by the Violence Prevention Network.

10 Whole-of-society approaches refer to a comprehensive set of solutions in P/CVE which focus on the cooperation between security, a broad range of government actors, civil society, and citizens. The underlying assumption of whole-of-society approaches is that P/CVE issues are too complex to be used by one entity alone but require involvement of all parts of society to be addressed.

11 The recommendations on P/CVE have been developed by the Violence Prevention Network.

12 The importance of civil society engagement in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) is outlined in various UN resolutions, such as Security Council resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014) and other UN instruments. Other international institutions adopt similar views, see for instance the GCTF in the Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices, and the OSCE guidebook for the Role of Civil Society in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism.



and rehabilitation programmes tailored to the needs of women foreign terrorist fighters and, in general, adopting gender-responsive services for disengagement and exit work in P/CVE.

- Immediately start to advocate for the full repatriation and return of children who remain in camps without access to education and health services and are particularly vulnerable to the influence and mobilisation attempts of violent extremist groups. Strengthen reintegration and rehabilitation programmes that are gender- and age-sensitive and end practices such as separating children from their parents as a condition for repatriation, which contributes to further traumatising.
- Germany should play a leadership role in strengthening international and local action against violent right-wing extremism and other ideologies of group-based enmity (*Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit*), which target the human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals and foster discrimination of marginalised groups based on gender, sexual orientation, disablement, social class, race, look/body type, etc.
- Strengthen the collection and use of gender-disaggregated data to assess and monitor the occurrence of group-based and ideologically motivated violence and hate crimes on distinct social groups. Promote projects to protect and support victims of group-based violence and address the gendered impacts of such attacks.
- Support other states in ensuring the safety and security of non-state actors, such as NGOs, in P/CVE, for example, by engaging in skill-sharing on fostering partnerships between state and non-state actors in tertiary prevention.

### **Hold corporations accountable and bind them to prioritise human rights and environmental protection**

- Ensure the mandatory, effective, and monitoring implementation of the *Lieferkettensorgfaltspflichtengesetz* holding corporations accountable for the human rights situation relating to the creation of their products.
- Amend the *Lieferkettensorgfaltspflichtengesetz* to include a stronger focus on strict regulation regarding environmental protection (Schneemann, 2021). Moreover, expand the scope and access to rights for survivors of human rights abuses.
- Expand and strengthen human rights criteria, transparent review processes, and the possibility of complaints in foreign trade promotion projects (*Projekte der Außenwirtschaftsförderung, AWF*). Sanction and temporarily exclude companies from the AWF in the event of non-compliance (Verband Entwicklungspolitik und Humanitäre Hilfe, 2021).
- Take measures to address the specific human rights risks posed by the exports of military equipment (see Chapter 3.3. Feminist Approach to Demilitarisation, Disarmament and Arms (Export) Control). Following the recommendations by Amnesty International (and others), arms companies (not only the German government) should assess the impact of their sales decisions on human rights before, during and after the provision of the goods and services. In doing so, they must take into account previous human rights violations by the recipient states. They must take action against human rights risks and violations, for example, through human rights clauses in contracts and the form of damage reduction or reparations. Since arm companies do not live up to this responsibility voluntarily, it is time to legally bind them to do so (Amnesty International, 2021).



## **3.3 Feminist Approach to Demilitarisation, Disarmament, and Arms (Export) Control**

International demilitarisation, disarmament, and arms (export) control are central pillars of any Feminist Foreign Policy and have been key to international feminist activism for more than 100 years. With an explicit emphasis on the pursuit and promotion of feminist security, Feminist Foreign Policy rejects the notion that peace and security can be achieved through subordination, violence, and war – all means to keep the patriarchal world order in place. Instead, Feminist Foreign Policy sheds light on the role militarised security structures play in generating violent conflict, for example, by normalising the use of force and by ‘othering’ groups of people (Davis, 2018).<sup>1</sup> Feminist Foreign Policy envisions an international system where power is not determined by military capacity and potential for profit does not eclipse humanitarian concerns.

### **STATUS QUO IN GERMANY**

Internationally, Germany enjoys a reputation of military restraint and continues to be considered a “civilian power” (Mauß, 2019). However, this reputation is increasingly detached from the reality of the situation on the ground. Since 2015, the German government has steadily increased its military expenditure, spending nearly 45 billion euros on defence in 2020 (Collini, 2021; BMF, 2021a). This is the highest amount since 1993, and spending has continued even during the ongoing pandemic that is draining crucial resources and overburdening public health systems (Collini, 2021). With an increase of 5.2 percent, Germany’s military spending saw the largest increase out of the top ten countries with the highest military expenditure in 2020 (ibid.; SIPRI, 2021).

Germany was also the fourth largest exporter of arms between 2015–2019 and had, over the last decades, repeatedly authorised exports that violate international human rights law and international humanitarian law (SIPRI, 2020; Wisotzki, 2020). In addition, Germany has actively resisted international disarmament efforts, refusing to sign or ratify the *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)*. Germany has not signed the *Humanitarian Pledge* and is not part of the *Humanitarian Initiative* (a group of states that evolved within the framework of the TPNW) and has yet to support a legally binding ban on fully autonomous weapons. In 2020, Germany spent 40 million euros on disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control (BMF, 2021b), compared to more than 7.4 billion euros on military procurement (BMF, 2021c). Implementing a Feminist Foreign Policy would require Germany to take more responsibility internationally as a leader for disarmament and arms control. It would require the government to end arms production and export and take meaningful steps towards investing in peace and not in war (see also chapter 3.1 on Feminist Peace and Security).

<sup>1</sup> “Othering is an interdisciplinary notion that refers, amongst other things, to differentiating discourses that lead to moral and political judgment of superiority and inferiority between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and within groups” (Dervin, 2015). The term was coined by Edward Said in his book *Orientalism* (1978). The authors here follow Stern’s (2011, p.28/31) analysis that the ESS reflects the division between Europeans and Others, who are represented as both feminised and subordinate.

**WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING  
ACTION POINTS:**

**Prioritise disarmament and truly restrictive arms control**

- In line with the *Arms Trade Treaty*, Germany should ensure that gender-based violence (GBV) is explicitly and mandatorily accounted for in the arms export control process. This includes introducing the risk of GBV in the *Political Principles of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military Equipment* as an explicit and mandatory criterion that needs to be accounted for in the arms export risk assessment (Bernarding and Lunz, 2020); and acknowledging the *Arms Trade Treaty's* requirement to also account for the risk that exported arms or items can facilitate GBV (Bernarding and Lunz, 2020).
- Design and implement a single harmonised and gender-sensitive law on arms export control, which replaces and encompasses the *German War Weapons Export Act*, the *Foreign Trade Law* and the *Political Principles of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military Equipment*.
- Ensure that comprehensive gender-sensitive human rights and international humanitarian law assessments are also undertaken for any arms or military equipment exported to EU, NATO, and NATO-equivalent countries (see Bernarding and Lunz, 2020).
- Ensure that the annual German arms exports include information on the reason for the denial of export licenses, including a stand-alone criterion for GBV (Bernarding and Lunz, 2020).
- Advocate among EU member states for a sanctioning mechanism for non-compliance with the *EU Common Position* and coherent interpretation of its eight criteria (Besch and Oppenheim, 2019).<sup>2</sup>
- End the export of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and corresponding ammunition to any country, recognising that SALW are often “weapons of choice” in cases of gender-based violence (based on Bernarding et al., 2020).
- Design and implement a policy for the end of German exports of arms, military equipment, technology, know-how, and support to subsidiary companies, with clear timelines and milestones.
- Take up an international leadership role in advocating for an end to arms production and exports (in the EU and beyond). This includes highlighting the interlinkages between the international arms trade, militarism, GBV, and gender inequality in statements and speeches.

<sup>2</sup> International obligations: International or Regional Arms Embargoes and Membership in Arms Control Agreements; Adherence to Human Rights; Internal Situation – Stability or Conflict; Preservation of regional peace, security and stability; National Security of Member States and Allies; Membership in Human Rights and Arms Control Conventions; Arms Export Controls and Danger of disproportionate military capacities impairing development.

**Feminist Foreign Policy envisions an international system where power is not determined by military capacity and potential for profit does not eclipse humanitarian concerns.**

**Promote banning fully autonomous weapons**

- Advocate for a legally binding international pre-emptive ban on fully autonomous lethal weapons and support proposals to launch treaty negotiations.
- Adopt national laws and policies committing to retain meaningful human control over the use of force and establishing prohibitions on the development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapons.
- Advocate for the EU to endorse an international legally binding ban treaty of fully autonomous weapons, in line with the resolution passed by the European Parliament in 2018.

**Advocate for nuclear disarmament**

- End nuclear hosting and sharing and disallow nuclear weapons to be stationed in Germany. Advocate for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in Europe.
- Accede to the *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* (TPNW) and encourage allied countries to ratify the treaty as well.
- Continuously raise awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian and ecological consequences of nuclear accidents and attacks in multilateral

fora, including the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) meetings.

- Encourage German pensions funds and financial institutions to divest from nuclear weapon producing companies.
- Within NATO, Germany should use its influence in the Nuclear Planning Group to advocate for nuclear disarmament and remind the nuclear-armed states to honour their commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
- Work towards ending the nuclear burden-sharing programme within NATO.
- Dissociate from NATO's current nuclear doctrine and encourage other NATO members to follow suit.

**Acknowledge the importance of addressing militarised power structures as a source of conflict**

- Integrate commitments to disarmament and arms (export) control into national guidelines and action plans, in particular into the Federal Government's Action Plan for the Women, Peace and Security Agenda as a crucial aspect of conflict prevention and the *Leitlinien der Bundesregierung: Krisen verhindern, Konflikte bewältigen, Frieden fördern* (Guidelines of the Federal Government for Preventing Crises, Managing Conflicts, and Promoting Peace).



## 3.4 Feminist Approach to Climate Justice

A Feminist Foreign Policy is committed to limiting the climate crisis as much as possible, strengthening climate justice, and supporting people in adapting to new circumstances. A Feminist Foreign Policy recognises the existing intersecting inequalities and power dynamics and imbalances – between states and within states – as one of the biggest issues to tackle in the pursuit of climate justice. A Feminist Foreign Policy adopts a holistic, intersectional, and human-centred perspective of climate justice and fights all factors, directly and indirectly, contributing to the climate crisis. With women being hit hardest by the climate crisis (Halton, 2018)<sup>1</sup> while fighting at the forefront for climate justice (Holt, 2019), the climate crisis is principally a feminist issue.

### STATUS QUO IN GERMANY

Once celebrated as an environmental champion, Germany has long lost this status (Busse and Loss, 2020). Germany only reached its climate goals in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic (ibid.; see Umweltbundesamt, 2021), with greenhouse gas emissions rising again in the first quarter of 2021 (Hein, 2021). In April 2021, the Federal Constitutional Court declared the 2019 German climate legislation partly unconstitutional because it, *inter alia*, violates fundamental freedoms, especially of younger people, by failing to provide details about how to cut emissions after the current target date of 2030 (BBC, 2021). Even more recent climate legislation shows significant deficits: missing concrete plans to achieve a coal phase-out, generally moving too slowly, mission after 2030 remains vague, greenhouse gas emissions linger on a high level, and some areas were not touched enough or at all (Jähnert and Plaß, 2021; Reibe, 2021). In short, it is still not enough.

Critically, the German government continues to address the climate crisis primarily as an environmental issue and fails to apply an intersectional lens to the climate crisis. It does not recognise the crisis as one of the mutually dependent injustices that demand structural and systematic change. This gap and failure have led the German government to propose inadequate solutions to the climate crisis and increase existing inequalities, especially for the most vulnerable.

To move forward, Germany needs to consider the climate crisis as one of the biggest threats to security and act accordingly. This means fully implementing its commitments of the Paris Agreements on time, acknowledging and addressing the power inequalities inherent in the climate crisis, and recognising its responsibility in contributing to the crisis as a wealthy and industrialised nation and former colonial empire.<sup>2</sup> At the EU level,

1 In addition, many other marginalised people such as BIPoC, inter, transgender, and nonbinary people, poor people, disabled people, elders, and people located in the Global South are particularly at risk by the climate crisis (see Minority Rights Group, 2008).

2 The climate crisis is, in large part, a result of the fossil fuel industry, which is based on the industrial revolution. The latter would not have been possible without slavery, a huge part of colonialism. “It’s no accident that the map of climate change’s worst wrath to date looks like a colonizer’s playground” (Heglar, 2020, para.7). Moreover, colonisers, Germany included, exploited stolen land and colonised people solely for their benefit. In German-

Germany should push for a united European green transformation, which includes, for example, a clear and significant budget for climate justice, and stronger engagement with frontline communities, recognising the value of indigenous and other marginalised knowledge. On an international level, Germany should prioritise the accountability of states and large companies as climate polluters, a jurisdiction that adjusts to the challenges of the climate crisis, and gender-sensitive implementation of international climate agreements, including the Paris Agreement.

### WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ACTION POINTS:

#### **Achieve climate justice on the domestic level**

- Establish a Ministry for Climate Justice and the Protection of Endangered Life.
- Implement a Commissioner for Climate Justice within the Federal Foreign Office with the task of assessing all new foreign policy agreements, projects, and partners from an intersectional climate perspective, making sure climate-related requirements are included. Create the role of a Climate Justice Officer who regularly reports to and seeks advice from the Ministry of Climate Justice and the Protection of Endangered Life and engages with civil society.
- Extend *The Trust Fund Contribution Agreement* between Germany and the Green Climate Fund Trust Fund until December 31, 2026.
- Spend \$616 billion<sup>3</sup> in total on international and gender-responsive climate finance until 2030.<sup>4</sup>
- Recognise the climate crisis as a social justice crisis and approach it accordingly. This includes defining climate justice as gender, racial, social, environmental, economic, and health justice. Integrate this lens in the UNSC Informal Expert Group on climate-related risks to peace and security initiated by Germany.

---

controlled Tanganyika (nowadays a part of Tanzania), people were forced to grow cotton for export. In their revolt against this policy, people were forced to leave their homes, exposed to famine, crops were burned or taken away. About 300,000 people perished (Voskoboynik, 2018).

<sup>3</sup> The US, as the second biggest polluter (World Population Review, 2021), is advised to contribute at least \$800 billion in international climate finance between 2021 and 2030 (Burns and Dolan, 2021). Germany, ranking as the 6th highest polluter (World Population Review, 2021) should thus contribute ~ \$616 billion in international climate finance.

<sup>4</sup> This date is connected to the 2030 Climate Target Plan, focusing on the EU's ambitions to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 percent below 1990 levels until 2030 (European Commission, 2020).

- Design and implement a clear intersectional feminist national climate strategy after 2030 within the first six months of taking office. This strategy includes a complete coal phase-out by 2030, implementing a CO<sub>2</sub> tax for high-income people, subsidies for green, innovative, and just energy instead of fossil fuels (Fridays For Future, 2019), advocating for climate insurance, investing in public transport, financing a just transition for people working in climate-damaging industries, financially supporting low-income people in leading a climate-responsible life, and lowering the permitted number of greenhouse gas emissions for all policy areas.
- Integrate climate sensibility and awareness in diplomatic training. Make knowledge about and proven record of addressing the climate crisis a prerequisite for internal promotions.
- Establish a national independently working, government-funded working group comprising climate activists, policymakers and scientists that work out policy recommendations and advise the Federal Foreign Office towards a climate-compatible foreign policy. Commission the working group with assessing the climate-friendliness and sustainability of all internal and external Foreign Office projects on an annual basis.
- Commission an additional study on unequal vulnerabilities with regards to the climate crisis in Germany.
- Reduce current military spending of 45 billion euros (BMF, 2021a) by January 2024 and reinvest and commit to climate investment and demilitarisation instead.<sup>5</sup>
- Work towards more interdisciplinary research and teaching in schools and universities to prepare for holistic social justice work (including climate justice) in the future. This includes teaching about climate (in)justice and the neo-colonial, capitalist, and patriarchal structures leading to the climate crisis and focusing on finding climate-justice solutions on various levels.

### Promote climate justice on the EU level

- Advocate among the EU Member States for the EU to pursue intersectional climate justice as a guiding principle of the EU external action (Bernarding and Lunz, 2020a).
  - This includes a revision for The Green New Deal to include more ambitious goals (the goal to cut emission should be at least by 65 percent by 2030), more detail on how to achieve the objectives (such as protecting nature), and concrete suggestions on how to overcome the traditional economic growth paradigm towards an economic approach that respects planetary boundaries (Harvey et al., 2019).
  - Lobby for the EEAS climate diplomacy to address the 'risks and threats to humans, societies, and states that emanate from the adverse effects of climate change' (Bremberg, 2019, p.2).
  - Lobby for including climate variables in all early warnings, as well as conflict and/or context analyses (Bernarding and Lunz, 2020a).
  - Advocate for the EU Special Representatives, EU delegations, and missions are mandated to analyse and address the risks and threats to humans, societies, and states that emanate from the adverse effects of climate change and report on their work in this regard (Bernarding and Lunz, 2020a).
  - Advocate for climate justice to be recognised and implemented as a horizontal principle in all coming Multiannual Financial Frameworks (Bernarding and Lunz, 2020a).

<sup>5</sup> Please also see chapter 3.1 Feminist Approach to Peace and Security.

- Support and advocate for possibilities for people to hold governments and companies accountable in court for life-changing pollution and violating environmental legislation, like a European environmental court or the advancement and extension of existing courts.
- Commit to a stronger engagement with frontline communities and climate activists from various regions (Nakate, 2020) in the EU, such as Romani or Saami people. Ensure indigenous voices and frontline communities are included in all climate-related EU decision-making.
- Establish an EU Committee on Climate Justice and the Protection of Endangered Life in the EU. The Committee is in regular exchange with national climate ministries, similar bodies, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
- Include a specific fund on climate justice, which entails financial support to feminist civil society organisations that strengthen local resilience and mitigate and manage the climate crisis consequences (ibid.). The fund is financed through the member states; large EU companies are strongly encouraged to contribute to the fund.
- Advocate for an internationally accepted definition of environmental migration, specifically climate migration, and strengthen connected instruments and laws that are already in place (Ionesco, 2019), such as the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the UNFCCC, or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Recognise climate insecurity as a legitimate basis for claiming asylum.
- Advocate for accepting ecocide under international law (Nakate, 2020), acknowledging it as a crime against humanity to be held accountable.
- Advocate for a Gender and Climate Justice Advisory Group that supports countries in accomplishing their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to fulfil the Paris Agreement with a gender-sensitive perspective.
- Continually emphasise the gendered and racialised dimensions of the climate crisis, such as declarations and public statements.
- Institute, a Global North financed, low-threshold international disaster relief and climate catastrophe fund by 2023, available to Global South countries, local communities, and civil society to prepare for or recover from climate-related natural disasters.

### **Promote climate justice on the international level**

- Promote the accountable and institutionalised participation of affected and vulnerable communities, such as indigenous peoples, women, and marginalised communities in climate-related decision-making processes, such as the UN Climate Change Conference, the Global Conference on Health & Climate Change, or the European Climate Change Adaptation conference.
- Promote easy access to green technologies on an international level by challenging intellectual property rights and nationalist trade systems, impeding the recognition of interconnectedness and joint effort instead of driving inequality and zero-sum protectionism (Burns and Dolan, 2021).



**A Feminist Foreign Policy would acknowledge that development aid is fundamentally a colonial structure and work towards decolonising this policy area.**



## **3.5 Feminist Approach to Development Cooperation**

A feminist approach to development cooperation prioritises intersectional (income, gender and racial) equality and justice over focusing on poverty reduction measured through nation-wide economic indicators such as GDPs, as eradicating the root causes of poverty is very much central to a Feminist International Assistance. It allocates substantial financial resources to achieve these goals. It closely supports and works with feminist civil society, particularly in Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs) (see chapter 4.3 on a Feminist Approach to Cooperation with Feminist Civil Society). A Feminist Approach to development cooperation further acknowledges that development aid is a colonial structure and works towards decolonising this policy area (see chapter 3.9 on a Feminist Approach to Decolonising Foreign Policy).

### **STATUS QUO IN GERMANY**

Poverty reduction remains the overarching goal of Germany's development policy (focusing on increasing economic growth as measured in GDP) rather than challenging inequality (BMZ, 2020). The BMZ (Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) *Reformkonzept 2030* lists gender equality as a priority cross-cutting quality criterion in the concept. However, it does not include specific action points on (gender and racial) equality or addressing intersecting forms of discrimination and inequality (ibid.). This is also reflected in the way Germany allocates resources.

While Germany reached the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) goal of allocating at least 0.7 percent of its GDP to Official Development Assistance (ODA)<sup>1</sup> for the first time since 2016 and is the second-largest donor of ODA among the DAC countries

<sup>1</sup> According to the OECD, "Official development assistance (ODA) is defined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries. The DAC adopted ODA as the 'gold standard' of foreign aid in 1969 and it remains the main source of financing for development aid" (OECD, n.d).

in absolute terms,<sup>2</sup> Germany only ranks 15th among DAC countries in terms of its ODA spending on gender equality relative to the size of its economy (Donor Tracker, 2021). The share of projects with a principal gender focus is minuscule (1.9 percent) and far behind the DAC average, which is 5.5 percent (principal objective) (OECD GenderNet, 2021). Gender equality focused aid was greatest in the population planning/reproductive health sector and women's equality projects,<sup>3</sup> but 2018–2019 saw little to no spending with a gender focus in the areas of education, production, health, water and sanitation, government and civil society, or economic infrastructure.

Encouragingly, the *LGBTI inclusion strategy in foreign and development policy* (2021c) requires Germany to pay appropriate attention to LGBTQI\* rights, e.g. technical support, capacity building, and networking for LGBTQI\* CSOs abroad, but is lacking a concrete funding commitment (Human Rights Watch, 2021). However, there are no similar strategies or principles specifically developed to address other forms of inequalities (e.g., racial inequality).<sup>4</sup>

Germany is currently channelling 22 percent of its ODA to multilateral institutions, and this proportion is showing an upward trend (OECD, 2021). However, the BMZ budget for 2021 indicates that only 11.6 percent of Germany's development funding goes directly to "civil society and business groups and institutions" (BMZ, 2021). This is a discouraging signal (see chapter 4.3 on a Feminist Approach to Cooperation with Feminist Civil Society).

The BMZ has rhetorically adjusted its terminology from Development Aid (Entwicklungshilfe) to Development Cooperation (Entwicklungszusammenarbeit). The intention was to establish a new relationship between Germany and recipient countries, who are officially regarded as equal partners in the ministry's view, based on a principle of joint development of cooperation goals, measures, and shared responsibility for successes and failures (BMZ, 2021). While "relevant aspects of missionary and colonial history are essential considerations" in the LGBTQI Inclusion Strategy (2021c), the German government has not publicly stated that it recognises that development cooperation overall continues to be influenced by colonial thinking and knowledge production. Consequently, it fails to acknowledge the inherent power inequalities between Germany and "partner countries" – as we argue in 3.9 Feminist Approach to Decolonising Foreign Policy: "Instead of making amends, Germany depicts the financial support as a voluntary relief campaign, thus diminishing its responsibility as a former colonial power." Moreover, there are no clear commitments to the engagement of local populations or civil society in the process of defining cooperation goals, which runs the risk of further replicating asymmetrical relationships.

---

2 However, 10 percent of Germany's ODA spending does not actually leave the country – it is directed towards lodging and services for refugees in Germany (taking in-country refugee expenses into account, Germany only spent 0.66 percent of its GDP on ODA).

3 Included under the 'other social infrastructure' stream.

4 It is worth noting that the OECD is the only organisation monitoring such spending, and therefore decides to a certain extent, which markers are singled out for funds.

**WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING  
ACTION POINTS:**

**Reorient Germany's development focus  
from poverty reduction towards eradicating  
inequalities**

- Shift focus away from poverty reduction towards eradicating inequalities and list this explicitly in the quality criteria defined in the *BMZ Reformkonzept 2030*.
- In cooperation with feminist civil society both in Germany and in partner countries, renew/update the BMZ's Development Policy Action Plan on Gender Equality 2016–2020 (BMZ, 2016) beyond 2020, and in line with the recommended focus towards eradicating inequalities.
- Under the leadership of the BMZ, establish an advisory group consisting of femocrats (individuals positioned within the BMZ, GIZ, and the relevant representatives of Germany who are motivated to move towards transformative change in line with feminist values), feminist civil society organisations (from Germany and abroad), and epistemic communities (professional experts with recognised expertise in development cooperation and intersectionality) to assess the current policies, define a feminist development cooperation policy, and develop a plan on how to operationalise and evaluate the policy.<sup>5</sup>
- Enact the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development principle of 'leaving no one behind' and make it the basis of all government policies. Invest resources in developing a coherent interministerial implementation plan that will pool the various initiatives and commitments in Germany's foreign and development policies. Analyse these initiatives and commitments from the perspective of ensuring improvements of people's lived experiences, rather than focusing on institutional change in partner countries only (VENRO, 2020).
- Increase financial commitments to decrease inequalities:
  - Ensure that at least 20 percent of ODA is directed to projects and initiatives with a primary gender focus by 2025 (OECD - DAC Marker 2).
  - Ensure that at least 90 percent of ODA is directed to projects and initiatives with a significant gender focus by 2025 (OECD - DAC Marker 1).
  - Ensure that most of this funding goes directly to feminist civil society and not international or multilateral organisations.
  - In cooperation with civil society, develop markers for tracking other forms of inequality (e.g., racial inequality or inequality in access to health services).
- Ensure that the funding earmarked for supporting multilateral organisations goes towards efforts with a specific focus on supporting intersectional feminist grassroots organisations, gender equality, including LGBTQI\* rights. The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) is one example of ensuring this.

<sup>5</sup> Based on Guerrina and Wright (2016); Woodward (2003).

- Increase gender spending in education, production, health, water and sanitation, government and civil society, and economic infrastructure.
- Include, as explicit development policy priorities, work on sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), violence against women and gender-based violence (GBV). Ensure that all of these resources go to organisations that fully support the right to safe and legal abortions and work with gender non-conforming people and people of all sexual orientations.
- Replace the current system of prioritising funding according to thematic and regional priorities with a new system guided by a feminist lens in prioritising funding to determine who is most in need and who is best placed to deliver quality support (also see chapter 4.3 on a Feminist Approach to Cooperation with Feminist Civil Society).

#### **Strengthen internal capacities to implement feminist development cooperation**

- Ensure the consistent application of standards for gender-sensitive programming in all spheres of work, including emergency contexts, i.e. not eschewing gender-sensitivity in the name of expediency or efficiency.
- Establish the position of a State Secretary at the BMZ specifically tasked with mainstreaming the feminist approach throughout the ministry and with coordinating outreach and communication with civil society in partner countries.
- As per the BMZ's commitments upon joining the *Charta der Vielfalt*, encourage and ensure

the hiring of more people with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities and expressions and BiPoC and people with a migration background and experiences in the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Factor in operating costs for building staff capacity, training, and accountability. Ensure that this applies also when awarding implementing contracts to organisations in partner countries. German development organisations receiving full or partial government funding should be required to make clear that persons with diverse SOGIESC are welcome and encouraged to apply (LSVD, 2017).

- Implement the *OECD DAC Recommendation on Ending Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment in Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance*.
- Strengthen Germany's evidence base. Invest in the collection of gender-, age-, and SOGIESC<sup>6</sup>-disaggregated data (McArthur, 2017) as it relates to Germany's development policy to ensure truly gender-sensitive programming.

#### **Strengthen cooperation with, and support towards, feminist civil society**

- Reorganise the bureaucratic processes to facilitate direct investment in local women-led and women's rights organisations according to feminist funding principles (also see chapter 4.3 on a Feminist Approach to Cooperation with Feminist Civil Society). Establish a separate fund dedicated to supporting feminist and women-led organisations, managed with/by women's funds and gender-lens investors (e.g. Canada's Equality Fund).

<sup>6</sup> Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression and Sex Characteristics.

- Recognise that local women's and LGBTQI\* organisations lead the way to pushing for equality. Accordingly, earmark long-term, accessible funding to support these organisations and movements to strengthen their own capacities to advocate for change in their communities. Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy are a good example of how this can be done in practice.
  - Ensure meaningful participation of the target population in planning and project design through active efforts to work with local communities in all phases of planning, implementation and monitoring of interventions. The guide 'Beyond consultations' provides some ways to achieve that (Women for Women International, 2020).
- Decolonise development cooperation**
- Building on the recognition of missionary and colonial history as essential considerations in the LGBTQI Inclusion Strategy,<sup>7</sup> start an official process to decolonise Germany's development policy by the end of 2022. Set up a commission consisting of civil society, researchers, and government officials, which will analyse how Germany's colonial legacy continues to impact Germany's development policy today. Analyse and highlight how German funding and development assistance structures are/have been complicit in reproducing these legacies. Ensure these results are publicly available.
  - Explicitly advocate for decolonising development cooperation, leveraging Germany's mandate in multilateral organisations, with a focus on the EU and the UN. One way this could be achieved is by advocating for a mandated body in the EU and the UN that would be explicitly charged with decolonising the approaches of these organisations to development cooperation (see also chapter 3.9 on a Feminist Approach to Decolonising Foreign Policy).
  - Establish systems of funding accessible to smaller, local organisations and movements in partner countries. The Feminist Funding Principles (Astraea, n.d.) provide some guidance on how this can be done. Specifically, ensure that due diligence requirements and eligibility criteria can be met by non-Western organisations (PeaceDirect, 2021).<sup>8</sup>
  - Invest in knowledge production, programme design, and evaluation rooted in local and indigenous values and methods (ibid.).
  - Build on this by encouraging a culture of openness to critique and encouraging local stakeholders to speak up without fear of reprisal or losing funding.

7 See also the Hirschfeld-Eddy-Foundation's 13-point-paper: Preliminary considerations from a civil society perspective for an LGBTQI-Inclusion Plan (LSVD, 2017)

8 As argued by AWID "Funding is often predicated on requirements around budget size, proof of financial audits, legal registration, short-term measurable impact, and other factors that may miss the reality of how movements work, mobilise, and organise. Due diligence systems manage perceived risk, rather than addressing real risk or recognising that 'safe' programmes may maintain the status quo and, as such, increase the risk that inequality will not be challenged or changed" (AWID, 2020, p.15).



## 3.6 Feminist Approach to Asylum and Migration

A Feminist Foreign Policy strives to tackle the underlying conditions of inequality and insecurity that can drive an individual's need to flee their home in the first place. It recognises the inherent violence of border checks, detentions, returns, profiling, and surveillance that often reinforce unequal power relations, reproduce colonial hierarchies between the Global North and the Global South, and increase individual circumstances of insecurity, particularly for women, children, LGBTQI\* individuals, and those defined as 'irregular' or 'illegal' (Achilleos-Sarll, 2021). A Feminist Foreign Policy understands (forced) migration as a human concern and challenges widespread depictions of (forced) migration as a 'hard' security issue or a 'threat' to a country's well-being. It provides gender-sensitive support for migrants at every stage of their migratory journey (origin, transit, reception, and integration) and advocates internationally for other states to do the same.

### STATUS QUO IN GERMANY

At the height of the 2015 'refugee crisis', Germany opened its borders to historic numbers of refugees, receiving over 500,000 asylum applications in 2015 and nearly 750,000 in 2016 (BAMF, 2017). Until last year, Germany remained the most accommodating country for asylum seekers in the European Union (EU). It now occupies the second position in the EU and is home to the fifth largest refugee population in the world (UNHCR, 2019). However, Germany refuses to understand itself as an *Einwanderungsland* (an 'immigration country'). Criticism suggests that this contradiction has led to the formulation of disjointed and inconsistent migration and asylum policies that continue to fail those who have been forcefully displaced as well as a perpetual reluctance to accept refugees in need (even, for example, after fires devastated the desperately overcrowded Moria refugee camp in September last year).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> After the fires in the Moria refugee camp, Germany did relocate over 1500 vulnerable persons (mainly families and unaccompanied minors). However, this is an extremely small proportion of the 12,000 in total who were left homeless.

In prominent policy papers,<sup>2</sup> the German government continues to promote discourse that characterises migration as a security issue (The Federal Government, 2016). Such rhetoric has prompted militarised responses to an inherently feminist security concern and the creation of increasingly hostile migration and asylum policies that force migrants into even more dangerous and insecure situations. For instance, at the EU level, Germany drives the externalisation of EU borders by strengthening and militarising border security in third countries,<sup>3</sup> for example, by providing border security and surveillance equipment, military aid, and police and coastguard training to African and Middle Eastern countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Niger, Mauritania, Chad, and Morocco (Transnational Institute and Stop Wapenhandel, 2018). As German NGO Pro Asyl has argued, “[a]ccording to the motto ‘out of sight, out of mind’, Europe’s policy of externalization aims to invisibilize refugees and migrants, the rights violations committed against them and the actual causes of flight and expulsion” (Pro Asyl, 2016 in Respond Migration, 2019, p.46). Indeed, this kind of cooperation in the field of border security has only emboldened military dictatorships outside of the EU while simultaneously triggering a parallel externalisation of responsibility regarding human rights violations and violence against migrants (Respond Migration, 2019).<sup>4</sup>

Germany recognises gender-based violence and persecution as a legitimate basis for asylum. However, it lacks a complimentary gender-sensitive reception and integration architecture that takes into account women and LGBTQI\* individuals’ experiences of war, violence, flight, resettlement, and (institutional) racism (The Gender Policy Report, 2018). For example, after arriving in Germany, migrant women are often forced to spend prolonged periods in cramped and unhygienic accommodation centres where they encounter high rates of sexualised and gender-based violence (InfoMigrants, 2019). Upon leaving, they are less likely to attend language courses, have their qualifications recognised, or join the workforce – typically inhibited by a lack of childcare options and insufficient psychosocial support (InfoMigrants, 2021). Where gender concerns are applied in popular rhetoric, migrant women are depicted as vulnerable passive victims in direct opposition to the “dangerous unaccompanied male refugee” (Respond Migration, 2018). Mandatory integration courses, for example, place an increasing emphasis on “gender equality” as a “liberal, egalitarian, western ideal”, often out of concern for culturally essentialist ideas of gender inequality and oppression in the Global South (ibid.).

---

2 Such as the *White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* (The Federal Government, 2016).

3 Border externalisation refers to the transfer of border controls to foreign countries, to prevent migrants from reaching Europe.

4 Several incidents have been documented where the involvement of foreign police forces and militias in border protection missions has led to the death of refugees, in particular through the operations of militias from the Libyan Coast Guard (Forensic Oceanography, 2018).

**WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ACTION POINTS:**

**Provide gender-sensitive support for migrants at every stage of their migratory journey on the national level**

- Establish safe and legal routes to Germany for those fleeing discrimination, persecution, or violence in their country of origin by protecting family reunion and ensuring legal aid for refugees.
- Decriminalise and financially strengthen civil sea rescue and increase the number of safe havens.<sup>5</sup>
- End restrictions on family reunification (especially for trailing wives who arrive in Germany after their spouse)<sup>6</sup> and improve processing to eliminate significant waiting times.
- Relocate more individuals left homeless by the fires in the Moria camp.
- Acknowledge that the climate emergency, environmental degradation, and disasters are drivers of human mobility (e.g., migration and displacement), recognising climate insecurity as a legitimate basis for claiming asylum.
- Remove 'safe country of origin' classifications to assess asylum claims on a case-by-case basis (particularly for LGBTQI\* asylum seekers, who can experience homophobic and/or transphobic violence and a curtailing of their rights in countries deemed to be 'safe').
- Ensure that the recent abolition of the 'grounds of discretion' principle is properly enforced. 'Grounds of discretion' is an assumption that LGBTQI\* asylum seekers can be returned to their country of origin if they 'decide' voluntarily and of their own accord to live discreetly (SOGICA, 2021).

<sup>5</sup> Safe havens are designated zones of refuge for internally displaced persons.

<sup>6</sup> According to Germany's 2008 Family Reunification Law (Act on Proceedings in Family Matters and in Matters of Non-contentious Jurisdiction), both husbands and wives must be present on German soil by the time this protected status is granted. This means that trailing wives who arrive after their husband's receipt of legal refugee status face stricter conditions and a greater possibility of denial, even though men frequently "blaze the trail"- by testing new routes before putting their families through dangerous journeys (The Gender Policy Report, 2018).



- Renew the deportation stop to Syria and stop deportations to crisis countries in accordance with Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
- End cooperation, funding, military aid, and support for border externalisation initiatives in general and in particular with governments such as Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan.

#### **Advocate for gender-sensitive support of migrants on the multilateral level**

- Advocate for establishing sufficient support structures to report gender-based violence at the EU level and allow legal prosecution of those committing it along EU borders (PeaceLab, 2020).
- Advocate for establishing an EU sea rescue system entailing search and rescue mechanisms, guided by a civil society council.
- Advocate for the evacuation of the Moria refugee camp in Greece, which is severely overcrowded.
- Advocate for the demilitarisation of EU borders and discontinue funding for militarised border initiatives.
- Advocate for the addition of sex/gender as a reason for flight to the *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*.

#### **Build a truly gender-sensitive reception and integration architecture**

- Ensure access to essential services for migrant women and LGBTQI\* individuals such as trauma counselling, sexual and reproductive health services, and women interpreters (especially for rarely spoken languages including Somali and Tigrinya).
- Ensure that individuals seeking asylum on the basis of gender-based violence (GBV) or persecution (such as female genital mutilation (FGM), rape, sexual assault/harassment, and/or forced marriage) are treated as credible candidates for asylum and are able to recount their stories to self-chosen immigration officers and interpreters within a safe space.
- Remain mindful of the intersecting oppressions experienced by multiple marginalised groups and the particular experiences that can stem from them (such as 'corrective' rape or forced arranged marriage for lesbian women).
- Implement nationwide legally binding, gender-sensitive, and sustainable minimum standard regulations for decent and safe refugee accommodation centres in Germany.
- Take steps to tackle gender-based and sexualised violence in refugee accommodation centres, for example, by ensuring that women have access to private toilets, showers, and bedrooms with locks and by establishing sufficient reporting mechanisms.
- Support the integration of asylum seekers (especially women and LGBTQI\* individuals) into the workforce and actively seek cooperation with diaspora, migrant, and LGBTQI\* organisations.



## 3.7 Feminist Approach to Health

A Feminist Foreign Policy advocates for global health free from discrimination and power inequalities within and among states. It is informed and guided by the principle of the human right to health. A Feminist Foreign Policy provides considerable resources to secure access to health and well-being for everyone. It puts the needs of the most marginalised at its centre – both at home and abroad. It recognises that health policies – as all policies – are influenced by patriarchal and racist stereotypes and colonial legacies and works to overcome these influences. The feminist values of this approach are equally prioritised in a country's international as well as domestic health policies.<sup>1</sup>

### STATUS QUO IN GERMANY

The new *Global Health Strategy of the German Federal Government*, published in 2020, aims to establish Germany as a major player within the international field of global health. The strategy acknowledges the human right to health as its guiding principle and commits to non-discriminatory, gender-sensitive, inclusive and barrier-free health structures and services in the global context (German Federal Ministry of Health, 2020). However, important feminist concerns remain unmet. For example, the exclusion of asylum seekers and migrants as vulnerable groups within the strategy or the omission to ensure equal representation of diverse perspectives in decision-making boards (Women in Global Health Germany, 2020). Moreover, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Germany, together with France, the Netherlands, and Italy, formed an alliance to negotiate priority access to vaccines for them and the rest of the EU and has done little to drive a global vaccine solution – thereby perpetuating further global health inequalities (Mullard, 2020).

Moreover, Germany continues to violate the human right to health on a domestic level. Despite criticism from various UN agencies and domestic pressure, abortions remain illegal in Germany, violating the internationally recognised human right to legal and safe abortion.<sup>2</sup> Further, Germany's current law on transgender rights, the so-called "*Transsexuellengesetz*"<sup>3</sup>, which demands, for example, mandatory psychological assessments before being able to legally change your gender, violates international human rights standards and is dehumanising and degrading towards trans individuals (Douglas, 2021).

<sup>1</sup> For more information on Feminist Global Health and further policy recommendations, see Kreitlow (2021) *A Feminist Global Health Policy*.

<sup>2</sup> For a full analysis of Germany's legal shortcomings with regards to abortion see Lembke (2021) *Aktuelle Regelung des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs: Strafgesetzbuch (StGB)*.

<sup>3</sup> For the full legal text in German see BMJV (1980) *Transsexuellengesetz - TSG*.

## **A Feminist Foreign Policy recognises that health policies - as all policies - are influenced by patriarchal and racist stereotypes and colonial legacies and works to overcome these influences.**

### **WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ACTION POINTS:**

#### **Ensure Germany's global and domestic health policies are guided by the guiding principle of health as a human right**

- Establish a task force, consisting of civil society representatives, health professionals as well as representatives of the Ministry for Health and the Foreign Office that evaluate Germany's global and domestic health policies from an intersectional feminist perspective, including an analysis of colonial influences on health policies.
- Based on the task force's assessment, together with civil society, draft and implement a feminist domestic health strategy that ensures non-discriminatory, gender-sensitive, inclusive and barrier-free health structures and services and aims at achieving Universal Health Coverage for all by the year 2030). Ensure that Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) and the specific needs of LGBTQI\* individuals and migrants, and asylum seekers are prioritised within this strategy. Ensure that the strategy implies an intersectional and anti-racist lens and aims to abolish racist discrimination within the German healthcare system.
- Ensure that all health policy decisions are based on gender-, race-, age-, and ability-disaggregated data.

- Politically and financially support independent research on specific health needs of marginalised groups, such as the vast range of gynaecological and maternal diseases (Kreitlow, 2021).
- Integrate and prioritise a health perspective in all foreign policy decisions, analysing all foreign policy decisions with a focus on their impact on the health and well-being of the human beings affected by those decisions (Kreitlow, 2021).

#### **End all forms of discrimination within Germany's domestic healthcare system**

- Ensure sufficient and sustainable funding for initiatives and facilities addressing the specific health needs of LGBTQI\* and BIPoC individuals and other marginalised groups in a safe place.
- Replace the "Transsexuellengesetz (TSG)" with a law that is guided by the principle of self-determination and allows all people wanting to change their gender so that they can do so without the need to undergo sterilisation and without the bureaucratic hassle.
- Ensure that abortion is legal, easily, and safely accessible for everyone and covered by health insurance providers. For this end, abolish § 218 and § 219a of the German Criminal Code. Information about abortion must be available without any restrictions. Contraception and information on contraception should also be easily accessible and free for all.

- Ensure that same-sex married couples and all unmarried couples have the same access to financial support for artificial insemination as heterosexual married couples.<sup>4</sup>
  - Introduce science-based comprehensive sexuality education in schools and ensure the curriculum reflects best practices on introducing children and adolescents to sexuality and diversity in an age-appropriate manner (Denkovski et al., 2021).
  - Promote gender-transformative approaches to public health campaigns by addressing harmful stereotypes of destructive masculinities in prevention and awareness campaigns (Kreitlow, 2021).
  - Ensuring easy and affordable access to mental health services for all people.
- Drive feminist global health policies that actively contribute to abolishing power inequalities**
- Advocate for gender parity and representation of diverse perspectives in decision making bodies and structures on global health, including the World Health Organisation.<sup>5</sup>
  - Proactively encourage other former colonial powers to analyse how colonial legacies influence their national health policies as well as international health policies.
  - Advocate for and support universal access to SRHR, including free and legal access to abortion, for all individuals anytime, everywhere, including in conflict and post-conflict settings.
  - Increase public investments in global health research and implementation and ensure through the provision of alternative research incentives (de-linkage) that the results of this research are harnessed to serve the public interest and made available in a cost-effective manner. Ensure that barrier-free access to the use of innovations is granted globally through comprehensive technology transfer and the application of non-exclusive licensing models. Ensure this research to be feminist and anti-racist. Actively encourage and support research projects that focus on decolonising global health.
  - Substantially drive forward a global COVID-19 vaccine solution that contributes to vaccine equity through a comprehensive approach including full-featured technology transfer and the removal of IP barriers by advocating for a temporary waiver for IP protection under the WTO TRIPS agreement.

4 In line with many feminist thinkers, we want to emphasise that even if marriage is available to homosexual and heterosexual couples (as it should be), “state-regulated marriage can further marginalise those individuals who are making their lives outside of marriage” (Enloe, 2017, 110).

5 The recent Global Health 50/50 report has demonstrated that 70% of leaders in global health are men, 84% are from high-income countries and 94% have attained their education in a high-income country.



## **3.8 Feminist Approach to Trade and International Investment**

A Feminist Foreign Policy acknowledges that trade and investment policies are highly gendered. It highlights that, unless accompanied by additional mechanisms, trade and investment policies can negatively contribute to rising in-country and country-country inequalities, increasing the care burden on women, or block states from enacting policies to combat inequality. In particular political minorities, especially Black, Indigenous, and Women of Colour (BIWoC), have been “incorporated into labour markets in a way that increases rather than diminishes inequalities” (McDonald and Keenan, 2021, p. 18). A Feminist Trade Policy thus actively invests human and political resources to address the unevenly distributed effects of international trade and globalisation to overcome structural inequalities through redefining the purpose of global trade away from economic growth and towards a feminist understanding of security, including economic justice (Hannah et al., 2020).

### **STATUS QUO IN GERMANY**

The EU’s exclusive power in the area of trade in goods means that individual member states lack the capacity to single-handedly define their trade policies – but they have the ability to shape the EU trade policies in the first place. However, the shared competencies in the areas of services and intellectual property allow member states more leeway in advancing a gender perspective in their approach, and political components of international trade agreements are within the remit of national parliaments.

In sum, the German government still mainly defines the goal of trade as economic growth (measured in GDP/GNI) and believes that this is the best way to foster prosperity for all. Welcomingly, Germany supports redefining the EU Trade Policy as a trade policy based on values, as opposed to one based on purely economic growth (BMWl, n.d.).

The Federal Ministry for Economy states that it sees social justice, social participation, and equality as the cornerstone for everyone to share in prosperity. However, gender equality, beyond supporting women entrepreneurs through trade, is mainly regarded as a development and not a trade issue. It further remains unclear if and to what extent Germany systematically assesses and mitigates the intersectional impact of trade. Racial inequality seems to be understood as inequality between the Global North and the Global South, with no recognition of Germany’s colonial history or the risk of increasing racial inequalities within a country through trade policies that lack an intersectional perspective.

**WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ACTION POINTS:**

**Strengthen internal capacities and resources to design and implement feminist trade policies**

- Clearly define how Germany understands, assesses and plans to mitigate the intersectional impact of trade and investment and mainstream this throughout the government bodies.
- Under the leadership of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), establish an advisory group consisting of femocrats (individuals positioned within the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy and the relevant representatives of Germany who are motivated to move towards transformative change in line with feminist values), feminist civil society organisations (from Germany and abroad), and epistemic communities (professional experts with recognised expertise in trade policy and intersectionality) to define a feminist national and international trade policy, as well as plan on how to operationalise and evaluate the policy.<sup>1</sup>
- Ensure that all international trade and investment policies are based on gender-, age-, race-ability-, and SOGIESC<sup>2</sup>- disaggregated data.
- Ensure that all delegations (for economic promotion) have equitable and meaningful participation of women and other politically marginalised groups. Train, second, and fund gender experts to become part of delegations negotiating international trade agreements. Ensure that gender-sensitive economic trade policies are part of the diplomatic training.

**Live up to Germany's extraterritorial responsibilities**

- Further strengthen the Due Diligence Law<sup>3</sup> by introducing civil liability for companies and allowing survivors of human rights abuses access to German courts.
- Expand the scope of the law to include all entities across the value chain – from raw materials extraction to final use of the products (ECCHR, 2021).

<sup>1</sup> Based on Guerrina and Wright (2016); Woodward (2003).

<sup>2</sup> Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression, and Sex Characteristics

<sup>3</sup> Lieferkettensorgfaltspflichtengesetz (The Federal Government, 2021)

- Further expand the scope of the Due Diligence law to ensure that human rights abuses are prevented, instead of limiting the law to “acute or imminent human rights violations” when the option of redress is rarely available (ibid.).
- Enable and fund civil society participation in the monitoring of the implementation of the Due Diligence Law.

### **Promote equality through international feminist trade policies**

- Ensure that feminist analysis is applied to all trade agreements, including the human rights and environmental impact assessment and sustainability impact assessments conducted in connection with trade negotiations (Government Office of Sweden, 2019). The UNCTAD Trade and Gender Toolbox (UNCTAD, 2017) could be a good starting point to assess the effects of trade on politically marginalised groups.
  - In negotiation for trade agreements, prioritise those products and services that have positive gender impacts (Government Office of Sweden, 2019).
  - Avoid focusing support on ‘women entrepreneurs’ only when developing gender-responsive trade policies but expand the focus of such initiatives to include women working low-wage, unpaid or informal jobs, who tend to have even less access to capital and other resources, and therefore less economic mobility (Feminist Foreign Policy Working Group, 2021).
  - Further ensure trade agreements do not increase women’s unpaid domestic and care work burden by guaranteeing that governments are not compelled to liberalise, or prevented from renationalising, public services (Kress, 2017; Trade Justice Movement, n.d.).
- ### **Advocate for feminist international trade law at the EU level**
- Ensure that Investor State Dispute Settlement provisions are excluded from trade agreements. Otherwise, policies that favour women, or indigenous communities, could potentially be interpreted as a “barrier to investment”, and national governments might be prosecuted by firms for adopting them. (Kress, 2017, para.5).
  - Advocate for the exclusion of intellectual property rights in the field of medicine to avoid the risk of poor communities and women losing access to needed generic medicine due to patents (Kress, 2017; Trade Justice Movement, n.d.).
  - Support the call by the European Parliament for “due diligence rules [which] would oblige companies to identify, address and remedy aspects of their value chain [...] that could or do infringe on human rights, the environment and good governance” (European Parliament, 2021, para.1), including a ban on the import of products linked to severe human rights violations, such as forced or child labour.
  - Advocate for all EU trade agreements to include the obligation to ratify all ILO fundamental conventions. Advocate for “binding clauses on labour standards that offer explicit protection to women working in precarious or informal conditions like domestic workers or seamstresses” (Kress, 2017, para.5).
  - Ensure that products consumed disproportionately by women do not face higher tariffs. Advocate for an EU and international wide scrapping of the so-called ‘pink tax’.<sup>4</sup>
  - In bilateral as well as supra- and multilateral fora, reinforce the right of governments to

<sup>4</sup> “The Pink Tax refers to the phenomenon whereby goods and services cost more for females than males for no good reason. The culprits include service providers, marketers and sellers of consumer goods (a lot of those goods and their packaging have pink on them), state governments, and the U.S. government. Sadly, the Pink Tax also happens to be a global phenomenon that rears its ugly head in many parts of the world” (Pink.Tax, n.d., para.1).

**A Feminist Foreign Policy highlights that, unless accompanied by additional mechanisms, trade and investment policies can negatively contribute to rising in-country and country-country inequalities, increasing the care burden on women, or block states from enacting policies to combat inequality.**

regulate in the public interest and accordance with their values (e.g., the way Canada has done, one option being replacing gender chapters in trade agreements by using 'right to regulate' provisions, which should "[...] ensure that the wording 'gender equality' is included in the illustrative list of areas where parties reaffirm their right to regulate in the public interest; this can be found either in the scope article of the investment chapter or the preamble of the whole agreement" (Government of Canada, 2021, para.4).

- Push for the mainstreaming of gender, age, disability, and race in international standards development. The average white, abled, young man can no longer be the standard for the safety of goods.
- Institute gender-lens investing and grant-making (taking gender and equality factors across the investment and grant-making process to inform investment and funding decisions better and ultimately advance gender equality) at the EU level. Advocate for establishing an EU counterpart to Canada's Equality Fund, which aims to "combine gender-lens investing, bold government funding, and powerful, multi-sector philanthropy to unlock new capital for feminist

movements globally" (Equality Fund, 2021b, para.1). This way, the EU could ensure that it is a driver of meaningful and sustainable change.

- Recognise that women who belong to racialised communities, immigrants and refugees, and LGBTQI\* communities have suffered disproportionately during the pandemic as they tend to work in the least valued jobs in the economy. Advocate for the inclusion of this perspective in the EU recovery plan (European Commission, 2021), the collection of disaggregated data, and the development of a specific plan to address the issue.

#### **Decolonise German and international trade**

- Champion debt cancellation for low-income countries, recognising publicly the colonial systems that led to that debt.
- Ensure that tax agreements do not have loopholes that allow German multinational companies to avoid paying tax in investment recipient countries.
- Ensure that investment agreements require that regular and meaningful consultation with local communities.





## **3.9 Feminist Approach to Decolonising Foreign Policy**

A Feminist Foreign Policy of a former colonial power like Germany takes full responsibility for all colonial crimes and their impacts today. This means allowing people in former colonies to reclaim what was taken from them and their communities and fully honour their roots and heritage; return stolen objects and arts; and actively tackle postcolonial structures and systemic violence that keep racism, white supremacy, and unequal power relations in place. It means understanding and facing the colonial and racial histories and trauma people and entire countries have been suffering from and still do.

### **STATUS QUO IN GERMANY**

Although Germany was the third largest colonial empire before World War I (Cascais, 2021), it remains reluctant to address its colonial past, both in education and (foreign) policy.<sup>1</sup> Germany is still reluctant to take full responsibility for colonial crimes. Until today, Germany has yet to return stolen culture and art goods to former colonies and rename streets honouring colonial masters (Hasselbach, 2018; Braun, 2019). Reaching an agreement with Namibia concerning the recognition of the 1904-1908 colonial-era massacre of Herero and Nama as genocide in May 2021 was a long-overdue step (Moulson and Smith, 2021). Yet, the agreement has been heavily criticised by descendants and Herero and Nama activists in both Germany and Namibia. It is argued that the negotiations took place behind closed doors and left affected parties underrepresented (African Examiner, 2021). The promised aid programme of 1.1 billion euros is far from being considered fair reparations. Further, Germany depicts the financial support as a voluntary relief campaign (RBB24 2021), diminishing its responsibility as a former colonial power. Recently, accusations about colonial discourse have also been made in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Germany prevents the reformation of the patent law from making vaccines more easily accessible or shows general reluctance to promote vaccine justice (David, 2021). As the pandemic is also more likely to kill Black people, the connection between vaccine distribution and white supremacy as well as new forms of colonialism has a bitter taste for many countries in need (Ahmed, 2021). While it is disputed whether a patent law reformation would actually help fair vaccine distribution, the international community must invest in a global vaccine solution without any form of exploitative power dynamics (Olla, 2021). Until a solution is found, Germany should increasingly export (without a rise in prices) and donate vaccines to countries in need.

<sup>1</sup> From 1884 until 1919, Germany held colonies in Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, China, Gabun, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Papua New Guinea, Ruanda, Tansania, Togo, Tschad and some island in the West Pacific and Micronesia (Die Welt, 2014).

Germany's Foreign Policy must genuinely address its colonial past and engage in decolonising foreign policy discourses. As a former coloniser, Germany should actively counter colonial structures and processes within government institutions and prioritise relations with former colonies and descendants of affected communities. The government should also cooperate with, strengthen, value, and support civil society initiatives (politically and financially) that focus on decolonised research and knowledge production and tackle internal structures barriers. On an international level, Germany should promote the decolonisation of International Relations and multilateral cooperation.

### WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ACTION POINTS:

#### Address Germany's colonial past

- Recognise all German colonial crimes (including taking legal responsibility), such as during the Maji Maji revolt in Tanzania 1905–1907 (Pelz, 2021) or the 1905 resistance in Douala, Cameroon (Lipowsky, 2017).
- Remove all remaining tributes to the colonial era and colonial rulers.
- Issue an official apology to the Herero and Nama (not the Namibian state) for the 1904–1908 genocide and all suffering connected with it.
- Promise remembrance and at least one tribute to colonial victims for each former German colony.
- Return all stolen colonial objects to their country of origin by the end of 2023. Ensure that each German city with over 200,000 inhabitants has a museum, exhibition or memorial addressing the area's colonial past by 2025.

- In cooperation with the Ministry of Education, local civil society, and diaspora organisations, assure that there is an emphasis on the reconditioning of Germany's colonial past in the history lesson syllabus.
- Investigate the impact of and relation between German colonialism and gender and sexuality and address how it continues to shape contemporary assumptions about sex(uality), gender (identity), gender roles, and sexual orientation.

#### Overcome colonial patterns and structures

- Introduce an easy-to-administer fund for German civil society organisations to promote municipal decolonial research on foreign policy by the end of 2022.
- Set up an advisory committee of policy-makers, diaspora representatives and postcolonial scholars to advise the government on decolonising foreign policy in general. Ensure that smaller working groups

consist of diaspora members of the respective country when advising the Foreign Office on its relations with a former German colony.

- Instruct the advisory committee with an official decolonisation process concerning Germany's colonial past by the end of 2022. This process includes listening to and valuing Indigenous knowledge, enforcing restorative justice, challenging white supremacy, fighting racism, revising how history is taught, and supporting BIPOC-led justice movements and restitution efforts. Initiate external knowledge production and research on how colonial legacy keeps influencing German foreign policy thinking and making by the end of 2023.
  - Proactively provide regular updates on the progress of decolonising foreign policies in the various policy areas. This could include an annual public briefing at the ministerial level, jointly with civil society, on the progress achieved in the previous year as well as lessons learned (based on Woroniuk, 2021).
  - Make yearly anti-racist training(s) obligatory for Foreign Office staff on all hierarchy levels.
  - Commission research on the colonial patterns within Germany's foreign policy institutions and how they contribute to exclusionary recruitment processes and institutional discrimination.
- Contribute to the decolonisation of International Relations**
- Acknowledge publicly that structural racism exists in foreign policy and both race and racism shape (foreign) policy-related institutions.
  - Financially support the Tax Justice Network Africa<sup>2</sup> and similar tools such as evidence-based financial indexes to measure stolen capital and track illicit but unusually high financial flows to uncover financial gaps in the public purse across the African continent.
  - Actively engage with and support local activists calling for the liberation of remaining colonies, such as returning the Chagos Islands to its people (Schwikowski, 2019) and assuring compensation for forced resettlement of the Chagos residents.
  - Promote the establishment of a Decolonisation officer in the European External Action Service (EEAS), tasked with overlooking the decolonisation processes of European foreign policy, including monitoring and managing the working group of former European colonial powers(s. below).
  - Establish a working group of former European colonial powers to focus on accountability and implement a process of joint decolonisation by 2023, with binding goals, mechanisms, and strategies.
  - Cooperate with feminist civil society to set up an international network committed to connecting (post)colonialism and gender. Within the network, promote the decolonisation of gender roles and gender identity.
  - Withdraw from development policy in the conventional sense: Invest in local researchers and indigenous knowledge and methods, specifically youth, feminist, gender, and religious experts, to ensure joint intersectional learning. Ensure intersectional and diverse recruiting mechanisms to fill positions with local staff. Decolonise language and include local communities in the process of terminology change (see Peace Direct 2021<sup>3</sup> and chapter 3.5 Feminist Approach to Development Cooperation).

<sup>2</sup> The Tax Justice Network Africa was set up in 2007 and aims to create an antidote to corruption rankings where African countries usually did poorly while it was ignored that rich Western countries welcomed stolen and illicit loot (secretly). The network advocates for pro-poor tax policies and the strengthening of tax systems to promote domestic resource mobilisation. For further information see: <https://taxjusticeafrica.net/about-us/>.

<sup>3</sup> See also the chapter "The Colonial Roots and Legacy of Aid and Peacebuilding" in Peace Direct (2021).



## **3.10 Feminist Approach to Countering the Anti-Gender Movement**

A Feminist Foreign Policy acknowledges that anti-feminist, anti-gender campaigns<sup>1</sup> are not an academic or policy debate but a development that renders many politically marginalised individuals and communities around the world insecure through initiatives and efforts to (further) restrict the rights of women, LGBTQI\*, and migrants and racialised communities, among others. A Feminist Foreign Policy acknowledges that there is nothing radical about expanding the concept of human rights to include traditionally marginalised groups. In fact, the anti-gender movement itself advances radical ideas intending to promote a world order that maintains the dominance of the white heterosexual, cisgender male from the Global North. A Feminist Foreign Policy commits substantial political and financial resources to counter the increasingly transnational efforts of anti-gender activities driven by governments, think tanks, parties, concerned citizens' groups and religious groups and actively promote the rights of women and LGBTQI\* individuals and communities, both at home and abroad.

### **STATUS QUO IN GERMANY**

Over the recent months, Germany has started to seriously recognise anti-gender campaigns as a threat to the rights of women and LGBTQI\* individuals and communities. For example, in Foreign Minister Heiko Maas' speech on International Women's Day in 2020, he reaffirmed that Germany is standing up to the pushback against women's rights (Auswärtiges Amt, 2020). In early 2021, the German government, together with Mexico, Finland, the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, and CFFP, hosted the event "Reasserting Rights: Countering Transnational Anti-Gender Campaigns". The Federal Foreign Office additionally continues to support CFFP's work on countering the anti-gender campaigns financially.

The presence of anti-gender actors and allies within Germany remains a challenge for countering the anti-gender movement successfully, both at home and internationally. While the right-wing party AfD can be characterised as an anti-gender actor, the programme of the party CSU who currently is in government also reflects influence from anti-gender actors by stating that families need to have freedom from "gender ideology" (CSU Landesleitung, 2016). Widely read newspapers, such as the FAZ or Die Welt, also give platforms to anti-

<sup>1</sup> When referring to anti-gender campaigns, we refer to initiatives aiming to restrict or roll-back gender equality, LGBTQI\* equality, comprehensive science-based sexuality education, and the rights of racialised and migrant communities, among others. These can take the form of e.g. popular mobilisations, on- and off-line campaigns, legislative and legal challenges, as well as lobbying. While we argue that what we are witnessing is a non-centralised movement, we believe that all individual anti-gender campaigns can be understood to be part of a (loosely defined) anti-gender movement. Therefore, we refer to the singular anti-gender movement, with the caveat that it is an umbrella term for a variety of individual campaigns. For more information, please see Denkovski et al. (2021).

gender narratives by publishing articles that argue that gender studies are unscientific and a new form of creationism (Villa, 2018). In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, anti-gender narratives became further entrenched. Blum (2020) points out how anti-feminists have used the pandemic to reinforce traditional family patterns in Germany and elaborates on the commonalities between anti-feminism and the ‘coronavirus conspiracy’, including abstract enemies, an anti-modern worldview, and non-science-based arguments, as well as the use of similar rhetoric. She warns of the “danger that anti-coronavirus protests will serve to instil an ideology in their supporters that will act as a gateway to a fixed, conspiracy worldview permanently associated with misanthropic ideologies such as racism, anti-Semitism, and anti-feminism [...]” (ibid., para.6).

Germany’s engagement to counter the anti-gender movement is further hindered by the lack of women’s equality and LGBTQI\* in front of the German law. While developments, such as the introduction of marriage equality for same-sex couples in 2017, the ban of ‘conversion therapies’ for minors (BBC, 2020), the ban of “corrective” surgery on intersex children in 2021 (Anarte, 2021) or the introduction of the ‘divers’ gender in 2018, are welcoming, major challenges remain. For example, abortions are still illegal in Germany, and the current transgender law remains “degrading, expensive, and illogical” (Douglas, 2021), as it continues to pathologise being transgender by requiring two independent medical/psychiatric assessments (please also see chapter 3.2 Feminist Approach to Human Rights and the Rule of Law).

### WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ACTION POINTS:<sup>2</sup>

#### Counter the anti-gender movement domestically.

- Strengthen internal capacities of the German government to advance women’s and LGBTQI\* rights.
  - Internally and externally, continue to advocate for framing the work of anti-gender campaigns as organised, well-funded attacks on human rights of (political) minorities and liberal democracy (and not a pushback) that needs to be contextualised within the wider attacks on democracy and multilateralism globally. Acknowledge that many of these anti-gender actors are using the rights of women and LGBTQI\* to either gain or increase their power. Ensure that the framing of anti-gender campaigns is not framed technically but reflects the political nature of their goals and strategies.
  - Ensure that staff members throughout the government are aware of the work of anti-gender campaigns, specifically, those working in the planning units, on human rights and gender, health, and education as well as those embassy staff members in embassies to multilateral organisations (e.g., New York City, Geneva, Vienna, Addis Ababa, Washington D.C.), and the Holy See. Include the topic of anti-gender campaigns in the diplomatic training track.

<sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise specified, the recommendations are based on Denkovski et al. (2021).

- Linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, establish a joint task force bringing together different government departments and ministries working on LGBTQI\*, the 'Women, Peace and Security' Agenda, health, and education, and respective planning units, as well as women's rights, LGBTQI\* rights and anti-right and anti-racism civil society and researchers working on anti-gender campaigns, which regularly assess joint challenges and develop joint action points.
- Ensure that (political) minorities have the same rights at home that the governments are protecting internationally.
  - Ensure that women and all people with a uterus have the right to legal and safe abortion without mandatory counselling and waiting periods. Ensure that abortion is part of the medical curriculum at universities. Ensure that medical services are easily and freely accessible, even during times when movement is restricted.
  - Ensure that all people wanting to change their gender can do so without bureaucratic hassle, pathologisation, and excessive costs.
  - Ensure that same-sex marriages are legally equal to heterosexual marriages, specifically concerning adoption and financial support of artificial fertilisation.
- Proactively raising awareness of the threat posed by anti-gender campaigns to human rights and our multilateral structures and building explicitly pro-gender alliances within multilateral fora. This should include establishing a pro-gender group at the United Nations following a similar principle to the 'LGBTI Core Group' and making efforts to establish such groups or task forces at the OSCE and the EU level.
- Financially supporting establishing broad, cross-sectoral civil society coalitions to defend and advance women and LGBTQI\* rights.
- Strengthen outreach and communication.
  - Through speeches, public campaigns, advertisements, specifically on social media, raise public awareness of the need to protect further and advance the rights of women and LGBTQI\* and strengthen our democratic societies. Counter the idea that gender equality is unnecessary or has gone too far. This will require a comprehensive assessment of human rights at home and abroad based on gender-disaggregated data. Ensure that the language used is inclusive and does not focus on white, cisgender, heterosexual women. Do not cater to the idea that transgender rights endanger women's rights.
  - Coordinate with other pro-gender European governments to conduct EU-wide campaigns (online and offline) explaining and defending the Istanbul convention. Advocate for EU-wide ratification of the Convention in EU fora.
  - Develop effective counter-narratives to those advanced by anti-gender actors (see Denkovski et al., 2021) and target the 'undecided' silent majority, which tends to be more responsive to the counter-narratives, rather than anti-gender actors themselves

### **Counter the anti-gender movement in multilateral fora.**

- Widen and strengthen alliances by:
  - Reviewing the partnerships built nationally and internationally and assessing whether additional actors could strengthen efforts to challenge anti-gender campaigns (e.g., progressive religious actors).

- Invest political capital and leverage Germany's position internationally towards advancing gender equality.
  - Proactively and regularly organise high-level events on anti-gender campaigns in or at the margins of important international gatherings, such as the CSW or the UN General Assembly – ideally in cooperation with other like-minded states. Highlight the threats posed by anti-gender campaigns to the human rights of (political) minorities and democracy in speeches, statements, and social media.
  - In negotiations, develop strategies and define red lines on gender issues with allies, ask for the maximum in the zero drafts of treaties and resolutions and do not try to appease anti-gender actors with weakened language as any language on gender will most likely be contested.
  - At the EU level, support initiatives such as the Report on the situation of sexual and reproductive health and rights in the EU (Matic 2021), in the frame of women's health or the Study for Policy Makers on opposition to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) in European institutions and enact the recommendations therein (Zacharenko 2021).
- (Financially) support feminist civil society.
  - Financially support civil society to conduct political advocacy work promoting gender equality, the rights of women and LGBTQI\*, and provide much-needed support to women and LGBTQI\* communities on the ground, with the understanding that addressing the symptoms of gender inequality (e.g., providing much-needed health service to transgender people) is as important as civil society's ability to shape political and public discourses.
- Provide long-term, institutional, and easy-to-administer funding for feminist and LGBTQI\* grassroots and civil society organisations, including loosely organised movements. Ensure that at least fifty percent of funds earmarked for gender equality goes to feminist grassroots and civil society organisations, including transgender and LGBTQI\* organisations, and not to international organisations or governments of EU Member States (please also see chapter 4.3 Feminist Approach to Cooperation with Feminist Civil Society). In this regard, the move by the Netherlands at the Generation equality forum to pledge USD 620 million to feminist organisations and gender equality movements is a good example to follow (Donor Tracker, 2021).
- When funding civil society, specifically to provide or protect Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR), ensure that the beneficiary civil society organisation does not oppose the right to abortion or exclude trans women.
- Support and enable feminist civil society to shape discussions within multilateral fora. For this end, invite feminist civil society to advise Germany's delegations to international conferences and processes (while compensating them adequately for their expertise) and support the accreditation of feminist civil society as observers to multilateral organisations.
- Enable continuing knowledge-building on anti-gender campaigns, particularly in specific (political) contexts through continuing to fund research and analysis of the work of anti-gender campaigns, especially context-specific research, investigating which external actors are influencing policies and narratives in the European context, specifically looking into the dangers of philanthropy for civil society, and the usefulness of anti-gender ideas for both left- and right-wing extremism.



## **3.11 Feminist Approach to the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda**

In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted the landmark resolution 1325, which, together with its nine sister resolutions, make up the 'Women, Peace, and Security' (WPS) agenda – a significant international normative and policy framework addressing the gendered impacts and drivers of violent conflict (Davies and True, 2019). Concretely, the agenda calls for equal *participation* of women in all aspects of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the *protection* of women and girls in armed conflict, *gender-sensitive relief and recovery*, and the (gender-sensible) *prevention* of armed conflict.

A Feminist Foreign Policy recognises the transformative approach of the agenda challenging “the patriarchal normative framework [...] that underpin[s] peace and security institutions” (ibid., p.4). Above all, a Feminist Foreign Policy recognises that feminist activists who initiated and continue to shape the WPS agenda today wanted the agenda (and the UN Security Council) to focus on conflict prevention and on rolling back “the escalating levels of militarisation, making homes, communities and nations less rather than more secure” (Global Study, 2015, p.194). A feminist approach to WPS calls out the increasing militarisation of security and coherently implements the agenda across both domestic and foreign policy in an intersectional and decolonised manner.

### **STATUS QUO IN GERMANY**

In recent years, the German government has increasingly been willing to invest political and human resources to advance the agenda nationally and internationally. Currently, it is implementing its third WPS National Action Plan (NAP), which represents important progress. It acknowledges that inequalities and militarisation of societies can contribute to violent conflict and that social norms uphold power inequalities that negatively impact women, girls, sexual minorities, and people with diverse gender identities (Auswärtiges Amt, 2021b). Moreover, it recognises that the agenda is a preventative one at its core (ibid., p.24). However, Germany does not commit to an explicit feminist peace policy agenda, which would include disarmament and ending arms exports (Bernarding et al., 2021). It further continues to understand the agenda as predominantly a foreign policy tool. The NAP focuses predominantly on initiatives outside Germany's state borders and does not address the importance of strengthening women's reproductive rights at home, for example. Further, while civil society has the opportunity to monitor the implementation of the NAP through regular consultation meetings twice a year, for instance, it has no institutionalised role in co-drafting (like in Sweden and Finland) and/or assessing the NAP itself. To strengthen accountability and impact, we consider it good practice when governments support critical reports of its work on WPS by (domestic and international) civil society, like in Switzerland.<sup>1</sup>

### **WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ACTION POINTS:**

#### **Commit to explicitly pursue a feminist conflict prevention and peace agenda**

- Explicitly recognise that sustainable conflict prevention requires uncompromising efforts to demilitarise national and international security

<sup>1</sup> The Swiss government recommended in its in-house progress report on its third NAP an independent report on the NAP's implementation by civil society. This resulted in the report *Women, Peace, and Security - Reloaded* a systematic review of the Swiss government's work on WPS financed by the government.

<sup>2</sup> Please also see: Bernarding et al. (2021). *Frauen, Frieden und Sicherheit. Zivilgesellschaftliche Stellungnahme zum 3. Nationalen Aktionsplan der Bundesregierung.*



structures and focus on feminist understandings of security.<sup>3</sup>

- Ensure that taking into account the risk of exported military goods being used to commit or facilitate gender-based violence (GBV) (in line with the 2014 Arms Trade Treaty's Article 7.4.) represents only a short-term step towards ending all German arms exports.
- Support international disarmament initiatives, including ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, an international treaty to ban lethal autonomous weapons.
- Fulfil and implement the obligations of the *Paris Climate Agreement*, take gender-equitable climate protection measures, and ensure the participation of women and persons with non-binary gender identifications and diverse sexual orientation in national and international climate protection processes, in accordance with the General Recommendation No. 37 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Bernarding et al., 2020).

**Implement the WPS agenda also within domestic policies**

- Ensure women, transgender people, non-binary and gender non-conforming persons, and persons with diverse sexual orientations have full access to reproductive rights in Germany, including the human right to legal and safe abortion. This includes the elimination of sections 218 and 219a of the German Criminal Code. Furthermore, abortions must be mandatory for any medical study programme (Bernarding et al., 2020).
- Commit to actively counter anti-gender, misogynistic, and right-wing violence against women, sexual minorities and people with diverse gender identifications. This includes the introduction of the criminal offence 'femicide'.
- Ensure that refugee and migrant survivors of

gender-based violence in Germany receive adequate support in line with the survivor-centred approach discussed in the current NAP and promoted by the German government, e.g., UN Security Resolution 2467. This includes rendering asylum procedures gender-sensitive and trauma-sensitive so that survivors have the opportunity to invoke sexualised and gender-based violence as grounds for asylum in a protected space (Bernarding et al., 2020).

- Create the position of Special Commissioner of the German Government for Women, Peace and Security. This needs to correlate with the creation of 1325-units in all relevant ministries and the increase in human resources within the individual departments (Bernarding et al., 2020).
- Prioritise and strengthen the criminal prosecution of sexualised and gender-based violence through law enforcement agencies in trials in Germany according to the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction (Bernarding et al., 2020).

**Institutionalise cooperation with civil society, including from conflict-affected societies**

- Establish a committee comprising of civil society, including from conflict-affected areas, and government representatives responsible for drafting the next NAP (Bernarding and Lunz, 2020).
- After each implementation phase, commission an independent evaluation of the NAP and its implementation by feminist civil society (Bernarding and Lunz, 2020).
- Report annually in writing to the parliament on the progress of implementing the NAP. Encourage and support shadow reports by civil society, including from conflict-affected areas (Bernarding and Lunz, 2020).
- Institutionalise consultations with women and feminist civil society affected by conflict in all phases of National Action Plans (Bernarding and Lunz, 2020).

<sup>3</sup> Please also see chapter 3.1 Feminist Approach to Peace and Security, chapter 3.3 Feminist Approach to Demilitarisation, Disarmament, and Arms (Export) Control and 3.9 Feminist Approach to Decolonising Foreign Policy.

# STRUCTURAL CHANGES

## 4.1 Feminist Approach to Communication

Inclusive internal and external communication that actively advocates for gender equality and racial justice are essential for designing intersectional policies. A Feminist Foreign Policy prioritises anti-racist, inclusive, gender-responsive language. Communicating effectively to people domestically and abroad and actively addressing power inequalities perpetuated through exclusive language is imperative. This means acknowledging the manifold experiences of different people, being aware that language and the way language is used is not free of discrimination and power relations. It means adapting societal and public discourses to anti-racism, equality, and inclusivity and communicating clearly and accessibly for everyone.

A Feminist Foreign Policy requires the active communication of gender equality and racial justice aspirations in statements, speeches, and external communication materials. This is a crucial step towards raising awareness of inequalities and changing the exclusive narrative of current foreign policy formulation. This can also challenge the narratives of anti-gender actors around gender equality and freedom of speech (Denkovski et al., 2021).

## STATUS QUO IN GERMANY

Germany's use of inclusive language is limited. Efforts to speak in a non-discriminatory way are minimal. There is also a reluctance to adopt anti-racist language and communicate in a way that is aware of and sensitive to Germany's diverse population. This is demonstrated in the exclusionary and discriminatory language of Federal Minister of the Interior, Building and Community, Horst Seehofer (CSU). Instead of highlighting the need for anti-racist action, Seehofer has repeatedly downplayed racism. In March 2018, he claimed that Islam does not belong in Germany (Sueddeutsche, 2018), despite more than approximately 5.5 million Muslims living in Germany (Statista, 2021). In September 2018, he called migration the source of all political problems;<sup>1</sup> and in 2020, he repeatedly rejected demands for a study examining racism in the German police (AfroNews, 2020). Unfortunately, he is only one example of many high-profile leaders in Germany perpetuating such narratives and language.

Anti-gender actors' impact on public discourses can be witnessed worldwide in politicians from all sides of the political spectrum who have adopted the language of 'gender ideology' or expressing their support of the anti-gender movement (Denkovski et al., 2021). German politicians are no exception here. In their 2016 programme, the CDU sister party CSU demands families to have freedom of 'gender ideology' (CSU Landesleitung, 2016). In May 2021, Hamburg's CDU head Christoph Ploß wanted to ban gender-responsive language in public bodies (Sueddeutsche, 2021); and the current government prefers to protect a leftover Nazi law (section 219a of the German Criminal Code) that views doctor's providing information about abortion as 'advertising' the latter (Sanyal, 2020, para.3).

## WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ACTION POINTS:

### Ensure discriminatory-sensitive, gender-responsive and accessible communication

- Ensure that every form of communication and publication, internal or external, is reviewed with a specific focus on anti-racist, inclusive, and gender-responsive language. Ensure that experts from civil society are part of this evaluation. Use tools such as the glossary and checklist *Sprache schafft Wirklichkeit. Glossar und Checkliste zum Leitfaden für einen rassismuskritischen Sprachgebrauch* (AntiDiskriminierungsBüro (ADB) Köln/ Öffentlichkeit gegen Gewalt e.V, 2013).
- Remove rules, traditions, and habits promoting standardised language to pave the way for inclusive language.
- Ensure that at least one employee per department is responsible for monitoring and supervising the process of discriminatory-sensitive and gender-responsive language. The goal here is not to control the departments but to ensure and support inclusivity as something in everybody's interest.
- Offer obligatory training in discriminatory-sensitive language for all employees at least once a year.
- Assign external experts with monitoring progress on inclusive and gender-responsive language once a year.

<sup>1</sup> The original statement was: "Aber die Migrationsfrage ist die Mutter aller politischen Probleme in diesem Land. Das sage ich seit drei Jahren" (Deutsche Welle, 2018, para. 2). Seehofer made the comment in the aftermath of protests in Chemnitz, showing understanding for racist protesters who attacked journalists, police, and alleged 'foreigners' (or non-white people). The protests emerged after a man was stabbed to death in Chemnitz, allegedly by two refugees.

- Choose diverse and accessible forms of communication, e.g., use different languages, including sign language and braille, transport information through video, voice, and written messages, and increasingly use social media to address people in ways they feel comfortable. Ensure to use sign language interpreters and braille for public events and publications.
- Translate all major external publications into Russian and Turkish as around three million Russian native speakers and two million native speakers of Turkish are currently living in Germany (Die Bundesregierung, 2020) as well as Romani, since Germany pledged to protect Romani culture, language, identity, tradition, and religion of German Sinti and Roma (Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma, 2019).
- Consult experts from civil society on the matter of gender-responsive language.
- Demilitarise the language used in Germany's foreign policy communication, foreign policy discourses, and multilateral fora. Instead of using language that supports militarisation and militaristic speech, strives for inclusive, gender-responsive language.
- Make discriminatory-sensitive and 'undecided' people your target audience instead of focusing on opponents such as anti-gender actors and extremists.

### **Pro-actively advocate for gender equality, anti-racism, and feminism**

- Systematically underscore the need to adopt inclusive and gender-responsive approaches to address foreign policy processes.
- Issue a statement emphasising the need to invest in women, adopt an intersectional perspective and underline Germany's commitment to UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda.
- Advocate for a Feminist Foreign Policy for the European Union in all your external activities. Ensure that senior policymakers within the European Commission and the EEAS, including the EU Commissioners and the High Representative/Vice President for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) as well as EU ambassadors in partner countries, regularly and publicly reiterate the commitment to a Feminist Foreign Policy and communicate this to their staff members in Brussels, delegations, missions, and partners at the bilateral, international, and multinational level.
- Foster the assessment of gender-disaggregated data to strengthen the case for intersectional justice and gender equality. Initiate campaigns promoting gender-disaggregated data and commit to integrating gender-disaggregated research in all research-based publications.
- Fund and support awareness-raising campaigns on inclusivity and anti-discrimination led by affected, intersectionally oppressed people. Initiate EU-wide campaigns that promote gender equality, anti-racism, and feminism.
- Raise public awareness of the need to further protect and advance the rights of BIPoC, women and LGBTQI\* on a local, national, and international level.
- Call out anti-gender actors, racists, and extremists at all times, even within the government.
- Partner with civil society in campaigns advocating gender equality, anti-racism, and feminism. Do not leave it to civil society to defend government policies when attacked but engage in common counter-strategies.



## 4.2 Feminist Approach to Participation and Leadership

Everyone has the right to influence the decisions that impact them. A Feminist Foreign Policy must be based on the equal and fair distribution of power in all institutions and across all levels to ensure equal representation of all people's needs, lived experiences, and perspectives. Equal representation results in better policies and means that the government will represent the diverse populations it serves. A Feminist Foreign Policy puts the responsibility on those in power to explain or change the overrepresentation of white cisgender men in power instead of asking the marginalised to justify their inclusion.

As the introduction of a Feminist Foreign Policy in Sweden has demonstrated, political leadership at the highest level across all policy levels is crucial to achieving institutional and policy change in line with feminist values. This includes strengthening institutional capacities and valuing people's expertise and lived experiences to promote a Feminist Foreign Policy.

### STATUS QUO IN GERMANY

While the German government increasingly recognises that their decision-making processes need to be more inclusive, progress is happening too slowly. To date, Germany has never had a woman as foreign minister. Fifty years after Germany announced a woman as ambassador for the first time, only around twenty-five percent of embassies are led by women. Still, only forty-three percent of heads of departments and their deputies within the Foreign Office are women (Auswärtiges Amt, 2021a). The initiative *Diplomats of Color* by diplomats in the German Foreign Office criticises that whilst around twenty-six percent of the German population has a so-called "migration" background, only twelve percent of those working as part of Germany's bureaucratic apparatus have a "migration" background (Gontek, 2021).

Due to committed individuals within the foreign ministry, gender and racial equality are increasingly recognised as imperative. However, this is not reflected in institutional capacities that drive feminist change and gender and racial equality are not mainstreamed throughout Germany's foreign and security policy. Currently, gender equality is mainly addressed within the department of human rights and gender.

**WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING  
ACTION POINTS:**

**Acknowledge and commit to changing  
structural power hierarchies**

- Adopt a negative quota of fifty-one percent to prevent over-representation of any gender/group of society for all levels within the German government, including German embassies and implementing agencies.
- Establish an external commission that investigates the (intersecting) barriers faced by marginalised actors with Germany's foreign policy institutions and provide concrete recommendations on how to deconstruct them.
- Conduct regular mandatory anti-racist training and awareness workshops in all state ministries.
- Provide long-term funding for the creation of safe spaces (e.g., groups, activities) in all state departments, including all Foreign Office premises for those who experience discrimination(s).
- Implement gender budgeting for all budgets of all ministries involved in Germany's foreign and security policy (and ideally for the whole budget for Germany).
- Include learning modules in the Foreign Office's public servant study programmes on Feminist Foreign Policy and inequality in political decision-making processes.
- Introduce expertise on gender equality and Feminist Foreign Policy and a proven track record of initiatives promoting gender and racial equality and a feminist approach to foreign policy as mandatory criteria in job offers and descriptions, performance reviews, and promotion requirements.

**Strengthen internal and institutional capacities  
to implement a Feminist Foreign Policy**

- Establish the position of Commissioner for Feminist Foreign Policy and Civil Society Engagement.
- Establish an Internal Taskforce for Feminist Foreign Policy comprised of representatives of German Federal Foreign Office, the German Ministry for Defence, the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community as well as the Chancellery, headed by the State Secretary for Feminist Foreign Policy (based on Bigio and Vogelstein's recommendation of a High Council on Gender Equality, 2020). The Internal Taskforce for Feminist Foreign Policy should continuously consult with the Global Partners Network on Feminist Foreign Policy, which CFFP and other international and national NGOs as well as governments are part of.
  - In cooperation with feminist civil society, develop a plan to operationalise its Feminist Foreign Policy (German Feminist Foreign Policy Action Plan outlining the principles, definition, priority areas with clear objectives and milestones). Ensure that staff members are consulted in the drafting process of the Action Plan and know how to implement it (see Thompson (2020) for more detail).
- Establish Feminist Foreign Policy Focal Points (below State Secretary level) in all ministries, embassies, and implementing agencies that report to the Commissioner for Feminist Foreign Policy and Civil Society Engagement.
- Conduct an institution-wide assessment of the knowledge on the interlinkages between gender and conflict and gender equality among staff members within the German Federal Foreign Office, the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Ministry for Defence. Based on the outcome of this assessment, develop a comprehensive institution-wide strategy on how to substantially increase knowledge on gender and conflict and gender equality "to ensure that all personnel have the technical expertise needed to implement gender equality policies" (Bigio and Vogelstein, 2020).



## **4.3 Feminist Approach to Cooperation with Feminist Civil Society**

Nation-states, including Germany, remain the ultimate duty-bearers in protecting and advancing human rights and equality. However, feminist civil society continues to be the key driver of social justice, particularly regarding the protection and advancement of the rights of marginalised groups. It is crucial for implementing a Feminist Foreign Policy to support feminists within (patriarchal) institutions and hold institutions accountable (Guerrina and Wright, 2016). For these reasons, it is important for the German government to develop further and strengthen clear mechanisms to ensure institutionalised engagement across all areas of foreign policy that enable regular dialogue and learning with feminist civil society both at home and abroad.

### **STATUS QUO IN GERMANY**

The German government acknowledges the importance of civil society for social cohesion and the rights and needs of marginalised actors (Auswärtiges Amt, 2019). However, the quantity and quality of exchange between the German government and feminist civil society vary enormously across the foreign policy sphere. It often depends on individuals within government institutions who enable meaningful engagement with feminist civil society organisations. Moreover, the German grant law (*Zuwendungsrecht*) complicates financial support for civil society. It often impedes long-term, easy-to-administer funding, particularly for smaller women's rights organisations and movements to work towards public and policy change.

### **WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ACTION POINTS:<sup>2</sup>**

#### **Strengthen cooperation with civil society**

- Under the leadership of the German Federal Foreign Office, establish an advisory group consisting of *femocrats* (individuals positioned within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for Defence, Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development who are motivated to move towards transformative change in line with feminist values), feminist German civil society organisations, and epistemic communities (professional experts with recognised expertise in a particular foreign policy area) to provide regular advice on all matters of foreign policy (Guerrina and Wright, 2016; based on Woodward, 2003).
- Institutionalise regular exchange and consultations with feminist civil society abroad through embassies and permanent representations on all aspects of foreign policy. Conceptualise these formats as open conversations that enable learning from and with each other. The 'Beyond Consultations' guide (Women for Women International, 2020) could help shape the consultations.

## Equal representation results in better policies and means that the government will represent the diverse populations it serves.

### Strengthen accountability towards civil society

- Proactively provide regular updates on the progress of implementing feminist policies in the various policy areas. This could include an annual public briefing at the ministerial level, jointly with civil society, on the progress achieved in the previous year and lessons learned (Woroniuk, 2021).
- Encourage and fund regular (at least every other year) evaluation of the implementation of the Feminist Foreign Policy by international civil society.

### Improve funding practices

- Implement and strengthen feminist funding practices (AWID and Mama Cash, 2020; Gunther and Srivastava, n.d.). This includes:
  - Ensure that funding is predominantly provided to those most impacted by gendered oppression (instead of predominantly to governments and international organisations) and those actors that address discrimination intersectionally (such as organisations that are both concerned with women's and LGBTQI\* rights).
  - Ensure that funding is easily accessible to activists and movements (instead of only fully established organisations).
  - Ensure that funding includes core and institutional funding, is long-term, and easy-to-administer.

- Ensure that funding is provided for activities aimed at driving social, political, legal, and cultural change, such as campaigns, research, and advocacy work that aims at shifting “dominant narratives about gender and sexuality, expanding public understanding of LGBTQI issues in their national contexts” (Gunther and Srivastava, n.d., p. 9).
- Ensure that funding is provided for cross-issue work (such as women and LGBTQI\* rights), cross-regional movement building and self-care.

### Protect and encourage civil society engagement

- Raise awareness about the gendered dimension of civil society's shrinking space in bilateral and multilateral fora (Wassholm, 2018).
- Promote dialogue with local civil society and provide safe spaces to meet (Wassholm, 2018), particularly for women and LGBTQI\* human rights defenders and peacebuilders through embassies and permanent representations. Develop mechanisms to work with movements whose registration status is threatened, revoked, or not permitted (Okech-PhD et al., 2017).
- Politically and financially support initiatives that provide security and protection for women and LGBTQI\* human rights defenders in online and virtual spaces.
- Allocate resources to support women and LGBTQI\* rights defenders facing criminalisation and judicial processes (Barcia, 2017).



# CONCLUSION

This manifesto is a first step on the journey towards a German Feminist Foreign Policy. It aims to support the incoming German government in a radical, feminist transformation of foreign policy structures and processes.

As both an introduction to Feminist Foreign Policy and a proposal of what a Feminist Foreign Policy for Germany would look like, this manifesto serves as a guiding document for those responsible for reshaping Germany's foreign policy at the most critical time - both domestically and globally.

This manifesto was drafted against the backdrop of devastating flooding across Germany in July 2021, a catastrophic earthquake in Haiti in August 2021, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the worsening climate emergency, and the increasingly volatile situation in Afghanistan threatening the lives and rights of Afghan women, especially women human rights defenders and activists.

## The time for a German Feminist Foreign Policy is now.

We urge the incoming government to take our recommendations and action points seriously and take the next step of organising consultations with (feminist) civil society organisations to begin to fundamentally and critically transform the way Germany 'does' foreign policy.

Achilleos-Sarll, C. (2021). #SecurityHasNoGender. *Frontex, border security, and the politics of gender-neutrality*. [online]. LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security. Available at: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2021/03/31/securityhasnogender-frontex-border-security-and-the-politics-of-gender-neutrality/>. [Accessed: 20 July 2021].

African Examiner (2021). *Ethnic Groups In Namibia Reject Reconciliation Agreement With Germany*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.africanexaminer.com/ethnic-groups-in-namibia-reject-reconciliation-agreement-with-germany/>. [Accessed: 1 June 2021].

AfroNews (2020). *German Interior minister Horst Seehofer rejects call for study into racism in German police force again*. [online]. Available at: <https://afronews.de/german-news/german-interior-minister-rejects-call-for-study-into-racism-in-german-police-force-again/>. Accessed: 14 June 2021].

Ahmed, A.K. (2020). *Decolonizing the vaccine*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.africasacountry.com/2020/06/decolonizing-the-vaccine>. [Accessed: 17 June 2021].

Amnesty International (n.d.). *Everything you need to know about human rights in Germany 2020*. *Amnesty International*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/germany/report-germany/>. [Accessed: 11 June 2021].

Amnesty International Deutschland (2021). *Menschenrechtspolitische Empfehlungen an die Parteien anlässlich der 20. Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag und für die nächste Bundesregierung*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.de/sites/default/files/2021-07/Amnesty-Forderungspapier-Bundestagswahl2021-Juli2021.pdf>. [Accessed: 21 July 2021].

Anarte, E. (2021). *Germany bans surgeries on intersex babies, but loopholes feared*. *Reuters*, 26 March 2021. [online]. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/germany-lgbt-health-idINL8N2LO4W2>. [Accessed: 16 July 2021].

AntiDiskriminierungsBüro (ADB) Köln/ Öffentlichkeit gegen Gewalt e.V. (2013). *Sprache schafft Wirklichkeit. Glossar und Checkliste zum Leitfaden für einen rassismuskritischen Sprachgebrauch*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.uni-hamburg.de/gleichstellung/download/antirassistische-sprache.pdf>. [Accessed: 16 July 2021].

Astraea (n.d.). *Feminist Funding Principles*. [online]. Available at: <https://astraeafoundation.org/microsites/feminist-funding-principles/>. [Accessed 23 August 2021].

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

Auswärtiges Amt (2019). *Zivilgesellschaft und Menschenrechte*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/themen/menschenrechte/03-zivilgesellschaft/zivilgesellschaft-menschenrechte/201452>. [Accessed: 21 April 2021].

Auswärtiges Amt (2020). *Rede von Außenminister Heiko Maas anlässlich des Weltfrauentags 2020 im Auswärtigen Amt*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/maas-weltfrauentag/2313600>. [Accessed: 11 June 2021].

Auswärtiges Amt (2021a). *Rede von Außenminister Heiko Maas anlässlich des FidAR-Forums XII 'Frauen in Führung. Eine gute Wahl. In Deutschland und international'*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/maas-fidar-forum/244088>. [Accessed: 22 June 2021].

Auswärtiges Amt (2021b). *Aktionsplan der Bundesregierung zur Agenda Frauen, Frieden und Sicherheit*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2443848/3596859eebe39f90fa327e81ede416a3/aktionsplan-zu-wps-iii-data.pdf>. [Accessed: 23 July 2021].

Auswärtiges Amt (2021c). *LGBTI Inclusion Strategy: Federal Government LGBTI Inclusion Strategy for Foreign Policy and Development Cooperation*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2445310/7a532b519e092ed6117535b78209162e/210226-inklusionskonzept-pdf-data.pdf>. [Accessed: 10 June 2021].

AWID (2020). *Moving More Money to the Drivers of Change*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.awid.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/movingmoremoney\\_finalfinalfinal.pdf](https://www.awid.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/movingmoremoney_finalfinalfinal.pdf). [Accessed: 4 August 2021].

AWID and Mama Cash (2020). *Moving More Money to the Drivers of Change: How Bilateral and Multilateral Funders Can Resource Feminist Movements*. [online]. Available from: [https://www.awid.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/movingmoremoney\\_finalfinalfinal.pdf](https://www.awid.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/movingmoremoney_finalfinalfinal.pdf). [Accessed: 21 April 2021].

BAMF (2017). *Entwicklung der jährlichen Asylantragszahlen seit 1953*. [online]. Available at: [http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/aktuelle-zahlen-zu asyl-maerz-2017.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile](http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/aktuelle-zahlen-zu asyl-maerz-2017.pdf?__blob=publicationFile). [Accessed: 16 June 2021].

Barcia, I. (2017). *Women Human Rights Defenders confronting extractive industries. An Overview of Critical Risks and Human Rights Obligations*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.awid.org/publications/women-human-rights-defenders-confronting-extractive-industries>. [Accessed: 12 May 2021].

BBC (2020). *Germany passes law banning 'gay conversion therapy' for minors*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52585162>. [Accessed: 12 July 2021].

BBC (2021). *German climate change law violates rights, court rules*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56927010>. [Accessed: 30 May 2021].

Bernarding, N., Lunz, K. and Wisotzki, S. (2020). [online]. *Why the international arms trade is a feminist issue – and what Germany can do about it*. Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy and Heinrich Böll Stiftung. Available at: [https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/2020-11/CFFP\\_hbs\\_policybrief\\_internationalarmstradefeministissue.pdf](https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/2020-11/CFFP_hbs_policybrief_internationalarmstradefeministissue.pdf). [Accessed: 10 June 2021].

Bernarding, N., Böhme, J., Heinlein, A. and Kappert, I. (2020). *The Women, Peace and Security Agenda. Implementation Matters. Policy Briefing on the Third National Action Plan of the German government*. [online]. Available at: <https://centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/briefings>. [Accessed: 16 June 2021].

Bernarding, N., Böhme, J., Heinlein, A. and Kappert, I. (2021). *Frauen, Frieden und Sicherheit. Zivilgesellschaftliche Stellungnahme zum 3. Nationalen Aktionsplan der Bundesregierung*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.medicamondiale.org/fileadmin/redaktion/5\\_Service/Mediathek/Dokumente/Deutsch/Positionspapiere\\_offene-Briefe/Stellungnahme\\_3\\_Nationaler\\_Aktionsplan\\_Frauen-Frieden-Sicherheit\\_Deutschland\\_04\\_2021.pdf](https://www.medicamondiale.org/fileadmin/redaktion/5_Service/Mediathek/Dokumente/Deutsch/Positionspapiere_offene-Briefe/Stellungnahme_3_Nationaler_Aktionsplan_Frauen-Frieden-Sicherheit_Deutschland_04_2021.pdf). [Accessed: 14 June 2021].

Bernarding, N. and Lunz, K. (2020a). *A Feminist Foreign Policy for the European Union*. Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, June 2020. [online]. Available at: <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57cd7cd9d482e9784e4ccc34/t/5ef48af0dbe71d7968ded22b/1593084682210/Feminist+Foreign+Policy+for+the+European+Union++Centre+for+Feminist+Foreign+Policy.pdf>. [Accessed: 15 June 2021].

Bernarding, N. and Lunz, K. (2020b). *Want to Implement the Women, Peace and Security Agenda? Engage With Civil Society! Peacelab Blog*. [online]. Available at: <https://peacelab.blog/2020/07/want-to-implement-the-women-peace-and-security-agenda-engage-with-civil-society>. [Accessed: 14 June 2021].

Besch, S. and Oppenheim, B. (2019). *Up in arms: Warring over Europe's arms export regime*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2019/arms-warring-over-europes-arms-export-regime>. [Accessed: 12 October 2020].

Bigio, J. and Vogelstein, R. (2020). *Understanding Gender Equality in Foreign Policy*. [online]. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/report/understanding-gender-equality-foreign-policy>. [Accessed: 22 June 2021].

Blum, R. (2020). *Retraditionalization, Coronavirus Conspiracies, and Anti-Feminism*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.gwi-boell.de/en/2020/09/04/retraditionalisierung-corona-verschwoerungen-und-antifeminismus>. [Accessed: 4 August 2021].

BMF (2021a). *Bundeshaushalt 2020. Einzelpläne*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bundeshaushalt.de/#/2020/soll/ausgaben/einzelplan.html>. [Accessed: 5 May 2021].

BMF (2021b). *Bundeshaushalt 2020. Einzelplan 05*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bundeshaushalt.de/#/2020/soll/ausgaben/einzelplan/05.html>. [Accessed: 5 May 2021].

BMF (2021c). *Bundeshaushalt 2020. Einzelplan 14*. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.bundeshaushalt.de/#/2020/soll/ausgaben/einzelplan/14.html>. [Accessed: 9 June 2021].

BMF (2021d). *Bundeshaushalt 2020. Einzelplan 16*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bundeshaushalt.de/#/2020/soll/ausgaben/einzelplan/16.html>. [Accessed: 5 May 2021].

BMJV (1980). *Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen (Transsexuellengesetz – TSG)*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tsg/BJNR016540980.html>. [Accessed: 16 July 2021].

BMJV (2008). *Act on Proceedings in Family Matters and in Matters of Non-contentious Jurisdiction*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch\\_famfg/englisch\\_famfg.pdf](https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_famfg/englisch_famfg.pdf). [Accessed: 11 June 2021].

BMWi (2021). *A restrictive, responsible policy on the export of military equipment*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Dossier/export-controls-for-military-equipment.html>. [Accessed: 5 May 2021].

BMWi (n.d.). *Trade Policy*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.bmwi.de/Navigation/EN/Topic/topic.html?cl2Categories\\_LeadKeyword=handelspolitik](https://www.bmwi.de/Navigation/EN/Topic/topic.html?cl2Categories_LeadKeyword=handelspolitik). [Accessed: 5 August 2021].

BMZ (2016). *Development Policy Action Plan on Gender Equality 2016-2020*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.bmz.de/resource/blob/23742/753ec81d6b57da695b1fc4550ac521d8/Strategiepapier363a\\_Development%20Policy%20Action%20Plan%20on%20Gender%20Equality%202016%E2%80%932020](https://www.bmz.de/resource/blob/23742/753ec81d6b57da695b1fc4550ac521d8/Strategiepapier363a_Development%20Policy%20Action%20Plan%20on%20Gender%20Equality%202016%E2%80%932020). [Accessed: 10 June 2021].

BMZ (2020). *Reformkonzept BMZ 2030*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bmz.de/de/entwicklungspolitik/reformkonzept-bmz-2030>. [Accessed: 7 May 2021].

BMZ (2021). *Facts and figures of German development cooperation*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bmz.de/en/ministry/facts-figures>. [Accessed: 5 July 2021].

Braun, S. (2019). *Looted colonial art: Is there the political will to return pilfered artifacts?* [online]. Available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/looted-colonial-art-is-there-the-political-will-to-return-pilfered-artifacts/a-46961670>. [Accessed: 1 June 2021].

Bremberg, N. (2019). *EU Foreign and Security Policy on Climate Related Security Risks: SIPRI Policy Brief*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/pb\\_1911\\_eu\\_policy\\_on\\_climate-related\\_security\\_risks\\_0.pdf](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/pb_1911_eu_policy_on_climate-related_security_risks_0.pdf). [Accessed: 30 May 2020].

Burns, B. and Dolan, M. (2021). *With a Feminist Foreign Policy, Biden Could Get Climate Change Right*. [online]. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/21/with-a-feminist-foreign-policy-biden-could-get-climate-change-right/>. [Accessed: 30 May 2021].

Busse, C. and Loss, R. (2020). *Why Germany lost its way on climate policy*. [online]. Available at: [https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_why\\_germany\\_lost\\_its\\_way\\_on\\_climate\\_policy/](https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_why_germany_lost_its_way_on_climate_policy/). [Accessed: 4 May 2021].

CFFP and WILPF (forthcoming). *How Militarised is Germany's Foreign Policy?* Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy & Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

Collini, F. (2021). *Staaten geben mehr für Militär aus – trotz Pandemie*. *Der Spiegel*, 26.04.21 [online]. Available at: <https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/sipri-bericht-2020-globale-militaerausgaben-stiegen-auch-waehrend-der-pandemie-a-c5e2d7ac-a488-41d1-b96c-fb72d5c2b719>. [Accessed: 9 June 2021].

CSU Landesleitung (2016). *Grundsatzprogramm*. [online] Available at: <http://csu-grundsatzprogramm.de/wp-content/uploads/CSU-Grundsatzprogramm-ES.pdf>. [Accessed: 26 November 2020].

David, D. (2021). *Covid: Germany rejects US-backed proposal to waive vaccine patents*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57013096>. [Accessed: 1 June 2021].

Davies, S.E. and True, J. (2019). WPS: A Transformative Agenda? In: Sarah E. Davies and Jacqui True (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security*. Oxford University Press: New York, pp. 3-14.

Davis, L. (2018). *Kissing the frog: Gender Equality in EU Conflict prevention and other fairy tales*. EU-CIVCAP. [online]. Available at: [https://eucivcap.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/eu-civcap\\_deliverable\\_3-4\\_web.pdf](https://eucivcap.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/eu-civcap_deliverable_3-4_web.pdf). [Accessed: 5 May 2021].

Deckwirth, C. (2017). *Lobbykontakte: Bundesregierung bevorzugt die Autoindustrie*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.lobbycontrol.de/2017/09/lobbykontakte-bundesregierung-bevorzugt-die-autoindustrie/>. [Accessed: 5 May 2021].

Denkovski, D., Bernarding, N. and Lunz, K. (2021). *Power over rights: Understanding and countering the transnational anti-gender movement*. [online]. Available at: <https://centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/power-over-rights-understanding-and-countering-the-antigender-campaigns>. [Accessed: 12 July 2021].

Department of Foreign Affairs Ireland (2016). *Joint Statement Human Rights Council 32nd Session Concluding statement*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/international-priorities/human-rights/ireland-and-the-human-rights-council/irelands-statements-hrc-32nd-session/preventingrespondingtoandaddressinghumanrightsviolations-jointconcludingstatement/>. [Accessed: 21 July 2021].

Dervin, F. (2015). *Discourses of Othering*. In: K. Tracy, C. Ilie, T. Sandel (Eds.), *The International Encyclopaedia of Language and Social Interaction* (Volume 1). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte (n.d.). *Deutschland im Menschenrechtsschutzsystem*. *Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/menschenrechtsschutz/deutschland-im-menschenrechtsschutzsystem>. [Accessed: 11 June 2021].

Deutsche Welle (2018). *Seehofer nennt Migration "Mutter aller Probleme"*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.dw.com/de/seehofer-nennt-migration-mutter-aller-probleme/a-45377457>. [Accessed: 15 July 2021].

Die Bundesregierung (2020). *Sprache als Spiegel der Kultur*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/suche/interview-muttersprache-1721084>. [Accessed: 20 July 2021].

Die Welt (2014). *Deutsche Kolonien und ihre Entwicklung*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.welt.de/geschichte/article160308458/Deutsche-Kolonien-und-ihre-Entwicklung.html>. [Accessed: 1 June 2021].

Donor Tracker (2021). *At Generation Equality Forum, Netherlands pledges US\$620 million to feminist organizations and movements*. [online]. Available at: <https://donortracker.org/policy-updates/generation-equality-forum-netherlands-pledges-us620-million-feminist-organizations>. [Accessed: 14 August 2021].

Douglas, E. (2021). Germany's Transgender Law seen as 'archaic, degrading'. [online]. *Deutsche Welle*. Available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/trans-germany/a-56031861>. [Accessed: 20 July 2021].

ECCHR (2021). *German parliament passes human rights due diligence law*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.ecchr.eu/en/press-release/bundestag-verabschiedet-lieferkettengesetz/>. [Accessed: 22 June 2021].

Enloe, C (2017). *The big push: Exposing and challenging the persistence of patriarchy*. University of California Press.

Equality Fund (2021a). *Funding Feminist Futures*. [online]. Available at: <https://equalityfund.ca/>. [Accessed: 7 May 2021].

Equality Fund (2021b). *What we do*. [online]. Available at: <https://equalityfund.ca/what-we-do/>. [Accessed: 9 June 2021].

European Commission (2020). *2030 Climate Target Plan*. [online]. Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eu-climate-action/2030\\_ctp\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eu-climate-action/2030_ctp_en). [Accessed: 18 June 2021].

European Commission (2021). *Recovery Plan for Europe*. [online]. Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/recovery-plan-europe\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/recovery-plan-europe_en). [Accessed: 12 July 2021].

European Parliament (2021). *MEPs: Companies must no longer cause harm to people and planet with impunity*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20210304IPR99216/meps-companies-must-no-longer-cause-harm-to-people-and-planet-with-impunity?xtor=AD-78-\[Social\\_share\\_buttons\]-\[linkedin\]-\[en\]-\[news\]-\[pressroom\]-\[corporate-due-diligence-and-corporate-accountability](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20210304IPR99216/meps-companies-must-no-longer-cause-harm-to-people-and-planet-with-impunity?xtor=AD-78-[Social_share_buttons]-[linkedin]-[en]-[news]-[pressroom]-[corporate-due-diligence-and-corporate-accountability). [Accessed: 9 June 2021].

Feminist Foreign Policy Working Group (2021). *Be Brave Be Bold: Recommendations for Canada's Feminist Foreign Policy*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/FFP%20Be%20Brave%20Be%20Bold%20EN.pdf>. [Accessed: 4 August 2021].

Forensic Oceanography (2018). *Mare Clausum: Italy and the EU's undeclared operation to stem migration across the Mediterranean*. [online]. Available at: <https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2018-05-07-FO-Mare-Clausum-full-EN.pdf>. [Accessed: 11 June 2021].

Fridays For Future Germany (2019). *Unsere Forderungen an die Politik*. [online]. Available at: <https://fridaysforfuture.de/forderungen/>. [Accessed: 8 August 2021].

GAFSP (2021). *What we do*. Global Agriculture and Food Security Program. [online]. Available at: <https://www.gafspfund.org/>. [Accessed: 10 June 2021].

German Federal Ministry of Health (2020). *Global Health Strategy of the German Federal Government*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/fileadmin/Dateien/5\\_Publikationen/Gesundheit/Broschueren/Global\\_Health\\_Strategy.pdf](https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/fileadmin/Dateien/5_Publikationen/Gesundheit/Broschueren/Global_Health_Strategy.pdf). [Accessed: 20 July 2021].

Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) (2016). *Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/2016%20and%20before/GCTF-Ankara-Memorandum-ENG.pdf?ver=2016-09-01-114735-333>. [Accessed: 23 August 2021].

- Global Health 50/50 (2021). Gender Equality: Flying Blind in a Time of Crisis. [online]. Available at: <https://globalhealth5050.org/wp-content/uploads/Global-Health-5050-2021-Report.pdf?v2>. [Accessed 23 August 2021].
- Global Study (2015). *Preventing Conflict. Transforming Justice. Securing Peace. A Global Study on the Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/UNW-GLOBAL-STUDY-1325-2015%20\(1\).pdf](https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/UNW-GLOBAL-STUDY-1325-2015%20(1).pdf). [Accessed: 14 June 2021].
- Gontek, F. (2021). Auswärtiges Amt: Wie Tiaji Sio mit der Initiative Diplomats of Color das AA diverser machen will. [online]. *Spiegel Online*. Available at: <https://www.spiegel.de/start/auswaertiges-amt-wie-tiaji-sio-mit-der-initiative-diplomats-of-color-das-aa-diverser-machen-will-a-4f533c31-ed7-4856-a4fe-aa4c46983ab2>. [Accessed: 22 June 2021].
- Government of Canada (2021). *Trade and gender in free trade agreements: The Canadian approach*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/gender\\_equality-egalite\\_genres/trade\\_gender\\_fta-ale-commerce\\_genre.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/gender_equality-egalite_genres/trade_gender_fta-ale-commerce_genre.aspx?lang=eng). [Accessed: 9 June 2021].
- Government Office of Sweden (2019). *Feminist Trade Policy*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.government.se/information-material/2019/09/feminist-trade-policy/>. [Accessed: 9 June 2021].
- Green Climate Fund (2019). *Contribution Agreement*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/contribution-agreement-germany-gcf-1.pdf>. [Accessed: 30 May 2021].
- Guerrina, R. and Wright, K.A.M. (2016). Gendering normative power Europe: lessons of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. *International Affairs* 92(2), pp.293-312.
- Gunther S. and Srivastava, M. (n.d.). *Feminist Funding Principles. Astraea Lesbian Foundation for Justice*. [online]. Available at: <https://s3.amazonaws.com/astraea-production/app/asset/uploads/2019/05/Feminist-Funding-Principles-Rev19-v10-pages.pdf> [Accessed: 21 April 2021].
- Guttmacher-Lancet Commission (2018). *Accelerate progress—sexual and reproductive health and rights for all: report of the Guttmacher-Lancet Commission*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.thelancet.com/commissions/sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-rights>. [Accessed: 11 June 2021].
- Halton, M. (2018). Climate change ‘impacts women more than men’. BBC, 8 March 2018. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-43294221>. [Accessed: 19 August 2021].
- Hannah, E., Roberts, A. and Trommer, S. (2020). Towards a Feminist Global Trade Politics. *Globalizations* 18(1), pp. 70-85.
- Harvey, F., Rankin, J. and Boffey, D. (2019). European Green Deal will change economy to solve climate crisis, says EU. *The Guardian*. [online]. 11 December. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/dec/11/european-green-deal-will-change-economy-to-solve-climate-crisis-says-eu>. [Accessed: 30 May, 2020].



Hasselbach, C. (2018). *Nazi-looted art: Germany failing 'moral obligation' to return stolen objects*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/nazi-looted-art-germany-failing-moral-obligation-to-return-stolen-objects/a-46444811>. [Accessed: 1 June 2021].

Heglar, M.A. (2020). *The fight for climate justice requires a new narrative*. Inverse. [online]. Available at: <https://www.inverse.com/culture/58632-mary-annaise-heglar>. [Accessed: 16 June 2021].

Hein, F. (2021). *Deutschland droht hinter Klimaziel zurückzufallen*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.agora-energiewende.de/blog/deutschland-droht-hinter-klimaziel-zurueckzufallen>. [Accessed: 30 May 2021].

Holt, B. (2019). *Women have always been at the forefront of climate justice*. Quartz, 8 October. [online]. Available at: <https://qz.com/1720372/women-are-not-the-new-face-of-climate-justice-theyre-the-original-face/>. [Accessed: 19 August 2021].

Hudson, H. (2005). 'Doing' Security As Though Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and the Politics of Human Security. *Security Dialogue* 36(2), pp. 155-74.

Hudson, V.M., Ballif-Spanvill, B., Caprioli, M. and Emmett, C.F. (2014). *Sex and World Peace*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hudson, V.M., Bowen, D.L. and Nielsen, P.L. (2020). *The First Political Order: How Sex Shapes Governance and National Security Worldwide*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Human Rights Watch (n.d.). *World Report 2021 Germany*. Human Rights Watch. [online]. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/germany#12ffb1>. [Accessed: 11 June 2021].

ICRW (2020). *A Feminist Foreign Policy for the United States: A Memo to the Next Administration* [online]. International Center for Research on Women. Available at: <https://www.icrw.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/FFP-PolicyTrnstrn-Dec2020-ICRW.pdf>. [Accessed: 16 June 2021].

InfoMigrants (2019). *How are Women Protected in German Refugee Centres?* [online]. Available at: <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/19299/how-are-women-protected-in-german-refugee-shelters>. [Accessed: 15 June 2021].

InfoMigrants (2021). *German Study Finds Gender Gap in Refugee Employment Chances*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/31573/german-study-finds-gender-gap-in-refugee-employment-chances>. [Accessed: 15 June 2021].

Ionesco, D. (2019). *Let's talk about climate migrants, not climate refugees - Think piece*. [online]. Available at: <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/blogs/let%E2%80%99s-talk-about-climate-migrants-not-climate-refugees-think-piece>. [Accessed: 30 May 2021].

Jähnert, C. and Plaß, C. (2021). *Neues Klimagesetz - Zahlen, Ziele, Zoff*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/klimaschutz-gesetz-101.html>. [Accessed: 18 June 2021].

Khalid, M. (2014). Feminist Perspectives on Militarism and War. In: Baksh, R. and Harcourt, W. (Eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Transnational Feminist Movements: Knowledge, Power and Social Change*. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 633.

- Kreitlow (2021). *A Feminist Global Health Policy*. Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy. [online]. Available at: <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57cd7cd9d482e9784e4ccc34/t/607d349c4d979c4ac3c1678c/1618818205289/A+Feminist+Global+Health+Policy-5.pdf>. [Accessed: 10 June 2021].
- Kress, L. (2017). *Gender Sensitive Trade? A Feminist Perspective on the EU-Mercosur Trade Negotiations*. [online]. Available at: <https://eu.boell.org/en/2017/02/22/gender-sensitive-trade-feminist-perspective-eu-mercotur-free-trade-negotiations#12>. [Accessed: 15 July 2021].
- Lange, T. (2021). *Das Lobbyregister kommt – Unsere Auswertung*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.lobbycontrol.de/2021/03/das-lobbyregister-kommt/>. [Accessed: 5 May 2021].
- Lembke, U. (2021). *Aktuelle Regelung des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs: Strafgesetzbuch (StGB)*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/de/lf/lb/lbk/veranstaltungen/aktuelle-regelungen-schwangerschaftsabbruch-2021.pdf>. [Accessed: 16 August 2021].
- Lipowsky, K. (2017). *Die Kunst des Entschuldigens*. [online]. Available at: <https://taz.de/Streit-um-Kolonialverbrechen-in-Kamerun/!546831/> [Accessed: 1 June 2021].
- Lutz, C. (2004). Militarization. In: Nugent, D. and Vincent, J. A (Eds.), *Companion to the Anthropology of Politics*. New York: Blackwell, pp. 320–321.
- Matic, P.F. (2021). *Report on the situation of sexual and reproductive health and rights in the EU, in the frame of women's health (2020/2215(INI))*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2021-0169\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2021-0169_EN.pdf). [Accessed: 15 July 2021].
- Markwald, M. (2020). *Die Rechtsstellung von Trans\*personen in Deutschland*. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/gender/geschlechtliche-vielfalt-trans/308625/die-rechtsstellung-von-transpersonen-in-deutschland#footnode50-50>. [Accessed: 17 June 2021].
- Mauß, H. W. (2019). Deutschland und Japan: Noch immer Zivilmächte? In: Brummer, K. and Kießling, F. (Eds.) *Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik. Bundesdeutsche außenpolitische Rollen vor und nach 1989 aus politik- und geschichtswissenschaftliche Perspektiven*. Nomos: Baden-Baden.
- McArthur, S. (2017). *Five steps to move Canada's development policy forward*. [online]. Available at: <https://opencanada.org/five-steps-move-canadas-feminist-development-policy-forward/>. [Accessed: 15 June 2021].
- McDonald, L. and Keenan, K. (2021). Globalization, Trade and Investment. In: Feminist Foreign Policy Working Group (eds.) *Be Brave, Be Bold*. [online]. Available at: [https://d3n8a8pro7vnmx.cloudfront.net/minesactioncanada/pages/298/attachments/original/1611865677/FFP\\_Be\\_Brave\\_Be\\_Bold\\_EN.pdf?1611865677](https://d3n8a8pro7vnmx.cloudfront.net/minesactioncanada/pages/298/attachments/original/1611865677/FFP_Be_Brave_Be_Bold_EN.pdf?1611865677). [Accessed: 9 June 2021].
- Minority Rights Group International (2008). *The Impact of Climate Change on Minorities and Indigenous Peoples*. [online]. Available at: <https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-524-The-Impact-of-Climate-Change-on-Minorities-and-Indigenous-Peoples.pdf>. [Accessed: 11 June 2021].
- Moulson, G. and Smith, S. (2021). *Germany recognizes colonial killings in Namibia as genocide*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/germany->

recognizes-colonial-killings-in-namibia-as-genocide/2021/05/28/6718c182-bf7b-11eb-922a-c40c9774bc48\_story.html. [Accessed: 1 June 2021].

Mullard, A. (2020). How COVID vaccines are being divvied up around the world. [online]. *Nature*. Available at: <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03370-6>. [Accessed: 20 July 2021].

Nakate, V. (2020). *What Foreign Policy Needs to do to Address Climate Change in the Developing World*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/what-foreign-policy-needs-do-address-climate-change-developing-world>. [Accessed: 4 May 2021].

OECD (2019). *DAC Recommendation on Ending Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment in Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance: Key Pillars of Prevention and Response* (12 July 2019). OECD/LEGAL/5020. Available at: <https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-5020>. [Accessed: 23 August 2021].

OECD (2021). *Aid in support of gender equality and women's empowerment - Donor Charts*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/development/gender-development/aid-in-support-of-gender-equality-2021.pdf>. [Accessed: 7 May 2021].

OECD GenderNet (2021). *Development finance for gender equality and women's empowerment: A 2021 snapshot*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/development/gender-development/Development-finance-for-gender-equality-2021.pdf>. [Accessed: 15 June 2021].

OECD (n.d.). *Official Development Assistance*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm>. [Accessed: 21 July 2021].

Okech-PhD, A. et al. (2017). *Feminist Resistance & Resilience. Reflections on Closing Civic Space*. [online]. Available at: [https://urgentactionfund.org/wp-content/uploads/dlm\\_uploads/2018/08/Feminist-Resistance-and-Resilience-FINAL-V3-2-1.pdf](https://urgentactionfund.org/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2018/08/Feminist-Resistance-and-Resilience-FINAL-V3-2-1.pdf). [Accessed: 12 May 2021].

Olla, A. (2021). *Welcome to the new colonialism: rich countries sitting on surplus vaccines*. *The Guardian*. [online]. 14 April. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/apr/14/rich-countries-surplus-covid-vaccines> [Accessed: 8 June 2021].

OSCE (2018). *The Role of Civil Society in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Guidebook for South-Eastern Europe*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/2/400241\\_1.pdf](https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/2/400241_1.pdf). [Accessed: 23 August 2021].

Olterman, P. and Harvey, F. (2021). *Germany to bring forward climate goals after constitutional court ruling*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/06/germany-to-bring-forward-climate-goals-net-zero-after-constitutional-court-ruling>. [Accessed: 17 May 2021].

Peace Direct (2021). *Time to Decolonise Aid*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.peacedirect.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/PD-Decolonising-Aid\\_Second-Edition.pdf](https://www.peacedirect.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/PD-Decolonising-Aid_Second-Edition.pdf). [Accessed: 9 June 2021].

- PeaceLab (2020). *Germany Should Acknowledge and Counter Violence Against Refugee Women at the EU's Borders*. [online]. Available at: <https://peacelab.blog/2020/07/germany-should-acknowledge-and-counter-violence-against-refugee-women-at-the-eu-borders>. [Accessed: 15 June 2021].
- Pelz, D. (2021). *How seriously is Germany taking its colonial history?* [online]. Available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/how-seriously-is-germany-taking-its-colonial-history/a-57340809>. [Accessed: 1 June 2021].
- Pink.Tax, (n.d.). *FAQ*. [online]. Available at: <http://pink.tax/pink-tax-faq>. [Accessed: 5 August 2021].
- Rbb24 (2021). *Verein Berlin Postkolonial kritisiert Abkommen mit Namibia* [online]. Available at: <https://www.rbb24.de/politik/beitrag/2021/05/verein-berlin-postkolonial-kritik-abkommen-namibia-voelkermord.html>. [Accessed: 23 July 2021].
- Reibe, P. (2021). *Regierung überarbeitet Klimagesetz: Expertin: Das reicht wieder nicht!* [online]. Available at: <https://www.mopo.de/news/politik-wirtschaft/regierung-ueberarbeitet-klimagesetz-expertin--das-reicht-wieder-nicht--38381708/>. [Accessed: 18 June 2021].
- Respond Migration (2018). *Gender in the German refugee debate: Reflections on shortcomings, side-effects, and pitfalls*. [online]. Available at: <https://respondmigration.com/blog-1/sanliurfa-gzynn-rh3gn-rzyss>. [Accessed: 17 June 2021].
- Respond Migration (2019). *Border Management and Migration Controls in Germany Report*. [online]. Available at: <https://respondmigration.com/wp-blog/2019/2/15/comparative-dataset-on-migration-border-management-and-migration-controls-germany>. [Accessed: 10 June 2021].
- Said, E.W. (2003[1978]). *Orientalism*. London: Penguin Books.
- Sanyal, M. (2020). *Germany's abortion law: made by the Nazis, upheld by today's right*. *The Guardian*. [online]. 8 January. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/08/abortion-law-germany-nazis-women>. [Accessed: 14 June 2021].
- Schneemann, M. (2021). *Das Lieferkettengesetz ist da*. [online]. Greenpeace. Available at: <https://www.greenpeace.de/themen/umwelt-gesellschaft/wirtschaft/das-lieferkettengesetz-ist-da>. [Accessed: 16 June 2021].
- Schwikowski, M. (2019). *Chagos islands: The fight over Africa's last British colony*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/chagos-islands-the-fight-over-africas-last-british-colony/a-51372316>. [Accessed: 9 June 2021].
- SIPRI (2020). *SIPRI Yearbook 2021. Armament, Disarmament and International Security: Summary*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/yb20\\_summary\\_en\\_v2.pdf](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/yb20_summary_en_v2.pdf). [Accessed: 5 May 2021].
- SIPRI (2021). *Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2020*. [online]. Available at: [https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/fs\\_2104\\_milex\\_0.pdf](https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/fs_2104_milex_0.pdf). [Accessed: 28 April 2021].
- Statista (2021). *Entwicklung der Anzahl der Muslime in Deutschland von 1945 bis 2020*. [online]. Statista Research Department. Available at: <https://de.statista.com/statistik/>

daten/studie/72321/umfrage/entwicklung-der-anzahl-der-muslime-in-deutschland-seit-1945/. [Accessed: 14 June 2021].

Stern, M. (2011). Gender and race in the European security strategy: Europe as a 'force for good'? *Journal of International Relations and Development* 14(1), pp. 28-59.

SOGICA (2021). *30 recommendations to improve the lives of people who apply for asylum in Germany based on their sexual orientation or gender identity (SOGI)*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.sogica.org/de/empfehlungen/>. [Accessed: 20 June 2021].

Süddeutsche Zeitung (2018). Seehofer: Der Islam gehört nicht zu Deutschland. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 15 March 2018. [online]. Available at: <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/integration-seehofer-der-islam-gehört-nicht-zu-deutschland-1.3908644>. [Accessed: 14 June 2021].

Süddeutsche Zeitung (2021). CDU-Idee zur Gendersprache. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 26 May 2021. [online]. Available at: <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/hamburg-cdu-idee-zur-gendersprache-1.5304427>. [Accessed: 20 July 2021].

SwissPeace et al. (2016). *Women, Peace, and Security - Reloaded*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Media/Publications/Report\\_Women\\_Peace\\_Security\\_reloaded\\_EN\\_online.pdf](https://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Publications/Report_Women_Peace_Security_reloaded_EN_online.pdf). [Accessed: 23 August 2021].

Tax Justice Network. Africa (2021). About Us. [online]. Available at: <https://taxjusticeafrica.net/about-us/>. [Accessed 23 August 2021].

The Federal Government (2016). *White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*. [online]. Available at: <https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/111704/2027268/2016%20White%20Paper.pdf>. [Accessed: 5 May 2021].

The Federal Government (2021). *Supply Chain Act (Lieferkettengesetz)*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/federal-government/supply-chain-act-1872076> [Accessed: 14 July 2021].

The Gender Policy Report (2018). *Learning from German Gender and Immigration Policy Missteps*. [online]. Available at: <https://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/learning-from-german-gender-and-immigration-policy-missteps/>. [Accessed: 15 July 2021].

Thompson, L. (2020). Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework [online]. *International Center for Research on Women*. Available at: <https://www.icrw.org/publications/feminist-foreign-policy-a-framework/>. [Accessed: 22 June 2021].

Tickner, J.A. (1992). *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 8-13.

Trade Justice Movement (n.d.). *Patriarchy and Profit: A feminist analysis of the global trade system*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.tjm.org.uk/resources/reports/patriarchy-and-profit-a-feminist-analysis-of-the-global-trade-system>. [Accessed: 15 June 2021].

Transnational Institute and Stop Wapenhandel (2018). *Expanding the Fortress: The Policies, The Profiteers, and the People Shaped by the EU's Externalisation Programme*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.tni.org/en/publication/expanding-the-fortress>. [Accessed: 10 July 2021].

Transparency International (2020). *Defence Industry Influence in Germany. Analysing Defence Industry Influence on the German Policy Agenda*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Publikationen/TIDS-DefenceIndustryInfluenceGermany-DIGITAL.pdf>. [Accessed: 5 May 2021].

Umweltbundesamt (2021). *Treibhausgasemissionen sinken 2020 um 8,7 Prozent*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/treibhausgasemissionen-sinken-2020-um-87-prozent> [Accessed: 10 June 2021].

United Nations Security Council (2000). Resolution 1325 (31 October 2000). S/RES/1325. [Accessed: 23 August 2021].

United Nations Security Council (2005). Resolution 1624 (14 September 2005). S/RES/1624. [Accessed: 23 August 2021].

United Nations Security Council (2014). Resolution 2178 (24 September 2005). S/RES/2178. [Accessed: 23 August 2021]

United Nations (2014). *Arms Trade Treaty*. [online]. Available at: [https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT\\_English/ATT\\_English.pdf?templateId=137253](https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.pdf?templateId=137253). [Accessed: 12 July 2021].

United Nations (2021). *What is Human Security?* [online]. Available at: <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/What-is-Human-Security.pdf>. [Accessed: 2 August 2021].

United Nations General Assembly (2011). 65/229. United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules) (21 December 2010). A/RES/65/229. [Accessed: 23 August 2021].

United Nations General Assembly (2015). Resolution 70/175. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) (17 December 2015). A/Res/70/175. [Accessed: 23 August 2021].

UNCTAD (2017). *Trade and Gender Tool Box*. [online]. Available at: [https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditc2017d1\\_en.pdf](https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditc2017d1_en.pdf). [Accessed: 12 July 2021].

UNODC (2016). *Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal\\_justice/Handbook\\_on\\_VEPs.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf). [Accessed 23 August 2021].

VENRO (2020). *VENRO Report: OECD DAC Peer Review Germany 2021*. [online]. Available at: [https://venro.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Dateien/Daten/Publikationen/Sonstige/VENRO\\_Report\\_DAC\\_Peer\\_Review\\_2020.pdf](https://venro.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Dateien/Daten/Publikationen/Sonstige/VENRO_Report_DAC_Peer_Review_2020.pdf). [Accessed: 22 June 2021].

Verband Entwicklungspolitik und Humanitäre Hilfe (2021). *Was jetzt #weltweitwichtig ist: Erwartungen an die Parteien zur Bundestagswahl 2021*. [online]. Venro. Available at: [https://venro.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Dateien/Daten/Publikationen/Positionspapiere/2021\\_VENRO\\_Positionspapier\\_Bundestagswahl\\_web.pdf](https://venro.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Dateien/Daten/Publikationen/Positionspapiere/2021_VENRO_Positionspapier_Bundestagswahl_web.pdf). [Accessed: 18 June 2021].

Villa, P.I. (2018). "Anti-genderismus": "German Angst?". In: Kuhar, R. & Paternotte, D. (Eds.) *Anti-gender campaigns in Europe*. S.I. Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 99-116.

Voskoboynik, D.M. (2018). To fix the climate crisis, we must face up to our imperial past. [online]. *Open Democracy*, 8 October. Available at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/to-fix-climate-crisis-we-must-acknowledge-our-imperial-past/>. [Accessed: 16 June 2021].

Wasshol, C. (2018). *Suffocating the movement - shrinking space for women's rights*. [online]. Available at: <https://kvinnaatillkvinna.se/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/kvinna-till-kvinna-suffocating-the-movement-report-eng-2018.pdf>. [Accessed: 12 May 2021].

Wisotzki, S. (2020). *Deutsche Rüstungsexporte in alle Welt? Eine Bilanz der vergangenen 30 Jahre*. [online]. Available at: [https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/publications/2020-07-19\\_studie\\_deutsche\\_ruestungsexporte.pdf](https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/publications/2020-07-19_studie_deutsche_ruestungsexporte.pdf). [Accessed: 5 May 2021].

Women for Women International (2020). *Beyond consultations: A tool for meaningfully engaging with women in fragile and conflict-affected states*. [online]. Available at: [https://beyondconsultations.org/images/Beyond\\_Consultations\\_Tool.pdf](https://beyondconsultations.org/images/Beyond_Consultations_Tool.pdf). [Accessed: 20 July 2021].

Women in Global Health Germany (2020). *Positionspapier: Frauen in den Gesundheitsberufen*. [online]. Available at: [https://globalhealth.charite.de/fileadmin/user\\_upload/microsites/ohne\\_AZ/sonstige/globalhealth/Dokumente/WGHG\\_Position\\_Papers/WGH-GER\\_Positionspapier\\_Frauen\\_in\\_Gesundheitsberufen.pdf](https://globalhealth.charite.de/fileadmin/user_upload/microsites/ohne_AZ/sonstige/globalhealth/Dokumente/WGHG_Position_Papers/WGH-GER_Positionspapier_Frauen_in_Gesundheitsberufen.pdf). [Accessed: 15 July 2021].

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (2021). *Leverage Feminist Perspectives on Peace*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.wilpf.org/work-areas/feminist-perspectives-on-peace/>. [Accessed: 21 July 2021]

Woodward, A. (2003). Building velvet triangles: Gender and informal governance. In: T. Christiansen and S. Piattoni (Eds.) *Informal Governance in the European Union*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

World Population Review (2021). *CO2 Emissions by Country*. [online]. Available at: <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/co2-emissions-by-country>. [Accessed: 18 June 2021].

Woroniuk, B. (2021). Canada's Feminist Foreign Policy: The Central Role of Feminist Activists and Movements. In: *Be Brave Be Bold. Recommendations for Canada's feminist foreign policy*. [online]. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/FFP%20Be%20Brave%20Be%20Bold%20EN.pdf>. [Accessed: 21 April 2021].

Zacharenko, E. (2021). *Anti-Gender mobilisations in Europe*. [online]. Available at: [https://heidihautala.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Anti-gender-Mobilisations-in-Europe\\_Nov25.pdf](https://heidihautala.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Anti-gender-Mobilisations-in-Europe_Nov25.pdf). [Accessed: 15 July 2021].

Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma (2019). *Minderheitenrechte*. [online]. Available at: <https://zentralrat.sintiundroma.de/arbeitsbereiche/minderheitenrechte/>. [Accessed: 18 June 2021].

